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ABSTRACT
Yi Xu: Toward Robust Video Event Detection and Retrieval Under Adversarial Constraints
(Under the direction of Jan-Michael Frahm and Fabian Monronse)
The continuous stream of videos that are uploaded and shared on the Internet has been leveraged
by computer vision researchers for a myriad of detection and retrieval tasks, including gesture
detection, copy detection, face authentication, etc. However, the existing state-of-the-art event
detection and retrieval techniques fail to deal with several real-world challenges (e.g., low resolution,
low brightness and noise) under adversary constraints. This dissertation focuses on these challenges
in realistic scenarios and demonstrates practical methods to address the problem of robustness and
efficiency within video event detection and retrieval systems in five application settings (namely,
CAPTCHA decoding, face liveness detection, reconstructing typed input on mobile devices, video
confirmation attack, and content-based copy detection).
Specifically, for CAPTCHA decoding, I propose an automated approach which can decode
moving-image object recognition (MIOR) CAPTCHAs faster than humans. I showed that not
only are there inherent weaknesses in current MIOR CAPTCHA designs, but that several obvious
countermeasures (e.g., extending the length of the codeword) are not viable. More importantly, my
work highlights the fact that the choice of underlying hard problem selected by the designers of a
leading commercial solution falls into a solvable subclass of computer vision problems.
For face liveness detection, I introduce a novel approach to bypass modern face authentication
systems. More specifically, by leveraging a handful of pictures of the target user taken from social
media, I show how to create realistic, textured, 3D facial models that undermine the security of
widely used face authentication solutions. My framework makes use of virtual reality (VR) systems,
incorporating along the way the ability to perform animations (e.g., raising an eyebrow or smiling)
of the facial model, in order to trick liveness detectors into believing that the 3D model is a real
iii
human face. I demonstrate that such VR-based spoofing attacks constitute a fundamentally new
class of attacks that point to a serious weaknesses in camera-based authentication systems.
For reconstructing typed input on mobile devices, I proposed a method that successfully
transcribes the text typed on a keyboard by exploiting video of the user typing, even from significant
distances and from repeated reflections. This feat allows us to reconstruct typed input from the
image of a mobile phone’s screen on a user’s eyeball as reflected through a nearby mirror, extending
the privacy threat to include situations where the adversary is located around a corner from the user.
To assess the viability of a video confirmation attack, I explored a technique that exploits the
emanations of changes in light to reveal the programs being watched. I leverage the key insight that
the observable emanations of a display (e.g., a TV or monitor) during presentation of the viewing
content induces a distinctive flicker pattern that can be exploited by an adversary. My proposed
approach works successfully in a number of practical scenarios, including (but not limited to)
observations of light effusions through the windows, on the back wall, or off the victim’s face. My
empirical results show that I can successfully confirm hypotheses while capturing short recordings
(typically less than 4 minutes long) of the changes in brightness from the victim’s display from a
distance of 70 meters.
Lastly, for content-based copy detection, I take advantage of a new temporal feature to index
a reference library in a manner that is robust to the popular spatial and temporal transformations
in pirated videos. My technique narrows the detection gap in the important area of temporal
transformations applied by would-be pirates. My large-scale evaluation on real-world data shows
that I can successfully detect infringing content from movies and sports clips with 90.0% precision
at a 71.1% recall rate, and can achieve that accuracy at an average time expense of merely 5.3
seconds, outperforming the state of the art by an order of magnitude.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Video analysis and video surveillance are active areas of computer vision research. Video
analysis techniques are widely used in a wide range of tasks, including recognizing license plate
numbers, detecting pedestrians, and identifying copyright infringement. Nowadays, staggering
amounts of videos were captured and uploaded to the internet. For example, in 2015, over 300
hours of video are uploaded to YouTube every minute (Youtube, 2015), the number of video posts
per Facebook user has increased by more than 75 percent in the past year alone, and nearly 70
million photos and videos are posted on Instagram each day1. Analysis of these video datasets is an
important and financially lucrative task for both online video companies and their customers. For
instance, in 2015, YouTube reported that more than 5,000 partners use Content ID (a large-scale
copy detection application for online videos), and the service has led to over $1 billion in payouts to
creators and rights holders since its launch in 2007.
The staggering amount of video data also posts serious challenges for computer vision tech-
niques and received much attention from academia. Two key tasks for large scale video analysis
and surveillance are video-based event detection and large-scale video event retrieval. The goal of
video event detection is to localize and identify spatio-temporal patterns in video, such as characters
(Bhardwaj and Mahajan, 2015), key strokes (Balzarotti et al., 2008a), moving vehicles (Jazayeri
et al., 2011) and pedestrians (Dollar et al., 2012). While event detection approaches extract event
information from each video, it still remains a difficult task to examine a large-scale dataset and find
a particular a certain video event, which is called “event retrieval”. Given the astronomic amount of
online video resources, sophisticated fingerprint extraction and indexing schemes must be designed
for efficient video event retrieval.
1 See https://instagram.com/press/. Accessed May 8, 2015.
1
For video event detection, the traditional approach is to track the targets, stabilize tracking
results, and then recognize them (Efros et al., 2003; Ikizler and Forsyth, 2007; I˙kizler and Forsyth,
2008). The detected action is recognized by the subtle changes in the stabilized local frame patches,
which are usually noisy and of low resolution, resulting in limited detection accuracy. Other
approaches utilize spatial-temporal volumes to recognize action patterns (Ke et al., 2010; Rodriguez
et al., 2008; Derpanis et al., 2010; Laptev and Pe´rez, 2007; Ke et al., 2007; Jiang et al., 2006,
2010; Seo and Milanfar, 2009). These approaches treat the temporal dimension of the video in the
same manner as the spatial dimensions and develop volume features in the high-dimensional space.
They rely on sliding windows to perform exhaustive searching for events, which is computationally
expensive for large-scale datasets.
For video event retrieval, the traditional approach is to utilize spatial features such as SIFT/SURF
(Gengembre et al., 2008; Ke et al., 2004; Zhang and Chang, 2004) to match individual frames in
the target video and frames from the dataset. However, spatial features are sensitive to spatial-
transformations, noise, and resolution changes, making them less usable in certain scenarios such as
copy detection (Jiang et al., 2014). Moreover, the approaches using spatial features require matching
of every key frame, making these less efficient for large-scale datasets.
While the aforementioned techniques can be applied successfully in surveillance scenarios such
as traffic and pedestrian detection, it is still an open problem to utilize these techniques for security
analysis under various adversarial constraints. By analysing video events instead of still images or
photos, additional temporal information can be extracted, and that information could be leveraged
by both the attackers and the defenders. For instance, while it has been known that reflections
can be used to reconstruct text on the screen (Kuhn and Kuhn, 2003; Backes et al., 2008), these
approaches rely on expensive telescopes with large aperture, making them impractical in the real
world. Most recently, Raguram et al. (2011) proposed an approach for analyzing pop-out events
from videos instead of decoding text on the screen directly. In this way, off-the-shelf devices can be
used to achieve the same precision and attack range as previous results from Backes et al. (2008),
significantly reducing the gap between theory and practice.
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Moreover, in some adversarial settings the existing techniques fail to deal with practical
challenges. For instance, if the adversary only acquires views of the victim through multiple
reflections or eyeball reflections, the event detection scheme will have to deal with extremely low
resolution, high noise and significant occlusion, which is beyond the scope of traditional event
detection methods. In these cases, I extend existing approaches or seek novel ideas that are more
robust and efficient. Towards this goal, I also make contributions in the computer vision domain by
introducing cues and features that improve the robustness of existing techniques.
To summarize, in my research (Chapter 3 to Chapter 7), I have investigated realistic security
settings for both video event detection and retrieval. For video event detection, I robustly detect
codewords from moving-object CAPTCHAs (Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell
Computers and Humans Apart) and reconstruct typed input from repeated reflections. I also propose
a novel technique that defeats existing face liveness detection systems. For video event retrieval,
from the attacker’s perspective, I utilize temporal cues to infer TV content from light effusions.
On the other hand, from the defender’s perspective, I use similar video retrieval techniques to
retrieve copies from large video collections. In each of these scenarios, I analyze the advantages
and limitations of the adversary and develop robust computer vision techniques to meet various
challenges.
1.1 Thesis Statement
The trajectories of objects can be utilized to improve the robustness of visual event detection
against low resolution, noise, and occlusion, making it possible to decode overlapping characters
in motion (e.g., video CAPTCHA) and even reconstruct typing behavior from reflections in an
eyeball. Features based on temporal brightness changes can be used as a resilient feature for event
retrieval, enabling TV content retrieval from light effusions and robust copy detection against
practical space-temporal transformations. These techniques can be used to solve computer vision
challenges in many security scenarios (e.g., video CAPTCHA decoding, compromising emanation
and copy detection) with demanding adversarial restrictions.
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1.2 List of Innovations
In summary, the primary contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
1.2.1 Decoding Codewords from Motion-based Captchas
In Chapter 2, given a moving-image-object-recognition (MIOR) CAPTCHA, I extract the
motion contained in the video using the concept of salient features. To infer the motion of the salient
feature points, I apply object tracking techniques. With a set of salient features at hand, I then use
these features to estimate the color statistics of the background. Next, to account for the fact that all
characters of the codewords move independently, I segment the foreground into n segments as in the
naı¨ve attack. I select each image patch containing a candidate character and evaluate the patch using
a neural network based classifier (Simard et al., 2003). The classifier outputs a likelihood score
that the patch contains a character. As a final enhancement, I incorporate a feedback mechanism
in which I use high confidence inferences to improve low-confidence detections of other patches.
The net effect is that I reduce the distractions caused by mutually overlapping characters. Once all
segments have been classified, I output a hypothesis for all the characters in the codeword.
Contributions in computer vision. My attack inherently leverages temporal information in the
moving-image object recognition (MIOR) CAPTCHAs and also exploits the fact that only
recognition of known objects is needed. My methods also rely on a reasonably consistent
appearance or slowly varying appearance over time. That said, they can be applied to any set
of known objects or narrowly defined objects under affine transformations that are known to
work well with detection methods in computer vision (Viola and Jones, 2001).
Contributions in security. I show that not only are there inherent weaknesses in the current MIOR
CAPTCHA design, but that several obvious countermeasures (e.g., extending the length of
the codeword) are not viable attack countermeasures. More importantly, my work highlights
the fact that the choice of underlying hard problem by NuCaptcha’s designers was misguided;
its particular implementation falls into a solvable subclass of computer vision problems.
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Publications. Xu, Y., Reynaga, G., Chiasson, S., Frahm, J.-M., Monrose, F., and van Oorschot, P. C.
(2012). Security and usability challenges of moving-object captchas: Decoding codewords in
motion. In USENIX Security Symposium, Bellevue, WA, pages 49–64,
Xu, Y., Reynaga, G., Chiasson, S., Frahm, J.-M., Monrose, F., and van Oorschot, P. C. (2014b).
Security analysis and related usability of motion-based captchas: Decoding codewords in
motion. Dependable and Secure Computing, IEEE Transactions on, 11(5):480–493.
1.2.2 Defeating Face Liveness Detection with Virtual Models
In Chapter 4, I introduce a novel approach to bypass modern face authentication systems. More
specifically, by leveraging a handful of pictures of the target user taken from social media, I show
how to create realistic, textured, 3D facial models that undermine the security of widely used face
authentication solutions. My framework makes use of virtual reality (VR) systems, incorporating
along the way the ability to perform animations (e.g., raising an eyebrow or smiling) of the facial
model, in order to trick liveness detectors into believing that the 3D model is a real human face.
The synthetic face of the user is displayed on the screen of the VR device, and as the device rotates
and translates in the real world, the 3D face moves accordingly. To an observing face authentication
system, the depth and motion cues of the display match what would be expected for a human face.
This work was submitted to the 25th USENIX Security Symposium, 2016.
Contributions in computer vision. I show that it is possible to undermine modern face authenti-
cation systems using one such attack. Moreover, I show that an accurate facial model can be
built using only a handful of publicly accessible photos — collected, for example, from social
network websites — of the victim. From a pragmatic point of view, I am confronted with
two main challenges: i) the number of photos of the target may be limited, and ii) for each
available photo, the illumination setting is unknown and the user’s pose and expression are
not constrained. To overcome these challenges, I leverage robust, publicly available 3D face
reconstruction methods from the field of computer vision, and adapt these techniques to fit
my needs.
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Contributions in security. I argue that such VR-based spoofing attacks constitute a fundamentally
new class of attacks that point to a serious weaknesses in camera-based authentication systems:
unless they incorporate other sources of verifiable data, systems relying on color image data
and camera motion are prone to attacks via virtual realism. To demonstrate the practical
nature of this threat, I conduct thorough experiments using an end-to-end implementation of
my approach and show how it undermines the security of several face authentication solutions,
including both motion-based and liveness detectors.
1.2.3 Reconstructing Typed Input from Repeated Reflections
In Chapter 5, I propose a method that successfully transcribes the text typed on a keyboard
by exploiting video of the user typing, either directly or through up to two reflections from nearby
objects. To do so, I devise techniques that are resistant to low resolution, blurring, and noise. I
take as input a recording of the target device while the user types on its keyboard. First, I roughly
estimate the location of the device in the image. Next, the image of the device is aligned to a
known reference template of the device’s keyboard layout. Then, the fingertips are identified in
the video and the locations of the fingertips over the video frames are combined into trajectories.
These trajectories are then analyzed to identify the pressed keys. From these pressed keys I then
reconstruct the typed text. Finally, as an optional post-processing step, I apply a language model in
order to improve the readability of the final text. Aside from some initial input in the tracking stage
to identify the first frame containing the target device, the entire process is fully automated.
Contributions in computer vision. My approach works despite low resolution images (a natural
consequence of increasing the distance between target and camera) and high noise levels (due
to reduced light levels in reflections of objects as compared to the originals). To overcome
these challenges and achieve my goals, I extend a large body of work on object detection
and tracking in the area of computer vision. Specifically, I extend existing finger tracking
mechanisms to consider spatial context in order to reliably locate fingertips in the images.
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In addition, I propose a novel method for identifying fingertip trajectories based on robust
estimation.
Contributions in security. Tracking fingers, rather than recognizing displayed images, broadens
the class of vulnerable devices to include Apple’s iPad and similar ones, which do not use
any pop-out effect. Moreover, my approach is capable of operating at significant distances
from the victim (e.g., up to 50 meters away with a camcorder). Perhaps most importantly,
my approach operates effectively even for repeated reflections, i.e., reflections of reflections
in nearby objects. This feat allows us to reconstruct typed input from the image of a mobile
phone’s screen on a user’s eyeball as reflected through a nearby mirror, extending the privacy
threat to include situations where the adversary is located around a corner from the user.
Publication Xu, Y., Heinly, J., White, A. M., Monrose, F., and Frahm, J.-M. (2013). Seeing
double: reconstructing obscured typed input from repeated compromising reflections. In
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security,
Berlin, Germany, pages 1063–1074. ACM
1.2.4 Inferring TV Content from Light Effusions
In Chapter 6, I leverage the key insight that the observable emanations of a display (e.g., a TV
or monitor) during presentation of the viewing content induces a distinctive flicker pattern that can
be exploited by an adversary. I compute the average pixel brightness of each frame in the video,
resulting in a mean brightness signal for the video. To capture the sharp changes in brightness, I
then use the gradient of the signal as the descriptor for the video. Similar to the captured video,
every video in the adversary’s collection is represented by a feature based on the gradient of the
brightness signal. Note that while the mean brightness signal of the reference video and the captured
videos signal may vary, their gradient-based features share common characteristics, and it is those
commonalities that are used to identify the content being watched.
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Contributions in computer vision. The key contribution in this work lies in the techniques I use
to take advantage of temporal information to find matches among reference and capture
signals, even in the face of significant noise and signal distortions. To do this, I extend tradi-
tional correlation measures to utilize temporal information when computing similarity scores
between sequences. The resulting strategy significantly outperforms traditional correlation
measures (e.g., Greveler et al. (2012)).
Contributions in security. My proposed approach works successfully in a number of practical
scenarios, including (but not limited to) observations of light effusions through the windows,
on the back wall, or off the victim’s face. My empirical results show that I can successfully
confirm hypotheses while capturing short recordings (typically less than 4 minutes long) of
the changes in brightness from the victim’s display from a distance of 70 meters.
Publication Xu, Y., Frahm, J.-M., and Monrose, F. (2014a). Watching the watchers: Automatically
inferring tv content from outdoor light effusions. In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Scottsdale, AZ, pages 418–428.
ACM
1.2.5 Detecting Copies from Large Video Collections
In Chapter 7, I propose a novel content-based copy detection (CBCD) approach that consists of
two main components: a knowledge extraction stage and a video subsequence matching (or “copy
detection”) stage. In the knowledge extraction stage, I first preprocess the reference library by ex-
tracting the derivative of the average intensity for all its videos (i.e., computing their “fingerprints”).
These derivative features encode the temporal position of illumination changes in the videos, which
can be leveraged to find linkages among a collection of videos. Then, my proposed approach focuses
on significant illumination changes that result in distinct derivative features. These local temporal
features (that cover a short span of time around a peak) are extracted for each reference video and
encode the gradient signal profile in close proximity to significant illumination change in a manner
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that is robust to temporal transformations. In that way, the local features of a transformed video will
be equivalent to those in the corresponding original video. To make finding matches more efficient,
a K-d tree index structure is built upon the local features of all reference videos. Then, the detection
stage is used to determine if the video under examination contains infringing material. In this phase,
the derivative features and the local temporal features of the uploaded video are computed. The
local features are then used as a first approximation. The collection of possible matches is then
considered for further scrutiny using full video information. This work was submitted to ECCV’16.
Contributions in computer vision. I propose a novel copy-detection system utilizing temporal in-
formation. Our large-scale empirical results show that my approach achieves higher accuracy
and recall rate on real-world videos from the VCDB dataset than contemporary approaches. I
am able to achieve improved accuracy because I am able to leverage observations regarding
temporal consistency for practical content-based copy detection, which is difficult to thwart
without significantly degrading the user’s viewing experience. My approach is more robust
against spatial transformations and commonly used temporal transformations.
Contributions in security. My technique narrows the detection gap in the important area of tem-
poral transformations applied by would-be pirates. My large-scale evaluation on real-world
data shows that I can successfully detect infringing content from movies and sports clips
with 90.0% precision at a 71.1% recall rate, and can achieve that accuracy at an average time
expense of merely 5.3 seconds, outperforming the state of the art by an order of magnitude in
terms of speed.
9
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
My work spans four different security scenarios: the security of moving object CAPTCHAs
(Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart), the security of
face liveness detection, compromising optical emanation, and content-based video copy detection.
In each of these scenarios, both the adversary and the defender have different constraints and
challenges. To better understand the problems, in the following sections, I first review the related
work in video event detection and retrieval. Then, I provide a review of background and related
work in each adversary constraint.
2.1 Video Event Detection and Retrieval
Before diving into specific scenarios, I first review general developments in video event detection
and retrieval.
2.1.1 Video Event Detection
Video event detection has attracted significant research interest in recent years. This trend dates
back to the early 1990s when researchers first tried to analyze movements in videos (Aggarwal et al.,
1994; Cedras and Shah, 1994, 1995), mainly using optical flow methods (Horn and Schunck, 1981).
In the late 1990s, the most widely discussed topic in video event detection was the recognition of
hand gestures (Pavlovic et al., 1997), for which most used dynamic time warping or Hidden Markov
Models (Eddy, 1996) for event detection. Later in the early 2000s, given the rapid developments in
recognition and classification techniques, a basic framework was setup for video event detection in
general (Wang et al., 2003), which consisted of motion segmentation, object classification, object
tracking, action recognition, and semantic description. Classification techniques such as neural
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networks and Principal Component Analysis were also introduced for behavior understanding.
Since different scenarios may have dramatically different constraints and requirements for video
event detection, in subsequent research efforts this framework was further developed to adapt to
different scenarios.
For behavior analysis in video surveillance for security, the framework can be modified by
adding a person identification component (Ko, 2008). After detecting a human target, the person’s
image can be automatically fed into an indexing scheme for identification. Then, the movement
trajectory of the target is analyzed for abnormality. This application is particularly useful for security
and abnormal behavior detection.
For pedestrian behavior analysis, Geronimo et al. (2009) discussed recent developments in
pedestrian detection systems. The main challenge in this scenario is the variety of human appearance
(e.g., different clothes, changing size, aspect ratio, and dynamic shape) and the unstructured
environment. The basic structure in this scenario still follows the one proposed by Wang et al.
(2003), which consists of background segmentation, classification, and tracking. Due to the
requirement of robustness, refinement techniques are often used to improve the result from the
object classification phase. For instance, by analyzing the movement patterns of a pedestrian, the
system can automatically identify abnormal behavior, and further analyze if it is a mis-classification
or not.
Lastly, human-computer interfaces (HCI) are also a widely discussed topic in video event
detection. Pantic et al. (2007) reviewed the latest developments in this field. Techniques such as
expression recognition, face recognition, and gesture detection all have significant applications
in HCI. Fortunately, in these cases, the human is more or less cooperating with the computer,
making it possible to assume a relatively predictable environment, e.g., with sufficient resolution
and brightness level.
In my work, I also mostly follow the framework of Wang et al. (2003) and develop different
video event detection schemes that specifically adapt to different scenarios, including decoding
codewords from motion-based CAPTCHAs (Section 2.2) and reconstructing typed input from
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repeated reflections (Section 2.4.1.1). On the other hand, I also explore the potential security
weakness of existing face authentication systems by proposing a novel adversary model (Section
2.3).
2.1.2 Video Event Retrieval
Video event retrieval first originated in the 1990s when techniques were proposed that index
video events by detecting visual objects and assigning icons for each shot (Aslandogan and Yu,
1999). However, these approaches rely on the results of video event detection and are limited to
targets that can be robustly detected and tracked.
In 2007, Jiang et al. (2007) proposed to use bag-of-features for semantic video retrieval. With
their approach, videos of similar topics can be retrieved, not limited to certain objects. However,
Jiang et al. (2007) failed to take temporal information into consideration, which means their approach
does not distinguish between different temporal events. For instance, the proposed system cannot
tell the difference between an object moving left and an object moving right. This fact restrains
Jiang et al. (2007)’s approach to temporally irrelevant events only.
Later, Jones and Shao (2013) extended the bag-of-features approach (Jiang et al., 2007).
Temporal information was taken into consideration using their proposed technique called spatial-
temporal pyramid, which includes temporal information in the indexing structure. Their approach
achieved over 95% retrieval accuracy on the UCF Sports dataset (Soomro and Zamir, 2014).
However, the accuracy is lower than 30% on the HOHA2 dataset (Marszałek et al., 2009), partly
because of the frequent scene switches.
Audio and subtitle information are also sometimes used for video event retrieval. For instance,
Yang and Meinel (2014) propose to use audio and text information for speech retrieval. However,
sometimes the user is only interested in visual content without speech, making this category of
approaches constrained to certain scenarios.
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Lastly, copy detection is also a hot topic in video event retrieval. Interestingly, while much
work claiming near perfect results on synthetic datasets, I show that these techniques do not work
well on real-world data. I return to this later in Section 2.5.
In my work, I use temporal features only for video retrieval. In this way, my proposed system
is immune to distortions, noise, and most spatial transformations, and maintaining a superior
processing speed. I first propose this technique to automatically infer TV content from light
effusions (Section 2.4.1.2). Later I extend this technique to content-based video copy detection
(Section 2.5). In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the specific background for each of the
four scenarios: (i) the security of moving object CAPTCHAs (Section 2.2); (ii) the security of
face liveness detection (Section 2.3); (iii) compromising optical emanation (Section 2.4); (iv)
content-based video copy detection (Section 2.5).
2.2 The Security of Moving Object CAPTCHAs
CAPTCHAs (Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart)
first came into place in 2003, when Von Ahn et al. (2003) used distorted letters to distinguish
between computers and humans. Once invented, it quickly became popular for websites to avoid
attacks such as automated spamming and brute force password guessing.
To date, a myriad of text, audio, and video-based CAPTCHAs have been suggested (Hidalgo
and Alvarez, 2011), many of which have succumbed to different attacks (Golle, 2008; Mori and
Malik, 2003; Yan and Ahmad, 2007, 2008a; Zhu et al., 2010; Bursztein et al., 2011b,a). While text-
based CAPTCHAs that prompt users to recognize distorted characters have been the most popular
form to date, motion-based or video CAPTCHAs that provide some form of moving challenge have
recently been proposed as the successor to static CAPTCHAs. One prominent and contemporary
example of this new breed of CAPTCHAs is NuCaptcha (NuCaptcha, 2011), which asserts to
be “the most secure and usable CAPTCHA,” and serves millions of video CAPTCHAs per day.
The general idea embodied in these approaches is to exploit the remarkable perceptual abilities of
humans, which allows us to quickly unravel complex patterns in dynamic scenes. For example, in the
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case of NuCaptcha, users are shown a video with a series of characters (so-called random codewords)
moving across a dynamic scene, and solve the CAPTCHA by identifying the characters of the
codeword. For enhanced security, the codewords are presented among adversarial clutter (Mori
and Malik, 2003) (e.g., moving backgrounds and other objects with different trajectories), and
consecutive characters may even overlap significantly.
In this section, I first review the adversary model in this scenario and the underlying assumption
for moving object CAPTCHA to work. Then, I review related work that covers the standard
approaches of CAPTCHA decoding. Finally, I analyse the remaining challenges for the security of
moving object CAPTCHAs.
2.2.1 Adversary Modeling
The potential adversary in this scenario acquires a video CAPTCHA, which consists of a
sequence of video frames, and intends to decode the CAPTCHA and extract the codewords auto-
matically. For moving object CAPTCHA to be secure, the underlying assumption is that attacks
based on state-of-the-art computer vision techniques are likely to fail at uncovering these challenges
within video sequences, whereas real users will be able to solve the challenges with little effort.
To further understand this assumption, I review some basic concepts in human visual cognition.
In the human brain, it is generally assumed that an image is represented by the activity of “units”
tuned to local features (e.g., small line and edge fragments). It is also widely believed that objects
appearing in a consistent or familiar background are detected more accurately, and processed more
quickly, than objects appearing in an inconsistent scene (Oliva and Torralba, 2007). In either case,
a person must somehow separate as much as possible of the image once they see it. This feat is
believed to be done via a segmentation process that attempts to find different objects in the image
that “go together” (Ullman, 2000).
As with other aspects of our visual system, segmentation involves different processes using a
multitude of sources of information (e.g., texture and color), which makes it difficult to establish
which spatial properties and relations are important for different visual tasks. While there is
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evidence that human vision contains processes that perform grouping and segmentation prior to,
and independent of, subsequent recognition processes, the exact processes involved are still being
debated (Oliva and Torralba, 2007).
Given the complexity of the visual system, it is widely believed that this feat remains unmatched
by computer vision algorithms. One of the many reasons why this task remains elusive is that
perception of seemingly simple spatial relations often requires complex computations that are
difficult to unravel. This is due, in part, to the fact that object classification (that is, the ability to
accurately discriminate each object of an object class from all other possible objects in the scene) is
computationally difficult because even a single individual object can already produce an infinite
set of different images (on the retina) due to variations in position, scale, pose, illumination, etc.
Discriminating objects of a certain class is further complicated by the often very large inner class
variability, which significantly changes the appearance beyond the factors encountered for a single
object. Hence, vision operates in a high-dimensional space, making it difficult to build useful forms
of visual representation.
In computer vision, the somewhat simpler process of recognizing known objects is simulated
by first analyzing an image locally to produce an edge map composed of a large collection of local
edge elements, from which we proceed to identify larger structures. In my work, I am primarily
interested in techniques for object segmentation and tracking. In its simplest form, object tracking
can be defined as the problem of estimating the trajectory of an object in the image plane as it moves
around a scene. Tracking makes use of temporal information computed from a sequence of frames.
This task can be difficult for computer vision algorithms because of issues related to noise in the
image, complex object motion, the nonrigid nature of objects, etc. However, the tracking problem
can be simplified if one can assume that object motion is smooth, the motion is of constant velocity,
or that the number and the size of the objects or even appearance and shape information are known.
In NuCaptcha, for example, many of these simplifications hold, and so several features (e.g., edges,
optical flow) can be used to help track objects. The correspondence search from one frame to the
next is performed by using tracking.
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In video, this correspondence can be achieved by building a representation of the scene (called
the background model) and then finding deviations from the model for each incoming frame.
Intuitively, any significant change in the image region from the background model signifies a
moving object. The pixels constituting the regions undergoing change are marked for further
processing, and a connected component algorithm is applied to obtain connected regions. This
process is typically referred to as background subtraction. At this point, all that is needed is a way
to partition the image into perceptually similar regions, and then infer what each of those regions
represent.
2.2.2 Related Work
Most CAPTCHAs in commercial use today are character-recognition (CR) CAPTCHAs in-
volving still images of distorted characters; attacks essentially involve building on optical character
recognition advances. Audio CAPTCHAs (AUD) are a distinct second category, though unrelated
to my present work. A third major category, image-recognition (IR) CAPTCHAs, involves classifi-
cation or recognition, of images or objects other than characters. A well-known example, proposed
and then broken, is the Asirra CAPTCHA (Elson et al., 2007; Golle, 2008) which involves object
classification (e.g., distinguishing cats from other animals such as dogs). CR and IR schemes
may involve still images (CR-still, IR-still), or various types of dynamic images (CR-dynamic,
IR-dynamic). Dynamic text and objects are of main interest of my work, and contribute to a cross-
class category: moving-image object recognition (MIOR) CAPTCHAs, involving objects in motion
through animations, emergent-image schemes, and video (NuCaptcha, 2011; Liao and Chang,
2004; Cui et al., 2009; Shirali-Shahreza and Shirali-Shahreza, 2008; Cui et al., 2010a,b; Mitra
et al., 2009). A fourth category, cognitive-based CAPTCHAs (COG), include puzzles, questions,
and other challenges related to the semantics of images or language constructs. I include here
content-based video-labeling of YouTube videos (Kluever and Zanibbi, 2009).
The most comprehensive surveys of CAPTCHAs to date are those by Hidalgo and Mara-
non (Hidalgo and Alvarez, 2011) and Basso and Bergadano (Basso and Bergadano, 2010). I
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also note other summaries: for defeating classes of AUD CAPTCHAs, Soupionis (Soupionis and
Gritzalis, 2010) and Bursztein et al. (Bursztein and Bethard, 2009; Bursztein et al., 2011a); for
defeating CR CAPTCHAs, Yan et al. (Yan and Ahmad, 2007; Yan and El Ahmad, 2011) and
Bursztein (Bursztein et al., 2011b); for a systematic treatment of IR CAPTCHAs and attacks, Zhu
et al. (Zhu et al., 2010), as well as for robustness guidelines.
Usability has also been a central focus, for example, including a large user study of CR and
AUD CAPTCHAs involving Amazon Mechanical Turk users (Bursztein et al., 2010), a user study
of video-tagging (Kluever and Zanibbi, 2009), usability guidelines and frameworks related to CR
CAPTCHAs (Yan and Ahmad, 2008b). Chellapilla et al. (Chellapilla et al., 2005b,a) also address
robustness. Hidalgo et al. (Hidalgo and Alvarez, 2011) and Bursztein et al. (Bursztein et al., 2011b)
also review evaluation guidelines including usability. Research on underground markets for solving
CAPTCHAs (Motoyama et al., 2010), and malware-based CAPTCHA farms (Egele et al., 2010),
raise interesting questions about the long-term viability of CAPTCHAs.
Concurrent to my own work, Bursztein (Bursztein, 2012) presented an approach to break the
video CAPTCHAs used by NuCaptcha. The technique exploits the video by treating it as a series
of independent frames, and then applies a frame-based background removal process (Bursztein
et al., 2011b) to discard the video background. Next, frame characteristics (e.g., spatial salient
feature density and text aspect ratio of the overlapping letters) are used to detect the codeword, after
which a clustering technique is used to help segment the characters of the codeword. As a final
step, traditional CR-still based attacks are used to recognize the characters in each of the segmented
frames. Some stages of the approach taken by Bursztein have similarities to my baseline method
which uses single frame segmentation and recognition. In contrast, my subsequent techniques
inherently use temporal information contained in the video to identify the codeword, to improve the
segmentation, and to enhance the recognition accuracy during the codeword recovery process.
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2.2.3 Remaining Challenges
In general, CAPTCHAs are challenges that are difficult for computer and easy for human.
However, with the rapid developments in computer algorithms, the ability of a computer is surpassing
or getting close to a human’s level almost in every domain. This trend is making challenges that
used to be hard for computers become feasible, which generates potential vulnerabilities in existing
CAPTCHAs. Therefore, it is always an important task to re-evaluate the security of contemporary
CAPTCHAs, using the latest developments in computer algorithms.
For moving object CAPTCHAs particularly, although it is still widely believed that the cognitive
perception of human is beyond the ability of current computer algorithms, it remains unclear whether
the current state of moving object CAPTCHAs utilizes this gap successfully. Namely, are the current
moving object CAPTCHAs challenges hard for computers while easy for humans? Additionally,
with possible variations of moving object CAPTCHA (e.g., extending codeword length, increasing
overlapping), will they better satisfy the goal of telling humans and computers apart? The answer
to these questions leads to a comprehensive study in both the security and the usability of moving
object CAPTCHAs, which is a contribution of my work.
2.3 The Security of Face Liveness Detection
While fingerprints has long been utilized as an authentication method since as early as 500
B.C. (Jain and Kumar, 2010), modern automatic biometric systems only emerge in the 1890s when
the automated fingerprint systems were first used for criminal identification. Legal standards were
eventually established in 1986 by The National Bureau of Standards (NBS), now the National
Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST) (Karu and Jain, 1996).
The history of automated face authentication is even shorter. In 1991, after the eigenface
technique (Turk and Pentland, 1991) was first developed, different face recognition techniques
such as feature-based recognition (Samal and Iyengar, 1992), elastic matching (Chellappa et al.,
1995) and neural nets (Valentin et al., 1994) significantly broadened the horizon. Since then, face
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recognition has been a hot topic in computer vision. In 2014, Lu and Tang (2014)’s work already
surpassed human performance in precision and recall. Most recently, recent advances with deep
learning algorithms (Taigman et al., 2014; Parkhi et al., 2015) have pushed the boundary even
further. However, how to use well-developed face recognition techniques in face authentication
is still an open problem, with no formal standard or well-acknowledged approaches. Lenovo,
Asus, and Toshiba have all made attempts to use face authentication for authenticating users on
desktop computers. However, at the Black Hat security conference in 2009, Duc and Minh (2009)
demonstrated that all these systems can be bypassed with photographs and fake pictures of faces.
Similar weaknesses have been shown with Android OS, which augmented its face authentication
approach in 2012 to require users to blink while authenticating (i.e. as a countermeasure to still-
image spoofing attacks). Unfortunately, this approach was also shown to provide little protection,
and can be easily bypassed by presenting the system with two alternating images — one with the
user’s eyes open, and one with her eyes closed.
Despite these failure attempts, face authentication is still a hot research topic. Researchers
have realized that the main barrier of face authentication approach is to prevent ”spoofing attacks”
as shown earlier. As a result, the latest designs of face authentication systems all contain a face
liveness detection component that distinguishes real faces from spoofed ones. In the rest of this
section, I review the current developments in face liveness detection, and their adversary model and
assumptions.
2.3.1 Adversary Modeling
To better understand the design of face liveness detection schemes, I first review the basic model
of a potential adversary. Loosely speaking, three types of such spoofing attacks have been used in
the past, to varying degrees of success: (i) still-image-based spoofing, (ii) video-based spoofing, and
(iii) 3D-mask-based spoofing. As the name suggests, still-image-based spoofing attacks present one
or more still images of the user to the authentication camera; each image is either printed on paper
or shown with a digitized display. Video-based spoofing, on the other hand, presents a pre-recorded
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video of the victim’s moving face in an attempt to trick the system into falsely recognizing motion
as an indication of liveness. The 3D-mask-based approach, wherein 3D-printed facial masks are
used, was recently explored by Erdogmus and Marcel (2014).
2.3.2 Related Work
Given the three prominent classes of spoofing attacks mentioned earlier, it should be clear that
while still-image-based attacks are the easiest to perform, they can be easily countered by detecting
the 3D structure of the face. Video-based spoofing is more difficult to accomplish because facial
videos of the target user may be harder to come by; moreover, such attacks can also be successfully
defeated, for example, using the recently suggested techniques of Li et al. (2015) (which I discuss
in more detail later). 3D-mask-based approaches, on the other hand, are harder to counter. That
said, building a 3D mask is arguably more time-consuming and also requires specialized equipment.
Nevertheless, because of the threat this attack vector poses, much research has gone into detecting
the textures of 3D masks (Erdogmus and Marcel, 2014).
Just as new types of spoofing attacks have been introduced to fool face authentication systems,
more advanced methods for countering these attacks have been developed. Nowadays, the most
popular liveness detection techniques can be categorized as either texture-based approaches, motion-
based approaches, or liveness assessment approaches. I discuss each in turn.
Texture-based approaches (Kim et al., 2012a; Ma¨a¨tta¨ et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2013; Tan et al.,
2010; Peixoto et al., 2011; Erdogmus and Marcel, 2014) attempt to identify spoofing attacks based
on the assumption that a spoofed face will have a distinctly different texture from a real face.
Specifically, they assume that due to properties of its generation, a spoofed face (irrespective of
whether it is printed on paper, shown on a display, or made as a 3D mask) will be different from
a real face in terms of shape, detail, micro-textures, resolution, blurring, gamma correction, and
shading. That is, these techniques rely on perceived limitations of image displays and printing
techniques. However, with the advent of high-resolution displays (e.g., 5K), the difference in visual
quality between a spoofed image and a living face is hard to notice. Another limitation is that these
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techniques often require training on every possible spoofing material, which is not practical for real
systems.
Motion-based approaches (Kim et al., 2013; Bao et al., 2009; Kollreider et al., 2005; Lagorio
et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2013) detect spoofing attacks by using the motion of the user’s head
to infer 3D shape. Techniques such as optical flow and focal-length analysis are typically used.
The basic assumption is that structures recovered from genuine faces usually contain sufficient 3D
information, whereas structures from fake faces (photos) are usually planar in depth. For instance,
the approach of Li et al. (2015) checks the consistency of movement between the mobile device’s
internal motion sensors and the observed change in head pose computed from the recorded video
taken while the claimant attempts to authenticate herself to the device. Such 3D reasoning provides
a formidable defense against both still-image and video-based attacks.
Lastly, liveness assessment techniques (Jee et al., 2006; Sun et al., 2007; Kollreider et al., 2007,
2008) require the user to perform certain tasks during the authentication stage. For the systems I
evaluated, the user is typically asked to follow certain guidelines during registration, and to perform
a random series of actions (e.g., eye movement, lip movement, and blinking) at login. The requested
gestures help to defeat contemporary spoofing attacks.
Take-away: For real-world systems, liveness detection schemes are often combined with motion-
based approaches to provide better security protection than either can provide on its own. With
these ensemble techniques, traditional spoofing attacks can be reliably detected. For that reason, the
combination of motion-based systems and liveness detectors has gained traction and is now widely
adopted in many commercial systems, including popular face authentication systems offered by
companies like KeyLemon, Rohos, and Biomids.
2.3.3 Remaining Challenges
The current state of the art face liveness detection systems successfully address all the three
spoofing models. However, it is unclear whether there exist other spoofing categories that have
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yet to be discovered, which would require face authentication systems to be redesigned to be safe
against the attack.
In my work, I show the reality of such hazards by proposing a novel spoofing approach that
undermines all the existing face liveness detection techniques. More specifically, by leveraging
a handful of pictures of the target user taken from social media, I show how to create realistic,
textured, 3D facial models that undermine the security of widely used face authentication solutions.
My framework makes use of virtual reality (VR) systems, incorporating along the way the ability
to perform animations (e.g. raising an eyebrow or smiling) of the facial model, in order to trick
liveness detectors into believing that the 3D model is a real human face. The synthetic face of the
user is displayed on the screen of the VR device, and as the device rotates and translates in the real
world, the 3D face moves accordingly. To an observing face authentication system, the depth and
motion cues of the display match what would be expected for a human face.
In the rest of this section, I list additional related works in the security of users’ online photos
and 3D reconstruction of human faces.
2.3.3.1 Online Photos and Face Authentication
It should come as no surprise that personal photos from online social networks can compromise
privacy. Major social network sites advise users to set privacy settings for the images they upload,
but the vast majority of these photos are often accessible to the public or set to ‘friend-only
viewing’ (Liu et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2012b; Golder, 2008). Users also do not have direct control
over the accessibility of photos of themselves posted by other users, although they can remove
(‘un-tag’) the association of such photos with their Facebook account.
A notable use of social network photos for online security is Facebook’s social authentication
(SA) system (Hicks, 2011), an extension of CAPTCHAs that seeks to bolster identity verification by
requiring the user to identify photos of their friends. While this method does require more specific
knowledge than general CAPTCHAs, Polakis et al. (2012) demonstrated that facial recognition
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could be applied to a user’s public photos to discover their social relationships and solve 22% of SA
tests automatically.
Given that one’s online photo presence is not entirely controlled by the user alone — but by
their collective social circles — many avenues exist for an attacker to uncover the facial appearance
of a user, even when the user makes private their own personal photos. In an effort to curb such
easy access, work by Ilia et al. (2015) has explored the automatic privatization of user data across
a social network. This method uses face detection and photo tags to selectively blur the face of
a user when the viewing party does not have permission to see the photo. In the future, such an
approach may help decrease the public accessibility of users’ personal photos, but it is unlikely that
an individual’s appearance can ever be completely obfuscated from attackers across all social media
sites and image stores on the Internet.
Clearly, the availability of online user photos is a boon for an adversary tasked with the challenge
of undermining face authentication systems. The most germane on this front is the work of Li et al.
(2014). There, the authors proposed an attack that defeated commonly used face authentication
systems by using photos of the target user gathered from online social networks. Li et al. (2014)
reported that 77% of the users in their test set were vulnerable to their proposed attack. However,
their work is targeted at face recognition systems that do not incorporate face liveness detection. In
modern face authentication software, sophisticated liveness detection approaches are already in use,
and these techniques thwart still-image spoofing attacks of the kind performed by Li et al. (2014).
2.3.3.2 Defeating Facial Liveness Detection by Building Virtual Models From Public Photos
Constructing a 3D facial model from a small number of personal photos involves the application
of powerful techniques from the field of computer vision. Fortunately, there exists a variety of
reconstruction approaches that make this task less daunting than it may seem on first blush, and
many techniques have been introduced for facial reconstruction from single images (Kemelmacher-
Shlizerman and Basri, 2011; Kemelmacher-Shlizerman, 2013; Baumberger et al., 2014; Qu et al.,
2014), videos (Suwajanakorn et al., 2014; Shi et al., 2014; Jeni et al., 2015), and combinations of
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both (Suwajanakorn et al., 2015). For pedagogical reasons, I briefly review concepts that help the
reader better understand my approach.
The most popular facial model reconstruction approaches can be categorized into three classes:
shape from shading (SFS), structure from motion (SFM) combined with dense stereoscopic depth
estimation, and statistical facial models. The SFS approach (Kemelmacher-Shlizerman and Basri,
2011) uses a model of scene illumination and reflectance to recover face structure. Using this
technique, a 3D facial model can be reconstructed from only a single input photo. SFS relies on the
assumption that the brightness level and gradient of the face image reveals the 3D structure of the
face. However, the constraints of the illumination model used in SFS require a relatively simple
illumination setting and, therefore, cannot typically be applied to real-world photo samples, where
the configuration of the light sources is unknown and often complicated.
As an alternative, the structure from motion approach (Fidaleo and Medioni, 2007) makes
use of multiple photos to triangulate spatial positions of 3D points. It then leverages stereoscopic
techniques across the different viewpoints to recover the complete 3D surface of the face. With this
method, the reconstruction of a dense and accurate model often requires many consistent views of
the surface from different angles; moreover, non-rigid variations (e.g., facial expressions) in the
images can easily cause SFM methods to fail. In my scenario, these requirements make such an
approach less usable: for many individuals, only a limited number of images might be publicly
available online, and the dynamic nature of the face makes it difficult to find multiple images having
a consistent appearance (i.e. the exact same facial expression).
Unlike SFS and SFM, statistical facial models (Baumberger et al., 2014; Qu et al., 2014) seek
to perform facial reconstruction on an image using a training set of existing facial models. The
basis for this type of facial reconstruction is the 3D morphable model (3DMM) of Blanz and Vetter
(1999, 2003), which learns the principal variations of face shape and appearance that occur within
a population, and then fits these properties to images of a specific face. Training the morphable
models can be performed either on a controlled set of images (Paysan et al., 2009; Cao et al., 2014)
or from internet photo-collections (Kemelmacher-Shlizerman, 2013). The underlying variations fall
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on a continuum and capture both expression (e.g., a frowning-to-smiling spectrum) and identity
(e.g., a skinny-to-heavy or a male-to-female spectrum). In 3DMM and its derivatives, both 3D shape
and texture information are cast into a high-dimensional linear space, which can be analyzed with
principal component analysis (PCA) (Jolliffe, 2002). By optimizing over the weights of different
eigenvectors in PCA, any particular human face model can be approximated. Statistical facial
models have shown to be very robust and only require a few photos for high-precision reconstruction.
For instance, the approach of Baumberger et al. (2014) achieves good reconstruction quality using
only two images.
To make the process fully automatic, recent 3D facial reconstruction approaches have relied
on a few facial landmark points instead of operating on the whole model. These landmarks can be
accurately detected using the supervised descent method (SDM) (Xiong and De la Torre, 2013)
or deep convolutional networks (Sun et al., 2013). By first identifying these 2D features in an
image and then mapping them to points in 3D space, the entire 3D facial surface can be efficiently
reconstructed with high accuracy. In this process, the main challenge is the localization of facial
landmarks within the images, especially contour landmarks (along the cheekbones) which are half-
occluded in non-frontal views; I introduce a new method for solving this problem when multiple
input images are available.
2.4 Compromising Optical Emanation
Techniques for undermining a user’s privacy via several forms of compromising emanations
have a rich and storied history (e.g., (Highland, 1986; van Eck, 1985; Kuhn and Kuhn, 2003; Asonov
and Agrawal, 2004; Zhuang et al., 2005; Elibol et al., 2012; Maggi et al., 2011; Cai and Chen,
2011, 2012; Owusu et al., 2012; Vuagnoux and Pasini, 2009; Backes et al., 2008, 2009)). Yet,
the earliest of these ideas originates during the Second World War, in 1943, when Bell engineers
accidentally discovered that electrical signals from one-time tapes (OTT’s) were picked up by
a nearby oscilloscope. However, this phenomenon did not receive much attention when it was
first reported to the Signal Corps. Seven years later the problem was long forgotten when it
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was rediscovered in 1951 by the CIA during tests with the very same mixer. They were able to
intercept plain text transmissions half a mile along a communications line. The American Forces
Security Agency (AFSA) further investigated the problem and discovered an even more serious
problem: crypto equipment, connected to radio transmitters, emitted very weak plain text signals.
These signals were picked up by the nearby transmitter and modulated onto the transmitted radio
waves. The plain text piggy-backed on the transmitters powerful radio waves, making it possible
to filter out and read the plain text at distances of tens or hundreds of miles. This was by far the
most serious security issue. In early 1960’s, after numerous unsuccessful experiments, the Navy
Research Laboratory proposed to reduce the voltage and signal amplitude as the final cure of the
problem, which led to TEMPEST (not an acronym but sometimes written out as Telecommunications
Electronics Material Protected from Emanating Spurious Transmissions). TEMPEST refers to a
whole set of technical recourses, standards and regulations to protect communications equipment
against unwanted radiation of signals that might be intercepted, analyzed, and exploited by the
adversary.
While TEMPEST regulations effectively protect a user’s privacy from compromising electrical
emanations, researchers soon discovered that acoustic emanations, electromagnetic emanations and
optical emanations are also potential sources of information leakage:
Acoustic emanation. Acoustic emanations from keyboards have been found to be excellent sources
of disguised information. Since most encrypted systems utilize keyboards as input devices,
acoustic emanations are compromising at best if reconstructed. An acoustic emanation can be
decoded with feature matching using a single microphone (Marquardt et al., 2011) or with
triangulation using multiple microphones (Fiona, 2006). Fortunately, the risk of acoustic
eavesdropping decreases when the microphone is far away from the keyboard; with accuracy
quickly dropping to random guesses at a distance of one foot.
Electromagnetic emanation. The innocuous seeming square waves and high switching frequen-
cies are excellent radiation sources even up to the UHF region. The Electromagnetic spectra
are rich with information and most of the means of communication irrespective of the form
26
reveal their little secrets with the EM spectra. This EM radiation is not merely interfering, but
informative or compromising depending on one’s attitude towards secrecy. Again, electro-
magnetic emanation is captured at close distances of less than one foot, with electromagnetic
interference devices attached to the power line (Mo et al., 2013).
Optical emanation. In contrast to acoustic emanation, optical emanation focuses on commonly
used output devices, i.e. the device’s display. While there are multiple kinds of screens (e.g.
CRT, LCD, LED), all of them allow the user to view content from certain angles. Using a
camcorder within these angles will allow the adversary to acquire informative emanations.
Unlike acoustic and electromagnetic emanation, optical emanation can be captured as far as
70 meters away (Xu et al., 2014a).
While optical emanation shows a superior attack range compared to acoustic and electro-
magnetic emanations, it is constrained by the viewing angle since visible light signals travel in
straight lines. To overcome this limitation, reflections and effusions can be often utilized instead of
observing the device screen directly.
2.4.1 Adversary Modeling
To better understand the problem and the challenges I face, I first analyze the properties of two
specific reflection and effusion scenarios: (i) reconstructing typed input from repeated reflections;
(ii) inferring TV content from light effusions. Although my adversary model is analyzed under
such specific scenarios, it is worth noting that the analysis (e.g., image size, noise, and impact of
diffraction) can be generalized to similar situations.
2.4.1.1 Reconstructing Typed Input from Repeated Reflections
From the adversary’s perspective, the techniques used to leverage so-called compromising
reflections in prior work has inspired my awareness of the realism of these threats. However, they
all suffer from a similar, and profound, weakness — the adversary must be either within visual
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range of the victim (e.g., to ensure that pop-out events in reflections in the victim’s sunglasses can
be discerned (Raguram et al., 2011)) or close enough to the target to avoid the use of expensive
telescopes (Backes et al., 2009).
In my work, I consider a broader and more challenging adversary model: devices with any
type of virtual or physical keyboard, without direct line-of-sight, at distances farther away from the
victim than previously thought possible and even from reflections on the eye-ball. In these scenarios,
the video captured by the adversary is noisy and the resolution is so low that visual cues such as the
“pop-out” effect are no longer usable, completely defeating the existing attacks.
Captured Size of the Object. Obviously, the size of the object in the captured images is of critical
importance and naturally depends on the size of the object itself. Other factors are the focal length
and sensor resolution of the camera. Loosely speaking, the size of the object in the image for direct
line-of-sight can be computed as:
SizeDirect =
Sensor Resolution
Sensor Size︸ ︷︷ ︸
pixel scale
· Object Size
TargetDistance
Focal Length
− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
size on sensor
(2.1)
Intuitively, the observed size is dependent on the physical size of the projection of the object
on the sensor and the characteristics of the camera sensor, namely the size and number of pixels
(picture elements). The size of the projection of the object on the sensor is controlled by the focal
length, the distance to the object, and the object size. Focal length can be viewed as the amount of
magnification of the image, where longer focal lengths (zoom lenses) provide higher magnifications.
Thus, by using a lens with a longer focal length, an adversary can gain a better view of the target.
The final size of the image of the device in pixels (given the image’s size on the sensor) then
depends on the ratio between how many pixels are on the image sensor (SensorResolution) and
the physical size of that sensor (SensorSize). At the same focal length, for example, the size of the
object in pixels tends to decrease with full frame sensors found in high-end digital SLRs compared
to cheaper digital camcorders with smaller sensors but the same video resolution.
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In addition to the physical object size, the size of the object on the image sensor also depends on
the presence and shape of any reflecting surfaces between the observer and the object. For instance,
if the reflecting object is convex (e.g., a pair of sunglasses or the human eyeball), the size of the
observed object will be much smaller than if observed with direct line-of-sight. When an object is
viewed via a reflection, the final observed size can be computed as:
SizeReflection = SizeDirect ∗ 12 Distance fromSurface
CurvatureRadius
+ 1
(2.2)
Thus, the curvature of the reflecting surface is an important factor in the observed size. The
more curved the reflecting surface is, the more the light will be bent. For convex surfaces, the
bending of the light will result in a smaller observed object size. Lastly, the distance between
the reflecting surface and the target object itself (Distance fromSurface) naturally affects the
observed object size.
Takeaway. One way to acquire a larger observed size is to simply reduce the distance to the target
object. However, from an adversarial point of view, it is desirable to be as far away as possible from
the victim. Hence, a better solution would be to use a lens with a long focal length. For similar
reasons, cameras with higher pixel density in their sensors are preferred. Finally, the curvature of
any reflecting surface must be taken into account. For example, the human eyeball has a typical
curvature of about 8 mm (Backes et al., 2008). Hence, when people look at an object 25 cm away,
the reflection in their eyeball will be about 60 times smaller than with direct line-of-sight.
Impact of Diffraction. The quality of the acquired image is significantly influenced by the wave
properties of the light. When light comes near the edge of the lens, not all light rays traveling
from the object pass directly through the lens to the image sensor. Instead, a fraction of the light
diffuses and travels in every direction, leading to a blurring of the image. This phenomenon is called
diffraction and cannot be eliminated. It presents a physical boundary for the effective resolution of
the object in the captured image (commonly referred to as the Rayleigh Criterion (Backes et al.,
2008)).
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The maximum effective size of the observed object (MaxSize) can be approximated as:
MaxSize =
Aperture/Wavelength
1.22 TargetDistance
∗ Object Size
2Distance fromSurface
CurvatureRadius
+ 1
(2.3)
Notice that the actual amount of diffraction is impacted by the wavelength of the light
(Wavelength). While the adversary has no control over this factor, I include it here for com-
pleteness (along with the well-known constant scale factor of 1/1.22 for circular apertures (Stelzer,
1998)). However, the adversary can select a lens with an appropriate aperture (i.e., opening of the
lens), which lets the desired amount of unobstructed light pass through the lens.
Takeaway. The larger the aperture of the lens, the smaller the amount of diffraction. It is for
precisely this reason that prior work (e.g., (Kuhn and Kuhn, 2003; Backes et al., 2008, 2009))
resorted to the use of telescopes. However, lenses with large apertures are typically very expensive,
costing well over $1,000 per square cm (Backes et al., 2008), and are difficult to conceal.
Impact of Noise. A very significant factor that affects the quality of the acquired image of the target
object is imaging noise. Noise is a random variation in each pixel’s intensity, causing the image to
appear speckled. As noted by Nakamura (2005), there can be several types of background noise in
the captured image, each with a constant noise level. To avoid visual impact on the image quality
by the noise, the exposure time is typically chosen so that the overall amount of light overwhelms
the background noise, making it hardly noticeable. However, for video capture, the exposure is
naturally limited to the time of a frame, which for darker scenes makes the background noise more
noticeable. The resulting noise causes significant challenges in identifying fine detail.
Typically, cameras with large sensors are more resistant to noise, as their pixels are usually
larger and can capture more photons of light. For that reason, the larger sensors provided in digital
SLR cameras (as opposed to cellphones or point-and-shoot cameras) are desirable for photography
even though they provide a smaller number of pixels on the object.
Taken as a whole, the aforementioned factors present challenges that severely limit the use of
existing techniques (e.g., (Backes et al., 2008, 2009; Raguram et al., 2011, 2013)) when considering
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reconstruction of typed input from repeated reflections. For instance, the recently used technique of
identifying salient feature points (Raguram et al., 2011, 2013) within the image in order to facilitate
alignment will fail because the poor image resolution does not provide the required details for the
salient feature points. The approach suggested by (Maggi et al., 2011) faces similar challenges.
Additionally, low image quality (e.g., as acquired from a reflection in the eyeball) prevents the
detection of fine detail.
2.4.1.2 Inferring TV Content from Light Effusions
In this scenario, a potential adversary captures a video of the flickering light caused by changes
in brightness on the device display and tries to confirm the video content being watched. This
is a challenging task because the light signal from device display is weakened and distorted by
reflections and effusions. The interference of nearby vehicle and road light might also be sources
of noise. Because of heavy obfuscation, many of us may not have given a second thought to the
amount of information these flickering patterns might reveal about the programs we watch.
The ability to confirm which video is being watched based off compromising diffusions of
changes in light hinges on several factors, including (i) the quality of the captured information (i.e.,
the signal-to-noise ratio), (ii) the entropy of the observed information (i.e., the amount of variation
in the captured signal), (iii) the length of the captured signal (e.g., short clips have more ambiguity),
and (iv) the amount of information required for successfully matching the unknown and reference
signals, which is related to the size of the adversary’s reference library and the distinctiveness of its
contents I discuss each in turn.
Noise Interference. For an arbitrary recording, the adversary’s goal is to infer a signal, S, based on
effusions of light from the display. In practice, this means that he or she also inadvertently captures
an additive noise signal, N , which may be composed of a variety of other signals (e.g., sensor noise,
photon noise). Consequently, the recording the adversary captures is the composition of the signal S
and noise N . Intuitively, the more significant the noise, the harder it will be to distinguish between
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the noise and the signal. This correlation is measured by the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), which is
the ratio of the signal variance σ2S and the noise variance σ
2
N .
In general, the higher the SNR, the less the noise influences the resulting signal, which leads to
more robust signal analysis. In the case of capturing reflections of emanations, the SNR depends
on a multitude of factors. More specifically, the amount of light emanated from the screen in any
frame depends on the intensity of the video frame that is displayed on the screen, Iref , the current
brightness level of the screen (measured by unit area emanation power P0), and the size of the
screen Sscreen. However, only a small fraction of this light might be captured by the camera, the
amount of which depends on the distance the light travels from the screen to the reflecting object,
the size and reflectance of the reflecting object, the aperture of the camera and the distance from
the reflecting object to the camera. The captured signal also depends on the sensitivity αcam of the
imaging sensor of the recording device. In summary, assuming αcap is the percentage of emanation
captured by the camera, the recorded signal can be modeled as:
Icap = IrefP0Sscreenαcapαcam (2.4)
It is important to note that αcap and αcam are not constant in practice because of the different
reflectance properties for different colors and the non-linear color transformations of digital cameras
(Tsin et al., 2001). Hence, they will depend on the actual color composition of the displayed video
frame. Additionally, the intensity of light in the room influences the amount of incoming light
and could be treated as another signal, but for simplicity, I consider it an additive constant (which
assumes the lights are not being repeatedly turned on and off). As such, I omit its embedded signal
in Equation 2.4, but instead simply consider it as a source of “impulse noise” (Buades et al., 2005),
similar to the lights of a passing vehicle.
To complicate matters even further, there can be noise from a myriad of other sources that
impact the measured brightness value in the adversary’s recording of the emanations coming
from the display. These include quantization noise of the camera during the A/D conversion to
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obtain pixel values (Widrow and Kolla´r, 2008), thermal noise from the sensor itself (Healey and
Kondepudy, 1994), and impulse noise. Again, for simplicity, I accumulate the above noise factors
into a single noise variable Inoise. The SNR can then be computed as:
SNR =
σ(Icap)
2
σ(Inoise)2
(2.5)
where σ2(·) is the variance of the signal.
Intuitively, lower screen brightness levels, smaller and darker reflecting objects, and longer
distances limit the amount screen light captured by the adversary. Fortunately for the adversary, a
high quality camera can capture a good percentage of the incoming light and reduce quantization and
electronic noise. Finally, note that while the intensity of a constant room light does not influence the
SNR directly—since it does not influence the noise variance—it indirectly effects the quantization
noise given that it affects the sensitivity of camera’s sensor (i.e., higher room light intensity makes
the camera less able to capture subtle illumination changes).
For my experimental evaluations I can directly acquire Icap + Inoise from the captured video.
An estimate of the noise variance σ(Inoise)2 can be measured by having the adversary capture the
reflection from a static image displayed on screen beforehand (e.g., at her house). Similarly, room
brightness can be approximated. With these measurements at hand, Icap can be estimated with linear
regression using Iref , and the SNR can be directly computed.
Takeaway. The factors that influence the signal I am interested in can be approximated by Equation
2.4. Moreover, by using Equation 2.5, I can infer the SNR directly from the captured data, which
ranged from 5 to 107 in my empirical evaluations.
Point of Capture. Obviously, the point from which the light diffusions are recorded influences
how well the attacker can confirm her hypotheses. Intuitively, the more she is able to record sudden
intensity changes, the higher the chances that the correct content will be inferred. A key challenge
for the adversary is that the average intensity of one frame is highly dependent on that of the
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previous frame. For instance, in my empirical evaluations, nearly 95% of consecutive frames have
the same average intensity (up to rounding error precision).
To improve my ability to carry out the attack, I do not use the raw data directly, but instead use its
gradient to reduce the correlation. To see why that helps, assume that xt = Iref (t+1)−Iref (t), yt =
Icap(t + 1) − Icap(t), t = 1, 2, 3, .... Then, given that the vast majority (i.e., 95%) of the average
intensities are similar, this means that 95% of the xs would be 0. Assuming the gradients are
independent of one another, the information in a particular frame sequence {xt|t = 0, 1, 2, 3, ...}
can be measured as:
Iref (x) = −ΣNt=0log(f(xt)∆x) (2.6)
where f(xt) is the probability density function (PDF) of xt in a single frame. Iref (x) can be viewed
as the logarithm of the inverse probability of the reference sequence. The higher its value, the
less likely another reference sequence will “accidentally” be the same as it, which means that the
sequence has less ambiguity and contains more information. Consequently, the more intensity
changes the adversary observes, the more likely it is that the correct content will be inferred.
To gauge how well the attack would work, I can compute the mutual information between x
and y using Equation 2.7. Infomutual(x, y) estimates the information captured by the adversary on
average.
Imutual(x, y) =
∫
p(x)p(y|x)log(p(y|x)
p(y)
)dxdy (2.7)
In practice, p(x) can be observed directly from a reference video. Likewise, p(y) can be
computed by ignoring impact noise (which is rare) and assuming that the noise follows a Gaussian
distribution. In fact, since Iref and Icap are linearly related, I can also assume y = x + noise,
where V ar{noise} = V ar{x}/SNR. In doing so, I can now compute the mutual information with
the SNR I acquired. For context, I note that in my evaluations that follow, at an SNR of 5, every
frame conveyed roughly 1.5 bits of information. Under much better conditions with an SNR of 107
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(observed when the diffusions were captured while the victim watched an action scene on a 50-inch
TV), every frame conveyed 3.2 bits of information.
Takeaway. The above analysis tells us what one would expect: the more intensity changes that
we observed, the less the resulting ambiguity. Therefore, if the adversary is lucky enough to
observe several sharp changes in intensity, she will have an easier time to identify the content being
watched by the victim. Not surprisingly, Equation 2.7 also tells us that bigger and brighter screens
provide more than twice as much information (compared to the smaller and darker ones used in my
experiments).
Length of Recording. Given the previous discussions, longer recordings are obviously better for
the adversary. To see that, assume that the arrival of intensity changes are Markov, meaning that the
distribution of arrival time and magnitude of the next intensity change depends only on the current
state of the video being watched. If that is the case, then the information learned by the adversary is
linearly related to the mutual information per frame. Ideally, the attacker’s best hope is for a high
SNR environment, a good starting point, and a suitable recording length capturing multiple changes
in intensity.
Size of the Reference Library. The last factor that affects the speed and accuracy of the attack is
the size of the reference collection the adversary must test her hypotheses against. On average, the
amount of information I need to uniquely identify a video is logarithmic with its total length, which
in turn, is linearly related to the size of the attacker’s library. Therefore, linearly increasing the size
of the library will only have marginal influence on her ability to successfully confirm which content
the victim is watching.
2.4.2 Most Related Works
In this section, I investigate in detail several of the most related works in both the security and
visual recognition and retrieval domains.
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2.4.2.1 Related Work in Security
In modern computer security research, probably the earliest idea of compromising emanation
is embodied in the work of van Eck (1985) and Highland (1986) on compromising signals from
electromagnetic radiation. That work was later extended by Kuhn and Kuhn (2003), wherein it
was argued that a telescope could be used to spy on reflections of a computer screen from afar.
Intuitively, the light emitted from the display was modeled as a function of time and space, and then
analyzed using signal processing methods. Naturally, the captured light is a disturbed signal of the
light emitted by the screen, where disturbances include atmospheric effects, dispersion, attenuation,
and lens distortion of the capture device. Regardless of these disturbances, Kuhn and Kuhn (2003)
show that by utilizing an expensive telescope with a wide aperture, they were able to reconstruct
text on a 32×24 cm display from 60 m away.
More recently, Backes et al. (Backes et al., 2008, 2009) overcame the requirement of direct
line-of-sight. The key innovation was to exploit reflections to vary the path of light between the
target screen and the observer, and showed it was possible to leverage the reflection off a human
eyeball (reading a very large 36 pt text font from a distance of 10 m). However, the approach still
used a high-powered telescope,, inheriting the drawbacks of high cost along with limited versatility
and ability to go undetected. In addition, the setting of Backes et al. did not have to consider motion
(of either the victim’s device or the adversary), and also was not concerned with the daunting task
of automatically reconstructing text from typed input.
The use of less expensive and more practical equipment was introduced by Raguram et al.
(2011). Unlike the approach I present, that method relied on detecting the presence of key pop-outs
in virtual keyboards. While that approach worked well for direct line-of-sight attacks, reconstruc-
tions involving a single reflection (in this case, off the victim’s sunglasses) did not perform as
well (Raguram et al., 2011). A related approach that also relied on the ability to detect pop-outs was
proposed by Maggi et al. (2011). However, the approach of Maggi et al. is sensitive to movement of
the device and camera and suffers in the presence of occlusions (including the fingers of the device’s
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user). Neither approach could handle reconstructions of low resolution images of reflections of
reflections in nearby objects.
Later, Yue et al. (2014) and Shukla et al. (2014) proposed two different approaches that utilize
finger movement and microscopic frame level dynamics to reconstruct typing behavior. Unlike
previous attacks, their approaches do not require a view of the device display, but solely use finger
movements as the data source. Yue et al. (2014)’s approach focuses on the movement of fingertips
and identifying key pressing behavior when the fingertip touches the device screen. Shukla et al.
(2014), on the other hand, detect typing behavior using the relative distance between feature points
on the user’s hand and device. The temporal changes of the relative distance reveals the timing of
typing behavior while the magnitude of relative distance reveals the key being typed. Yet both of
the attacks require direct a view of the victim.
In a similar manner, Torralba and Freeman (2012) make use of reflections to reveal “accidental”
scenes from within a still image or video sequence. The advantage for these approaches comes
from the uniformity and easy-access of visual signals; while TV and computer screens come with
different models using different technologies — resulting in extremely different electromagnetic
behavior — they all share similar visual output. Due to market demand, the visual signals have to
cover a certain area and maintain a certain brightness level to ensure clarity of picture, which also
make them susceptible to compromising reflections. That said, these attacks require a view of the
screen, either directly or via reflections.
Lastly, Enev et al. (2011) and Greveler et al. (2012) proposed techniques for undermining
a user’s privacy via TV program retrieval, wherein power usage and power line electromagnetic
interference were investigated as side-channels. This work infers the TV signal in ways that largely
depend on the model of the TV and the structure of the power system. Therefore, to successfully
carry out the attack, an adversary must not only have specialized equipment and access to smart
electrical meters, but must also have a priori knowledge of the victim’s TV model — all of which
weaken the practicality of the attack. Moreover, other electronic devices (e.g., computers) within
37
the vicinity of the TV can interfere with the captured signal, compounding the decoding challenges
even further.
2.4.2.2 Related Work in Recognition and Retrieval
Within the computer vision and human computer interaction communities, work on finger
tracking for gesture recognition (Oka et al., 2002; Chaudhary et al., 2012), virtual input systems
(Ukita and Kidode, 2004; Zhang, 2003), virtual object manipulation (Lee and Hollerer, 2007;
Lee and Chun, 2009), and hand writing recognition (Yang et al., 2005; Jin et al., 2007) all share
similarities to my application of finger motion analysis. Probably the most germane of these is the
work of Iturbe et al. (2008) which uses finger movement to control a virtual input system in which a
user’s finger is modeled as a straight line and its movement is used to determine the button being
pointed to by the user. Unfortunately, their approach quickly fails for small mobile devices where
the fingers need to bend in order to reach the keys. Similarly, Jin et al. (2007) utilized finger input
for character writing recognition. In their approach, the user’s finger is isolated using a background
modeling technique. Next, the path taken by the finger is tracked as the user writes individual letters,
effectively recognizing the letter through the trajectory of the finger. Unfortunately, the approach of
Jin et al. (2007) cannot be directly applied to mobile devices as users do not spell words by forming
one character at a time, but instead interact with a keyboard via a series of touch events.
Kerdvibulvech and Saito (2007) apply a novel technique for tracking the fingers while a user
plays a guitar. Instead of trying to uniquely identify each individual finger, the authors use a neural
network classifier to recognize known patterns corresponding to different chord formations. While
promising, their approach is also not applicable in my setting, as the way users type on mobile
devices can differ significantly for the same user (e.g., switching between typing with one, two, or
several fingers), and even more among different users, making the learning strategy less practical.
Nevertheless, as I show later, I found that by combining many of the strengths of prior works
alongside my own enhancements, I am able to achieve a solution that surpasses previous attempts in
terms of its practically, range, and robustness.
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Also related within the domain of computer vision is the process of image and video retrieval.
Interested readers are referred to Zhang and Rui (2013), which presents an excellent review of image
retrieval techniques used to search through billions of images. Likewise, Liu et al. (2013) presents
a survey of near-duplicated video retrieval techniques that also focuses on similarity of semantic
content of the video sequences. In short, features are extracted to reveal detailed information in the
image and semantic labels are used to provide a high level understanding. Unfortunately, I have no
such luxury in my application since I may have no visual access either directly or indirectly to the
screen, and must therefore find ways to work with much more limited information.
Lastly, my application domain shares similarities to genome sequence matching and database
searching. In particular, considering only the average image intensity signal, the task at hand can be
viewed as a sequence matching problem. For instance, in genome sequence matching, Langmead
et al. (2009) present a fast DNA sequence matching scheme that exploits time and space trade-offs.
In database searching, Faloutsos et al. (1994) and Moon et al. (2002) present methods that perform
fast matching from an input subsequence to those in a database. Unfortunately, these techniques
suffer from several limitations that make them ill-suited for my setting. For example, in DNA
sequence matching, many parts of a sequence may be missing and so to find the best matches,
dynamic optimization methods are usually deployed to maximize the length of the best match.
These algorithms typically have O(mn) complexity, where m is the length of the query sequence
and n is the length of the reference sequence. In my application, however, the only uncertainty is
the starting point of the query sequence and so much more effective strategies (i.e., O(nlog(m)) or
faster) can be applied.
In database searching, the problem is more similar to mine, but the state-of-the-art solutions
utilize Fourier transformation and focus on low frequencies. In my application, the sudden intensity
changes contain most of the information I utilize, but live in the high end of the frequency spectrum.
As such, these approaches cannot be directly applied. However, by combining many of the strengths
of prior work together with my own enhancements, I provide a solution that boasts high accuracy
and speed.
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2.4.3 Remaining Challenges
While the use of off-the-self video cameras to perform optical attacks has been investigated
to varying degrees, the practicality of these attacks has not been well studied. Intuitively, a long
range attack is much easier to conceal than a close one. My approach deals with this challenge and
significantly pushes forward the upper limit of the attack range.
Specifically, I propose automated optical emanation compromising attacks that utilize reflections
and effusions, which can be performed at a much longer range than previous work. To make this
happen, I propose innovative computer vision approaches in video event detection and retrieval that
are robust against noise, low resolution, and low brightness level.
2.5 Content-Based Copy Detection (CBCD)
While the techniques used by online social networks to detect pirated content have been
successful, they have been widely criticized for false detections (Bartholomew, 2014)1. Improving
the accuracy of such systems remains an important social problem and immense business opportunity,
and as such, has garnered much attention from both academia and industry. However, content-
based copy detection — especially as it pertains to subsequence similarity — is more difficult
than it might appear at first blush. This is particularly true when transformations to the original
content might be made either in video or in audio2, either spatially or temporally, and may be
either simple or compound. So pressing is the problem of content identification that in 2008,
the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) included a separate challenge
on video copy detection in their annual TREC Video Retrieval Evaluation (TRECVID). In that
challenge, synthetic video-based transformations were used to test the performance of different
content detection approaches.
1 See also P. Tassi, “The Injustice of the YouTube Content ID Crackdown Reveals Google’s Dark Side” Forbes Magazine,
2013.
2 See S. Smitelli “Fun with YouTube’s Audio Content ID System”, available at http://www.scottsmitelli.
com/articles/youtube-audio-content-id
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Four years later, the challenge was prematurely terminated, claiming that near-duplicate video
detection was a solved problem. However, in 2014, Jiang et al. (2014) showed that the current
state of the art — which showed near-perfect results on the simulated benchmarks — is far from
satisfactory in detecting complex real-world copies. To highlight the problem, Jiang et al. (2014)
released a new dataset (called VCDB) that contains pirated videos available on YouTube and
MetaCafe. Their preliminary evaluations suggest that the transformations observed in the real world
are very different from the synthetic transformations considered by the academic community to date.
For instance, the most widely studied transformation (i.e., “picture in picture”) in the TRECVID
evaluations is rarely seen in real cases, while the more commonly used transformations observed
online are far more complex than the synthetic ones tested in past works. As a result, the techniques
that appear to be robust in simulated benchmarks fail miserably in the wild. Jiang et al. (2014)
confirmed my own suspicion that the adversarial assumptions made in the NIST challenges were far
too naı¨ve and simply did not capture the behavior of real-world adversaries.
To better understand the problem and challenges, I first analyze the adversary model in realistic
copy detection scenarios and then review related work in this domain.
2.5.1 Adversary Modeling
To better identify the challenges in this scenario, I first explored several widely used sources of
data. I turned to the multimedia community, where numerous datasets for evaluating copy detection
technologies are publicly available. The most widely cited of these are the MUSCLE-VCD-2007
dataset (with over 100 hours of video) (Law-To et al., 2007) and the IACC dataset (with over 200
hours of video) released by NIST for the TRECVID challenge (Smeaton et al., 2006). Both datasets
contain material from a wide variety of sources and also include simulated “pirated” videos wherein
various synthetic transformations were applied. These transformations were either applied to short
segments within a video or to the entire video. The duration of a copied segment ranged from 1
second to 1 minute.
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Unfortunately, upon close inspection of these datasets, I was surprised to learn how naı¨ve
the transformations were (with little, or no, temporal adjustments involved). Fortunately, recently
released VCDB dataset published by Jiang et al. (2014) contains 528 videos retrieved from two user
generated content (UGC) platforms using 28 queries. Among those videos, the authors manually
labelled 9,236 pairs of copied segments. Examples of transformations observed in the VCDB
dataset are shown in Figure 2.1.
Compared with previously used synthetic datasets, the VCDB dataset is extracted and labelled
directly from real data. Although it suffers from the limited sample size, the VCDB dataset consists
the most comprehensive modeling of the adversary to my best knowledge. Therefore, I analyze the
properties of the VCDB dataset as my target adversary model.
Figure 2.1: Copy-reference pairs in the VCDB dataset
To get a better sense of the perceived quality of both the synthetic and real-world trans-
formed videos, I investigate to objective measures for video quality assessment (Chikkerur et al.,
2011). While most work in that domain only considers spatial distortions due to network coding,
Soundararajan and Bovik (2013) suggest an approach (coined the RRED index) that also assesses
temporal distortions. At a high level, the RRED index computes the mutual information in both
the spatial frequency and temporal frequency domains, and the amount of information between the
distorted video and reference video yields a score depicting how much distortion is involved. One
would expect that the higher the distortion, the more likely that viewers would find the transformed
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Video Source
Copy-Reference Pair
from IACC
Copy-Reference Pair
from VCDB
Two Random Videos
25th Percentile 118.5 56.8 141.1
Median 217.8 215.7 244.2
75th Percentile 381.6 320.5 542.0
Table 2.1: RRED index score statistics for copy-reference pairs in the IACC and VCDB dataset,
compared with the result from random videos
video distracting. The experimental analysis of Soundararajan and Bovik (2013) indicates that
their approach provides scores that correlate well with human judgements. Unfortunately, my
analysis shows that the RRED index does not adequately capture the impact of distortions besides
noise. To see that, Table 2.1 shows the RRED index scores for copy-reference pairs in the IACC
and VCDB datasets. Keep in mind that the analysis of Jiang et al. (2014) aptly showed that all
the CBCD techniques that achieved near perfect scores on the IACC dataset failed miserably on
the VCBD dataset. Notice, however, that although slightly lower scores are assigned for two
similar copy-reference pairs than for two different videos, the range of scores overlaps significantly.
Thus, left with no other way to objectively measure the quality of the transformations, I use the
popularity of the pirated videos in the VCDB dataset as an indication of the perceived quality of
the transformations, the fact that users were willing to watch the pirated content even with these
transformations should not be overlooked. Figure 2.2 shows that most of the pirated videos in the
dataset were watched on YouTube more than 300 thousand times.3
2.5.1.1 Findings
Having acquired copies of pirated content observed on UGC platforms, I began a thorough
analysis of the statistics of the data in order to ground my adversarial assumptions. Although the
VCDB dataset provided loose labelling for the copy-reference pairs, to fully understand the data,
frame-level labelling was required. To accomplish that goal, I built a graphical user interface for
labelling corresponding frames in the videos and manually labelled a subset of 210 videos that were
3 Recall that even though the videos still appear on YouTube, it is not clear if they were missed by Content ID or if
they were flagged but the copyright owner choose to redirect all monetization and ad revenue instead of having the
infringing videos removed.
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Figure 2.2: Viewership statistics for the videos in the VCDB dataset
all over 30 seconds long. Among those videos, I found 4402 copy-reference segment pairs, all of
which were manually verified.
The videos from the VCDB dataset contain a wide range of content transformations, which is in
stark contrast to the pre-defined lab-generated transformations (Smeaton et al., 2006). For instance,
8% of copies were edited to have parts of the original video deleted or extra segments inserted. The
distribution of transformations is also different from that in IACC. Among the 9,236 pairs of copies,
36% contain insertion of patterns, 18% are due to camcording, 27% have scale changes, and only
2% contain “picture in picture” patterns. Digging deeper, I focused on the temporal characteristic of
the transformed videos. Two types of temporal transformations were immediately apparent: speed
adjustment and segment editing (i.e., video cropping and temporal reversing). I discuss each in turn.
Speed Adjustments: To characterize the observed video speed transformations, I computed the
distribution of video speed. Instead of observing video speed directly, I use the logarithm of the
video speed ratio (i.e., speed of the distorted video divided by the speed of the original video).
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This distribution is well modeled by a log-logistic distribution. I observed only 44.2% of pirated
videos have no temporal scaling and only 2.2% are scaled by more than 20%. Next, to analyze the
consistency of the speed adjustments, I computed the standard deviation of the video speed within
each pirated content. The results (not shown) revealed that as many as 97.7% of the pirated videos
do not have different speeds within the video.
Cropping, Editing and Reversing: My analysis of the data collected from the UGC platforms
indicated that roughly 40% of the videos contained more than 80% content copied from elsewhere.
These results are consistent with the observations of Jiang et al. (2014). Over 8% of the samples
contain edited video segments wherein segments were either deleted or inserted. 2% of the videos
were temporally reversed. The low percentage of temporal reversion makes sense because few
videos are still watchable once reversed.
2.5.1.2 Assumptions
The limited types of temporal transformations observed in the real-world data suggest that
although the magnitude of the intensity signal in a copied video may vary a lot due to spatial
transformations, the temporal positions of sudden intensity changes remain relatively constant. I
assume that to be true because harsh temporal adjustments appear to degrade the viewing experience
more than similarly strong spatial adjustments (e.g., degraded video quality).
2.5.2 Related Work
Although there is abundant literature on CBCD approaches, all of them share the same detection
structure: feature extraction and then indexing.
The feature extraction phase identifies fingerprints of both the query video and the reference
videos. It also defines the measure to compute the difference between two fingerprints. A successful
feature extraction scheme should be robust against transformations. Namely, the fingerprints from a
transformed video and a reference video should result in a close distance measure, compared with
non-reference videos.
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The indexing phase efficiently compares the query video against the dataset. The naive way is
to run linear searching within the dataset. However, given the size of datasets, this is usually not
practical. To solve this problem, data structures such as Kd-tree and hashing tables are used for
efficiency.
Since feature extraction is essential to the accuracy and success rate of video copy detection, I
mainly focus my survey on this area.
2.5.2.1 Spatial Features
The most popular features used in CBCD are spatial features. These features characterize the
property of individual frames and can be divided into global features and local features.
Global Features. The most well known global feature is the ordinal feature (Hampapur et al.,
2001) (Hua et al., 2004). In this approach, as image frame is divided into K blocks. The
ordinal feature is defined as the K ranking of the average intensity value of each block.
Other similar global spatial features include spatial correlation descriptor (Yeh and Cheng,
2009), MPEG-7 descriptors (Ku¨c¸u¨ktunc¸ et al., 2010), and TIRI descriptor (Esmaeili et al.,
2011). The advantage of the spatial global feature is as follows. First, global features are
more robust against noise and global changes introduced by the digitization/encoding process.
In Arun Hampapur et. al’s approach, the ordinal feature is compared against motion signature
and color signature. The ordinal feature showed superior results in detecting short video
clips and computation efficiency. In addition, unlike local features, spatial global features
usually result in relatively low dimension data, which makes feature matching computationally
efficient.
However, spatial global feature such as ordinal feature is not robust against image shift,
adding black margins or black borders and flipping.
Local Features. The most widely used local feature includes Harris corner features (Joly et al.,
2007) (Law-To et al., 2006) (Law-To et al., 2009) (Poullot et al., 2007), SIFT/SURF feature
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(Gengembre et al., 2008) (Ke et al., 2004) (Zhang and Chang, 2004), and their variations
such as Hessian-based STIP descriptor (Willems et al., 2008). Local features extract visually
significant points in the image (corners, spots, tips, etc.). Every local feature only represents
the texture of a small region. To fully encode one image, these approaches extract hundreds
of local features in each single frame.
The use of local features provides detailed information about every frame in the video. This
makes it possible to retrieve much shorter copy sequences. Moreover, they are robust against
image shift, scaling and rotation. However, local features are sensitive to noise and blurring.
They are also computationally expensive for efficient matching.
The most traditional measure for spatial features is through voting (Law-To et al., 2006).
Reference videos in the dataset vote for how many similar spatial features are detected in the test
video. However, this scheme completely ignores the relation skip between frames, not taking
advantage of temporal information.
More recently, researchers have proposed to use more complicated schemes for difference
measuring so that the temporal relationship between frames can be identified. More sophisticated
models were proposed to take temporal adjustment (frame dropping, speed changing, etc.) into
consideration. These approaches include frame fusion (Wei et al., 2011), bag-of-words model
(Chiu et al., 2007) and graph based matching (Chiu et al., 2008). These models takes temporal
relationship between frames into consideration and work with temporal transformation such as
speed adjustment.
However, global spatial features are sensitive to bordering and shifting, while local features are
sensitive to noise. These sensitivity makes spatial-based CBCD detections always vulnerable to
some kind of spatial transformations. Moreover, although spatial methods may require only short
sequences for detection, the complexity of the features makes these schemes less computationally
efficient. If the user cares more about long copies (longer than 1 minute), temporal features might
provide easier and more efficient retrieval results.
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2.5.2.2 Temporal Features
Instead of focusing on individual frames, temporal features characterize the changes of pixel
values along time. However, a very limited number of papers have worked on this domain.
The most relevant approach is Jean-Hugues Chenot et. al. (Chenot and Daigneault, 2014),
which designed a temporal fingerprint based on spectral analysis of intensity changes. It was the
first attempt of CBCD to characterize the temporal behaviour of the video. Since the fingerprint only
relies on average intensity changes, this approach is resistant against typical spacial transformations,
but is very sensitive to temporal adjustments. Moreover, since only the first 16 channels of the
FFT transformation are used as fingerprint, this approach fails to characterize sudden illumination
changes that contain the most information.
Another related approach is from (Chen and Stentiford, 2008),which applied ordinal measure
in the temporal domain on different blocks of the image. While the ordinal measurement captures
temporal characteristics, tuning the number of blocks enables the algorithm to seek a balance
between spatial robustness and detection efficiency. However, this approach fails to characterize the
magnitude of temporal changes. It is also sensitive to temporal adjustments such as speed changes,
temporal smoothing and frame dropping.
In my latest work (Xu et al., 2014a), I also propose a TV content retrieval scheme based
on temporal information. Different from previous research, my approach focuses on the timing
of sudden illumination changes, since they contain the most of the information. Similar with
previous approaches, my method is robust against spatial changes. It also shares the disadvantage
of sensitivity against temporal adjustments, but the discrete nature of sudden illumination changes
makes it more promising to be temporally robust with some improvements.
2.5.2.3 Indexing
Different indexing methods also play an important role in efficient copy detection. The most
popular indexing approaches involve local sensitive hashing and tree-based searching (R-tree, Kd-
48
Video Source
Copy-Reference Pair
from IACC dataset
Copy-Reference Pair
from VCDB dataset
Random Two Different
Videos
25% Percentile 118.5 56.8 141.1
Median% 217.8 215.7 244.2
75% Percentile% 381.6 320.5 542.0
Table 2.2: RRED index score statistics for copy-reference pairs in IACC and VCDB dataset,
compared with result from random different videos
tree, K-means tree or B+-tree) (Shen et al., 2005) (Yuan et al., 2004). In my latest work (Xu et al.,
2014a), I also built a Kd-tree structure for efficient retrieval.
2.5.2.4 Video Quality Assessment
Additionally, I introduce another set of papers that is relevant to the topic: full reference and part
reference video quality assessment (Chikkerur et al., 2011). Video quality assessment evaluates how
a video is distorted from a human perspective. It mimics the human vision system to determine how
much video distortion is involved. Video quality assessment mainly considers spatial distortions
from network coding and transferring.
A most relevant approach considering both spatial and temporal distortion is the RRED index
(Soundararajan and Bovik, 2013). Their work computes the mutual information in both spatial
frequency and temporal frequency domains. The amount of mutual information between dis-
torted video and reference video provides a score revealing how much distortion is involved. The
experiments indicate that their result has high correlation with human judgement.
However, video quality assessment approaches fail to take the variety of distortions into
consideration. When I apply RRED index to IACC dataset and VCDB dataset, they fail miserably,
failing to assess copies with transformations other than adding noise. The results are listed in
Table 2.2, indicating that RRED index results in slightly lower scores for copy-reference pairs than
two different videos but the score intervals are highly overlapped. It only results in 12% and 22%
precision with 100% recall rate. This might be useful to select videos within minor distortions, but
fail on complicated transformations.
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2.5.2.5 Audio Matching
Lastly, sequence matching is also a widely discussed topic in audio retrieval and speech
recognition. The standard approach for these tasks is to represent the audio sequence in the
frequency domain and handle temporal transformations through dynamic temporal warping (DTW).
For instance, Raffel and Ellis (Raffel and Ellis, 2015) represent query audio data with constant-Q
transforms (CQT) and align them against reference sequences with DTW. In speech recognition, a
similar use of DTW was proposed by Godin and Lockwood (Godin and Lockwood, 1989). DTW
breaks the audio input sequences into discrete elements, which can then be matched in a manner
that is robust against non-linear transformations. The usage of DTW in audio matching is guided
by the fact that the frequency property of a music note or a spoken word is highly informative and
relatively consistent against temporal transformation. However, DTW is not well applicable in
my CBCD scenario as the spatial features are sensitive to spatial transformations, and cannot be
treated as robust DTW elements. Additionally, the temporal sampling rate of visual data is only
30 Hz compared to at least 8,000 Hz for audio data, making visual data much less informative in
the temporal domain. Therefore, it is difficult to extract informative temporal features as DTW
elements from visual data. My proposed methods overcome these limitations and achieve robust
matching under spatial and temporal transformations. Before introducing my approach, I model the
adversary setting with statistical results.
In what follows, I delve into details for each of the aforementioned scenarios.
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CHAPTER 3: DECODING CODEWORDS FROM MOTION-BASED CAPTCHAS
3.1 Introduction
Humans can recognize a wide variety of objects at a glance, with no apparent effort, despite
tremendous variations in the appearance of visual objects, and we can answer a variety of questions
regarding shape properties and spatial relationships of what we see. The apparent ease with which
we recognize objects belies the magnitude of this feat. we can also do so with astonishing speed
(e.g., in a fraction of a second) (Thorpe et al., 1996). Indeed, the Cognitive Science literature
abounds with studies on visual perception showing that, for the most part, people do not require
noticeably more processing time for object categorization (e.g., deciding whether the object is a
bird, a flower, a car) than for more fine grained object classification (e.g., an eagle, a rose) (DiCarlo
and Cox, 2007). Grill et al. (Grill-Spector and Kanwisher, 2005) showed that by the time subjects
knew that a picture contained an object at all, they already knew its class. If such easy-for-human
tasks are, in contrast, difficult for computers, then they are strong candidates for distinguishing
humans from machines.
Since understanding what we see requires cognitive ability, it is unsurprising that the decoding of
motion-based challenges has been adopted as a security mechanism: various forms of motion-based
object recognition tasks have been suggested as reverse Turing tests, or what are called Completely
Automated Public Turing tests to tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHAs). Among the
key properties of CAPTCHAs are: they must be easily solved by humans; they should be usable;
correct solutions should only be attainable by solving the underlying AI problem they are based
on; they should be robust (i.e., resist automated attacks); and the cost of answering challenges with
automated programs should exceed that of soliciting humans to do the same task (Ahn et al., 2003;
von Ahn et al., 2004). To date, a myriad of text, audio, and video-based CAPTCHAs have been
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suggested (Hidalgo and Alvarez, 2011), many of which have succumbed to different attacks (Golle,
2008; Mori and Malik, 2003; Yan and Ahmad, 2007, 2008a; Zhu et al., 2010; Bursztein et al.,
2011b,a).
While text-based CAPTCHAs that prompt users to recognize distorted characters have been the
most popular form to date, motion-based or video CAPTCHAs that provide some form of moving
challenge have recently been proposed as the successor to static CAPTCHAs. One prominent and
contemporary example of this new breed of CAPTCHAs is NuCaptcha (NuCaptcha, 2011), which
asserts to be “the most secure and usable CAPTCHA,” and serves millions of video CAPTCHAs per
day. The general idea embodied in these approaches is to exploit the remarkable perceptual abilities
of humans to unravel structure-from-motion (Marr and Poggio, 1979). For example, users are shown
a video with a series of characters (so-called random codewords) moving across a dynamic scene,
and solve the CAPTCHA by entering the correct codeword. For enhanced security, the codewords
are presented among adversarial clutter (Mori and Malik, 2003) (e.g., moving backgrounds and
other objects with different trajectories), and consecutive characters may even overlap significantly.
The underlying assumption is that attacks based on state-of-the-art computer vision techniques are
likely to fail at uncovering these challenges within video sequences, whereas real users will be able
to solve the challenges with little effort.
However, unlike in humans, it turns out that object classification, not recognition of known
objects, is the more challenging problem in Computer Vision (Ullman, 2000). That is, it is
considerably more difficult to capture in a computer recognition system the essence of a dog, a
horse, or a tree—i.e., the kind of classification that is natural and immediate for the human visual
system (Marr, 1982). To this day, classification of objects in real-world scenes remains an open
and difficult problem. Recognizing known objects, on the other hand, is more tractable, especially
where it involves specific shapes undergoing transformations that are easy to compensate for. As I
show later, many of these well-defined transformations hold in current motion-based CAPTCHA
designs, due in part to design choices that increase usability.
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In what follows, I present an automated attack to defeat the current state-of-the-art in moving-
image object recognition CAPTCHAs. Through extensive evaluation of several thousand real-world
CAPTCHAs, my attack can completely undermine the security of the most prominent examples of
these, namely those currently generated by NuCaptcha. After examining properties that enable my
attack, I explore a series of security countermeasures designed to reduce the success of my attacks,
including natural extensions to the scheme under examination, as well as an implementation of
a recently proposed idea (called Emerging Images (Mitra et al., 2009)) for which attacks do not
appear as readily available. Rather than idle conjecture about the efficacy of countermeasures, I
implement CAPTCHAs implementing them and evaluate these strengthened variations of moving-
image CAPTCHAs by carrying out and reporting on a usability study with subjects asked to solve
such CAPTCHAs.
My findings highlight the well-known tension between security and usability, which often
have subtle influences on each other. In particular, I show that the design of robust and usable
moving-image CAPTCHAs is much harder than it looks. For example, while such CAPTCHAs
may be more usable than their still-based counterparts, they provide an attacker with a significant
number of views of the target, each providing opportunities to increase the confidence of guesses.
Thus the challenge is limiting the volume of visual cues available to automated attacks, without
adversely impacting usability.
3.2 Our Automated Approach
The human visual processes of segmentation, object tracking, and region identification are
possible in today’s MIOR CAPTCHAs because of several design decisions that promote rapid
visual identification (Driver and Baylis, 1996). NuCaptcha, for instance, presents a streaming
video containing moving text against a dynamic background. The videos have four noticeable
characteristics, namely: (1) the letters are presented as rigid objects in order to improve a user’s
ability to recognize the characters; (2) the background video and the foreground character color
are nearly constant in color and always maintain a high contrast—we posit that this is done to ease
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Figure 3.1: Example moving-image object recognition (MIOR) CAPTCHAs from NuCaptcha (see
http://nucaptcha.com/demo).
cognitive burden on users; (3) the random “codewords” each have independent (but overlapping
trajectories) which better enable users to distinguish adjacent characters; (4) lastly, the codewords
are chosen from a reduced alphabet where easily confused characters are omitted. Some examples
of a state-of-the-art MIOR CAPTCHA are given in Figure 3.1.
Before delving into the specifics of my most successful attack, I first present a naı¨ve approach
for automatically decoding the challenges shown in MIOR CAPTCHAs. To see how this attack
would work, I remind the reader that a video can be seen as a stream of single pictures that simply
provides multiple views of a temporally evolving scene. It is well known that human observers
perceive a naturally moving scene at a level of about thirty frames per second, and for this reason,
video CAPTCHAs tend to use a comparable frame rate to provide a natural video experience that
is not too jerky. Similarly, the challenge shown in the CAPTCHA is rendered in multiple frames
to allow users to perceive and decode the codewords in an effortless manner. In the NuCaptcha
scheme, for example, a single frame may contain the full codeword.
3.2.1 A Naı¨ve Attack
Given this observation, one way to attack such schemes is to simply apply traditional OCR-
based techniques that work well at defeating CR-still CAPTCHAs (e.g., (Mori and Malik, 2003;
54
Yan and Ahmad, 2007)). More specifically, choose k frames at random, and identify the foreground
pixels of the codeword by comparing their color with a given reference color; notice the attacker
would likely know this value since the users are asked to, for example, “type the RED moving
characters”. Next, the length of the codeword can be inferred by finding the leftmost and rightmost
pixels on the foreground. This in essence defines a line spanning over the foreground pixels (see
Figure 3.2). The positions of the characters along the line can be determined by dividing the line
into n equidistant segments, where n denotes the desired number of characters in the codeword. For
each of the segments, compute the center of gravity of the foreground pixels in the vertical area
of the image belonging to the segment. Lastly, select an image patch (of the expected size of the
characters) around the centers of gravity of the segments, and feed each patch to a classifier. In my
work, I use a neural network approach (Simard et al., 2003) because it is known to perform well at
this object identification task. The neural network is trained in a manner similar to what I discuss in
§3.2.3.
Figure 3.2: Naı¨ve attack: Based on the foreground pixels, I find the longest horizontal distance
(white line) and the mean value of vertical area (the respective bounding boxes above).
The above process yields a guess for each of the characters of the codeword in the chosen frames
of the video. Let i denote the number of possible answers for each character. By transforming the
score from the neural network into the probability pijk where the j-th character of the codeword
corresponds to the i-th character in the k-th frame, I calculate the probability Pij for each character
j = 1, . . . , n of the codeword over all k frames as Pij = 1sp
∑
k pijk with sp =
∑
i,j,k pijk. The
choice that has the highest probability is selected as the corresponding character. With k = 10,
this naı¨ve attack resulted in a success rate of approximately 36% accuracy in correctly deducing
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all three characters in the codewords of 4000 CAPTCHAs from NuCaptcha. While this relatively
simple attack already raises doubts about the robustness of this new MIOR CAPTCHA, I now
present a significantly improved attack that makes fewer assumptions about pixel invariants (Yan
and El Ahmad, 2011) in the videos.
3.2.2 Exploiting Temporal Information
A clear limitation of the naı¨ve attack is the fact that it is not easily generalizable and it is not
robust to slight changes in the videos. In what follows, we make no assumption about a priori
knowledge of the color of the codewords, nor do I assume that the centers of gravity for each patch
are equidistant. To do so, I apply a robust segmentation method that utilizes temporal information
to improve my ability to recognize the characters in the video.
A basic overview of my attack is shown in Figure 3.3. Given a MIOR CAPTCHA I extract the
motion contained in the video using the concept of salient features. Salient features are characteristic
areas of an image that can be reliably detected in several frames. To infer the motion of the salient
feature points, I apply object tracking techniques (stage Ê). With a set of salient features at hand,
I then use these features to estimate the color statistics of the background. Specifically, I use a
Gaussian mixture model (Friedman and Russell, 1776), which represents the color statistics of the
background through a limited set of Gaussian distributions. I use the color model of the background
to measure, for all pixels in each frame, their likelihood of belonging to the background. Pixels
with low likelihoods are then extracted as foreground pixels (stage Ë). The trajectories of the
foreground pixels are then refined using information inferred about the color of these pixels, and a
foreground color model is built. Next, to account for the fact that all characters of the codewords
move independently, I segment the foreground into n segments as in the naı¨ve attack (stage Ì).
I select each image patch containing a candidate character and evaluate the patch using a neural
network based classifier (Simard et al., 2003) (stage Í). The classifier outputs a likelihood score
that the patch contains a character. As a final enhancement, I incorporate a feedback mechanism
in which I use high confidence inferences to improve low confidence detections of other patches.
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Figure 3.3: High-level overview of my attack. (This, and other figures, are best viewed in color.)
The net effect is that I reduce the distractions caused by mutually overlapping characters. Once all
segments have been classified, I output my guess for all characters of the codeword. I now discuss
the stages of my approach in more detail.
Detecting Salient Features and Their Motion (Stage Ê)
A well-known class of salient features in the computer vision community is gray value corners
in images. In this chapter, I use the Harris corner detector (Harris and Stephens, 1988) for computing
salient features, which uses the image gradient to identify points in the image with two orthogonal
gradients of significant magnitude. An example of the detected corners is shown in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: The circles depict salient features. These salient features are usually corners of an
object or texture areas.
After identifying salient features in one frame of the video I now need to identify their respective
position in the subsequent frames of the video. In general, there are two choices for identifying
the corresponding salient features in the subsequent frames of the video. The first choice is to
independently detect salient features in all frames and then compare them by using their image
neighborhoods (patches) to identify correlating patches through an image based correlation (com-
monly called matching). The second class of methods leverages the small motion occurring in
between two frames for an iterative search (commonly called tracking).
I opt for a tracking method given that tracking results for video are superior in accuracy and
precision to matching results. Specifically, I deploy the well known KLT-tracking method (Lucas
and Kanade, 1981), which is based on the assumption that the image of a scene object has a
constant appearance in the different frames capturing the object (brightness constancy). The MIOR
CAPTCHAs by NuCaptcha use constant colors on the characters of the codewords. This implies
that the NuCaptcha frames are well suited for my method. Note that no assumption about the
specific color is made; only constant appearance of each of the salient features is assumed. I return
to this assumption later in Section 3.3.2.
Motion Trajectory Clustering (Stage Ë)
In a typical video, the detected salient features will be spread throughout the image. In the case
of NuCaptcha, the detected features are either on the background, the plain (i.e., non-codeword)
58
characters or the codeword characters. I am foremost interested in obtaining the information of the
codeword characters. To identify the codeword characters I use their distinctive motion patterns
as their motion is the most irregular motion in the video CAPTCHA. In the case of NuCaptcha,
I take advantage of the fact that the motion trajectories of the background are significantly less
stable (i.e., across consecutive frames) than the trajectories of the features on the characters. Hence
I can identify background features by finding motion trajectories covering only a fraction of the
sequence; specifically I assume presence for less than l = 20 frames. In my analysis, I observed
little sensitivity with respect to l.
Additionally, given that all characters (plain and codeword) move along a common trajectory,
I can further identify this common component by linearly fitting a trajectory to their path. Note
that the centers of the rotating codeword characters still move along this trajectory. Accordingly, I
use the distinctive rotation of the codeword characters to identify any of their associated patterns
by simply searching for the trajectories with the largest deviation from the more common motion
trajectory. This identifies the pixels belonging to the codeword characters as well as the plain
characters. Additionally, the features on the identified codeword characters allow us to obtain the
specific color of the codeword characters without knowing the color a priori (see Figure 3.5).
Knowing the position of the codeword characters allows us to learn a foreground color model. I
use a Gaussian mixture model for the foreground learning, which in my case has a single moment
corresponding to the foreground color.1 Additionally, given the above identified salient features on
the background, I also learn a Gaussian mixture for the background, thereby further separating the
characters from the background.
At this point, I have isolated the trajectories of codeword characters, and separated the code-
words from the background (see Figure 3.6). However, to decide which salient features on the
codeword characters belong together, I required additional trajectories. To acquire these, I simply
relax the constraint on the sharpness of corners I care about (i.e., I lower the threshold for the Harris
corner detection algorithm) and rerun the KLT-tracking on the new salient features. This yields
1 In the case where the foreground characters have varying appearance, I simply use multiple modes.
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Figure 3.5: (Top): Initial optical flow. (Middle): salient points with short trajectories in background
are discarded. (Lower): Trajectories on non-codeword characters are also discarded.
significantly more trajectories for use by my segmentation algorithm. Notice how dense the salient
features are in Figure 3.7. Note also that since the foreground extraction step provides patches that
are not related to the background, I can automatically generate training samples for my classifier,
irrespective of the various backgrounds the characters are contained in.
Segmentation (Stage Ì)
To segment the derived trajectories into groups, I use k-means clustering (Jain et al., 1999).
I chose this approach over other considerations (e.g., mean-shift (Ray and Turi, 1999) based
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Figure 3.6: Example foreground extraction.
Figure 3.7: re-running tracking with a lower threshold on corner quality: Left: before modification.
Right: after modification.
clustering, or RANSAC (Fischler and Bolles, 1981a) based clustering (Yan and Pollefeys, 2007))
because of its simplicity, coupled with the fact that I can take advantage of my knowledge of the
desired number of characters (i.e., k), and use that to help guide the clustering procedure. I cannot,
however, apply the standard k-means approach directly since it relies on Euclidean distances, where
each sample is a point. In my case, I need to take the relationship between frames of the video
sequence into consideration, and so I must instead use each trajectory as an observation. That is, I
cluster the different trajectories. However, this results in a non-Euclidean space because different
trajectories have different beginning and ending frames. To address this problem, I utilize the
rigidity assumption (Ullman, 1983) and define a distance metric for trajectories that takes into
consideration their spatial distance, as well as the variation of their spatial distance. The result is a
robust technique that typically converges within 5 iterations when k = 3, and 20 interations (on
average) when k = 23. A sample output of this stage is shown in Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.8: Left: before segmentation. Right: trajectories are marked with different colors and
bounding boxes are calculated based on the center of the trajectories and the orientation of the
points. The red points denote areas with no trajectories.
3.2.3 Codeword Extraction and Classification
Given the center and orientation of each codeword character, the goal is to figure out exactly
what that character is. For this task, I extract a fixed-sized area around each character (as in
Figure 3.8), and supply that to my classification stage. Before doing so, however, I refine the patches
by deleting pixels that are too close to the trajectories of adjacent characters.
As mentioned earlier, I use a neural network for classifying the refined patches. A neural
network is a mathematical model or computational model that is inspired by the structure of a
biological neural network. The training of a neural network is based on the notion of the possibility
of learning. Given a specific task to solve, and a class of functions, learning in this context means
using a set of observations to find a function which solves the task in some optimal sense.
Optimization: While the process outlined in stages Ê-Í works surprisingly well, there are several
opportunities for improvement. Perhaps one of the most natural extensions is to utilize a feedback
mechanism to boost recognition accuracy. The idea I pursue is based on the observation that an
adversary can leverage her confidence about what particular patches represent to improve her overall
ability to break the CAPTCHA. Specifically, I find and block the character that I am most confident
about. The basic idea is that although I may not be able to infer all the characters at once, it is very
likely that I can infer some of the characters. By masking the character that I am most confident
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about, I can simplify the problem into one of decoding a codeword with fewer characters; which is
easier to segment and recognize.
Figure 3.9: Iterative decoding of a CAPTCHA.
The most confident character can be found using the probability score provided by the classifier,
although it is non-trivial to do so without masking out too much of the other characters. I solve this
problem as follows. In order to block a character, I try to match it with templates of each character
that can be gained by learning. One way to do that is to match scale-invariant feature transforms
(SIFT) between the patch and a reference template. While SIFT features can deal with scaling,
rotation and translation of characters, there are times when some frames have insufficient SIFT
features. My solution is to find a frame with enough features to apply SIFT, and then warp the
template to mask the target character in that frame. Once found, this frame is used as the initial
position in an incremental alignment approach based on KLT tracking. Essentially, I combine the
benefits of SIFT and KLT to provide a video sequence where the character I am most confident
about is omitted. At that point, I rerun my attack, but with one fewer character. This process is
repeated until I have no characters left to decode. This process is illustrated in Figure 3.9.
Runtime: Our implementation is based on a collection of modules written in a mix of C++ and
Matlab code. I make extensive use of the Open Source Computer Vision library (OpenCV). My
un-optimized code takes approximately 30s to decode the three characters in a MIOR CAPTCHA
when the feedback loop optimization (in stage Í) is disabled. With feedback enabled, processing
time increases to 250s. The bottleneck is in the incremental alignment procedure (written in
Matlab).
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3.3 Evaluation
I now discuss the results of experiments I performed on MIOR CAPTCHAs. Specifically, the
first set of experiments are based on video sequences downloaded off the demo page of NuCaptcha’s
website. On each visit to the demo page, a CAPTCHA with a random 3-character codeword is
displayed for 6 seconds before the video loops. The displayed CAPTCHAs were saved locally using
a Firefox plugin called NetVideoHunter. I downloaded 4500 CAPTCHAs during November and
December of 2011.
Attack Strategy Single Character Accuracy 3-Character Accuracy
Naı¨ve 68.5% (8216/12000) 36.3% (1450/4000)
Enhanced (no feedback) 90.0% (540/600) 75.5% (151/200)
Enhanced (with feedback) 90.3% (542/600) 77.0% (154/200)
Table 3.1: Reconstruction accuracy for various attacks.
The collected videos contain CAPTCHAs with all 19 backgrounds in use by NuCaptcha as of
December 2011. In each of these videos, the backgrounds are of moving scenes (e.g., waves on a
beach, kids playing baseball, etc.) and the text in the foreground either moves across the field of
view or in-place. I painstakingly labeled each of the videos by hand to obtain the ground truth. I note
that while NuCaptcha provides an API for obtaining CAPTCHAs, I opted not to use that service as
I did not want to interfere with their service in any way. In addition, my second set of experiments
examine several countermeasures against my attacks, and so for ethical reasons, I opted to perform
such experiments in a controlled manner rather than with any in-the-wild experimentation. These
countermeasures are also evaluated in my user study (§3.4).
3.3.1 Results
The naı¨ve attack was analyzed on 4000 CAPTCHAs. Due to time constraints, the extended
attack (with and without the feedback optimization) were each analyzed on a random sample of
500 CAPTCHAs. To determine an appropriate training set size, I varied the number of videos
as well as the number of extracted frames and examined the recognition rate. The results (not
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shown) show that while accuracy steadily increased with more training videos (e.g., 50 versus 100
videos), I only observed marginal improvement when the number of training patches taken from
each video exceeded 1500. In the subsequent analyses, I use 300 video sequences for training (i.e.,
900 codeword characters) and for each detected character, I select 2 frames containing that character
(yielding 1800 training patches in total). I use dense SIFT descriptors (Vedaldi and Fulkerson, 2010)
as the features for each patch (i.e., a SIFT descriptor is extracted for each pixel in the patch, and
concatenated to form a feature vector). The feature vectors are used to train the neural network.
For testing, I choose a different set of 200 CAPTCHAs, almost evenly distributed among the 19
backgrounds. The accuracy of the attacks (in §3.2) are given in Table 3.1.
The result indicate that the robustness of these MIOR CAPTCHAs are far weaker than one
would hope. In particular, my automated attacks can completely decode the CAPTCHAs more than
three quarters of the time. In fact, my success rates are even higher than some of the OCR-based
attacks on CR-still CAPTCHAs (Mori and Malik, 2003; Yan and Ahmad, 2007; Golle, 2008;
Bursztein et al., 2011b). There are, however, some obvious countermeasures that designers of
MIOR CAPTCHAs might employ.
3.3.2 Mitigation
To highlight some of the tensions that exists between the security and usability of MIOR
CAPTCHAs, we explore a series of possible mitigations to my attacks. In order to do so, I generate
video CAPTCHAs that closely mimic those from NuCaptcha. In particular, I built a framework for
generating videos with characters that move across a background scene with constant velocity in
the horizontal direction, and move up and down harmonically. Similar to NuCaptcha, the characters
of the codeword also rotate. My framework is tunable, and all the parameters are set to the defaults
calculated from the original videos from NuCaptcha (denoted Standard). I refer the interested reader
to Appendix A for more details on how I set the parameters. Given this framework, I explore the
following defenses:
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• Extended: the codeword consists of m > 3 random characters moving across a dynamic
scene.
• Overlapping: same as the Standard case (i.e., m = 3), except characters are more closely
overlapped.
• Semi-Transparent: identical to the Standard case, except that the characters are semi-
transparent.
• Emerging objects: a different MIOR CAPTCHA where the codewords are 3 characters but
created using an “Emerging Images” (Mitra et al., 2009) concept (see below).
Figure 3.10: Extended case. Top: scrolling; bottom: in-place.
Increasing the number of random characters shown in the CAPTCHA would be a natural way
to mitigate my attack. Hence, the Extended characters case is meant to investigate the point at
which the success rate of my attacks fall below a predefined threshold. An example is shown in
Figure 3.10. Similarly, I initially thought that increasing the overlap between consecutive characters
(i.e., the Overlapping defense, Fig. 3.11) might be a viable alternative. I estimate the degree that
two characters overlap by the ratio of the horizontal distance of their centers and their average
width. That is, suppose that one character is 20 pixels wide, and the other is 30 pixels wide. If the
horizontal distance of their centers is 20, then their overlap ratio is computed as 20/20+30
2
= 0.8.
The smaller this overlap ratio, the more the characters overlap. A ratio of 0.5 means that the middle
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character is completely overlapped in the horizontal direction. In both the original CAPTCHAs
from NuCaptcha and my Standard case, the overlap ratio is 0.95 for any two adjacent characters.
Figure 3.11: Overlapping characters (with ratio = 0.49).
The Semi-Transparent defense is an attempt to break the assumption that the foreground is of
constant color. In this case, foreground extraction (stage Ë) will be difficult. To mimic this defense
strategy, I adjust the background-to-foreground pixel ratio. An example is shown in figure 3.12.
Figure 3.12: Semi-transparent: 80% background to 20% foreground pixel ratio. (Best viewed in
color.)
The final countermeasure is based on the notion of Emerging Images proposed by Mitra et al.
(2009). Emergence refers to “the unique human ability to aggregate information from seemingly
meaningless pieces, and to perceive a whole that is meaningful” (Mitra et al., 2009).2 The concept
has been exploited in Computer Graphics to prevent automated tracking by computers, while
simultaneously allowing for high recognition rates in humans because of my remarkable visual
system. I apply the concepts outlined by Mitra et al. (Mitra et al., 2009) to generate CAPTCHAs that
are resilient to my attacks. The key differences between my implementation and the original paper
is that my input is 2D characters instead of 3D objects, and I do not have the luxury of incorporating
shadow information. My Emerging CAPTCHAs are constructed as follows:
1. I build a noisy frame Ibg by creating an image with each pixel following a Gaussian distribution.
I blur the image such that the value of each pixel is related to nearby pixels. I also include
2 Readers can view videos of the Emerging Images concept (Mitra et al., 2009) at http://graphics.stanford.
edu/˜niloy/research/emergence/emergence_image_siga_09.html.
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Figure 3.13: Emerging CAPTCHA. (a) Top: noisy background frame. Middle: derivative of
foreground image. Bottom: single frame for an Emerging CAPTCHA. (b) Successive frames.
time correspondence by filtering in the time domain. That is, each frame is a mixture of a
new noisy image and the last frame.
2. I generate an image Ifg similar to that in NuCaptcha. I then find the edges in the image by
calculating the norm of derivatives of the image.
3. I combine Ibg and Ifg by creating a new image I where each pixel in I is defined as I(x, y) :=
Ibg(x, y) ∗ exp( Ifgconst), where exp(x) is the exponential function. In this way, the pixels near
the boundary of characters in I are made more noisy than other pixels.
4. I define a constant threshold t < 0. All pixel values in I that are larger than t are made white.
All the other pixels in I are made black.
The above procedure results in a series of frames where no single frame contains the codeword
in a way that is easy to segment. The pixels near the boundaries of the characters are also more
likely to be blacker than other pixels, which the human visual system somehow uses to identify
the structure from motion. This feat remains challenging for computers since the points near the
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boundaries change color randomly, making it difficult, if not impossible, to track, using existing
techniques. An illustration is shown in Figure 3.13. To the best of my knowledge, I provide the
first concrete instantiation of the notion of Emerging Images applied to CAPTCHAs, as well as a
corresponding lab-based usability study (§3.4).
I refer interested readers to http://www.cs.unc.edu/videocaptcha/ for examples
of the mitigation strategies I explored.
3.3.2.1 Results
I now report on the results of running attacks on CAPTCHAs employing the aforementioned
defenses. Figure 3.14 depicts the results for the Extended defense strategy. In these experiments,
I generated 100 random CAPTCHAs for each m ∈ [3, 23]. My results clearly show that simply
increasing the codeword length is not necessarily a viable defense. In fact, even at 23 characters,
my success rate is still 5%, on average.
Figure 3.14: Attack success as a function of codeword length.
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Figure 3.15 shows the results for the Overlapping defense strategy. As before, the results are
averaged over 100 sequences per point. The graph shows that the success rate drops steadily as
the overlap ratio decreases (denoted as “sensitivity” level in that plot). Interestingly, NuCaptcha
mentions that this defense strategy is in fact one of the security features enabled by its behavioral
analysis engine. The images provided on their website for the “very secure” mode, however, have
an overlap ratio of 0.78, which my attacks would still be able to break more than 50% of the time.3
My success rate is still relatively high (at 5%) even when the overlap ratio is as low as 0.49. Recall
that, at that point, the middle character is 100% overlapped, and others are 51% overlapped.
Figure 3.15 also shows the results for the Semi-Transparent experiment. In that case, I varied
the transparency of the foreground pixel from 100% down to 20%. Even when the codewords are
barely visible (to the human eye), I am still able to break the CAPTCHAs 5% of the time. An
example of one such CAPTCHA (with a background to foreground ratio of 80 to 20 percent) was
shown earlier in Figure 3.12.
Lastly, I generated 100 CAPTCHAs based on my implementation of the Emerging Images
concept. It comes as no surprise that the attacks in this chapter were not able to decode a single
one of these challenges — precisely because these CAPTCHAs were specifically designed to make
optical flow tracking and object segmentation difficult. From a security perspective, these MIOR
CAPTCHAs are more robust than the other defenses I examined. I return to that discussion in §3.5.
3.3.2.2 Discussion
The question remains, however, whether for any of the defenses, parameters could be tuned
to increase the robustness and still retain usablility. I explore precisely that question next. That
said, the forthcoming analysis raises interesting questions, especially as it relates to the robustness
of CAPTCHAs. In particular, there is presently no consensus on the required adversarial effort a
CAPTCHA should present, or the security threshold in terms of success rate that adversaries should
be held below. For example, Chellapilla et al. (Chellapilla et al., 2005b) state: “automated attacks
3 See the Security Features discussed at http://www.nucaptcha.com/features/security-features,
2012.
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Figure 3.15: Attack success rate against Overlapping and Semi-Transparent defenses. Sensitivity
refers to the overlap ratio (circles) or the background-to-foreground ratio (squares).
should not be more than 0.01% successful but the human success rate should be at least 90%.”
Others argue that “if it is at least as expensive for an attacker to break the challenge by machine
than it would be to pay a human to take the CAPTCHA, the test can be considered secure” (Hidalgo
and Alvarez, 2011). Zhu et al. (Zhu et al., 2010) use the metric that the bot success rate should not
exceed 0.6%.
In the course of my pilot studies, it became clear that if the parameters for the Extended, Over-
lapping, and Semi-Transparent countermeasures are set too stringently (e.g., to defeat automated
attacks 99% of the time), then the resulting MIOR CAPTCHAs would be exceedingly difficult for
humans to solve. Therefore, to better measure the tension between usability and security, I set the
parameters for the videos (in §3.4) to values where my attacks have a 5% success rate, despite that
being intolerably high for practical security. Any CAPTCHA at this parametrization, which is found
to be unusable, is thus entirely unviable.
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3.4 User study
We now report on an IRB-approved user study with 25 participants that we conducted to
assess the usability of the aforementioned countermeasures. If the challenges produced by the
countermeasures prove too difficult for both computers and humans to solve, then they are not viable
as CAPTCHA challenges. We chose a controlled lab study because besides collecting quantitative
performance data, it gave us the opportunity to collect participants’ impromptu reactions and
comments, and allowed us to interview participants about their experience. This type of information
is invaluable in learning why certain mitigation strategies are unacceptable or difficult for users and
learning which strategies are deemed most acceptable. Additionally, while web-based or Mechanical
Turk studies may have allowed us to collect data from more participants, such approaches lack the
richness of data available when the experimenter has the opportunity to interact with the participants
one-on-one. Mechanical Turk studies have previously been used in CAPTCHA research (Bursztein
et al., 2010) when the goal of the studies are entirely performance-based. However, since we
are studying new mitigation strategies, I felt that it was important to gather both qualitative and
quantitative data for a more holistic perspective.
(a) Forest background (b) Beach background (c) Sky background
Figure 3.16: Three backgrounds used for the challenges, shown for the Semi-Transparent variant.
3.4.1 Methodology
I compared the defenses in §3.3.2 to a Standard approach which mimics NuCaptcha’s design.
In these CAPTCHAs the video contains scrolling text with 2-3 words in white font, followed by
three random red characters that move along the same trajectory as the white words. Similar to
NuCaptcha, the red characters (i.e., the codewords) also independently rotate as they move. For the
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Extended strategy, I set m = 23. All 23 characters are continuously visible on the screen. During
pilot testing, I also tried a scrolling 23-character variation of the Extended scheme. However, this
proved extremely difficult for users to solve and they voiced strong dislike (and outrage) for the
variation. For the Overlapping strategy, I set the ratio to be 0.49. Recall that at this ratio, the
middle character is overlapped 100% of the time, and the others are 51% overlapped. For the
Semi-Transparent strategy, I set the ratio to be 80% background and 20% foreground. For all
experiments, I use the same alphabet (of 20 characters) in NuCaptcha’s original videos.
A challenge refers to a single CAPTCHA puzzle to be solved by the user. Each challenge was
displayed on a 6-second video clip that used a canvas of size 300× 126 and looped continuously.
This is the same specification used in NuCaptcha’s videos. Three different HD video backgrounds
(of a forest, a beach, and a sky) were used. Some examples are shown in Figure 3.16. Sixty
challenges were generated for each variation (20 for each background, as applicable).
I also tested the Emerging strategy. The three-character codeword was represented by black
and white pixel-based noise as described in §3.3.2. Sixty challenges were generated using the same
video parameters as the other conditions.
The twenty-five participants were undergraduate, graduate students, staff and faculty (15 males,
10 females, mean age 26) from a variety of disciplines. A within-subjects experimental design was
used, where each participant had a chance to complete a set of 10 CAPTCHAs for each strategy.
The order of presentation for the variations was counterbalanced according to a 5× 5 Latin Square
to eliminate biases from learning effects; Latin Squares are preferred over random ordering of
conditions because randomization could lead to a situation where one condition is favored (e.g.,
appearing in the last position more frequently than other conditions, giving participants more chance
to practice). Within each variation, challenges were randomly selected.
A simple web-based user interface was designed where users could enter their response in the
textbox and press submit, could request a new challenge, or could access the help file. Indication of
correctness was provided when users submitted their responses, and users were randomly shown
the next challenge in the set. Immediately after completing the 10 challenges for a variation, users
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were asked to complete a paper-based questionnaire collecting their perception and opinion of that
variation. At the end of the session, a brief interview was conducted to gather any overall comments.
Each participant completed their session one-on-one with the experimenter. A session lasted at most
45 minutes and users were compensated $15 for their time.
3.4.2 Data Collection
The user interface was instrumented to log each user’s interactions with the system. For each
challenge, the user’s textual response, the timing information, and the outcome was recorded. A
challenge could result in three possible outcomes: success, error, or skipped. Questionnaire and
interview data was also collected.
3.4.3 Analysis
My analysis focused on the effects of five different CAPTCHA variants on outcomes and
solving times. I also analyzed and reviewed questionnaire data representing participant perceptions
of the five variants. I used several statistical tests and the within-subjects design of my study
impacted my choice of statistical tests; in each case the chosen test accounted for the fact that I had
multiple data points from each participant. In all of my tests, I chose p < 0.05 as the threshold for
determining statistical significance.
One-way repeated-measures ANOVAs (Lazar et al., 2010) were used to evaluate aggregate
differences between the means for success rates and times. When the ANOVA revealed a significant
difference, I used post-hoc Tukey HSD tests (Lowry, 1998) to determine between which pairs the
differences occurred. Here, I was interested only in whether the four proposed mitigation strategies
differed from the Standard variant, so I report only on these four cases.
My questionnaires used Likert-scale responses to assess agreement with particular statements (1
- Strongly Disagree, 10 - Strongly Agree). To compare this ordinal data, I used the non-parametric
Friedman’s Test (Lowry, 1998). When overall significant differences were found, I used post-hoc
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Pairwise Wilcoxon tests with Bonferroni correction to see which of the four proposed variants
differed from the Standard variant.
Outcomes: Participants were presented with 10 challenges of each variant. Figure 3.17 shows
a stacked bar graph representing the mean number of success, error, and skipped outcomes. To
be identified as a Success, the user’s response had to be entirely correct. An Error occurred when
the user’s response did not match the challenge’s solution. A Skipped outcome occurred when the
participant pressed the “Get A New Challenge” button and was presented with a different challenge.
I observe differences in the outcomes, with the Standard variant being most successful and the
Semi-Transparent variant resulting in the most skipped outcomes.
Figure 3.17: Mean number of success, error, and skipped outcomes for Standard, Extended,
Overlapping, Semi-Transparent and Emerging variants, respectively.
For the purposes of my statistical tests, errors and skipped outcomes were grouped since in both
cases the user was unable to solve the challenge. Each participant was given a score comprising the
number of successful outcomes for each variant (out of 10 challenges).4
A one-way repeated-measure ANOVA showed significant differences between the five variants
(F (4, 120) = 29.12, p < 0.001). I used post-hoc Tukey HSD tests to see whether any of the
differences occurred between the Standard variant and any of the other four variants. The tests
4 One participant opted to view only six challenges in each of the Extended and Emerging variants. I count the remaining
four as skips.
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showed a statistically significant difference between all pairs except for the Standard⇔Emerging
pair. This means that the Extended, Overlapping, and Semi-Transparent variants had a significantly
lower number of successes than the Standard variant, while Emerging variant showed no difference.
Time to Solve: The time to solve was measured as the time between when the challenge was
displayed to when the response was received. This included the time to type the answer (correctly
or incorrectly), as well as the time it took the system to receive the reply (since the challenges were
served from my local server, transmission time was negligible). Times for skipped challenges were
not included since users made “skip” decisions very quickly and this may unfairly skew the results
towards shorter mean times. I include challenges that resulted in errors because in these cases
participants actively tried to solve the challenge. The time distributions are depicted in Figure 3.18
using boxplots. Notice that the Extended variant took considerably longer to solve than the others.
I examined the differences in mean times using a one-way repeated-measure ANOVA. The
ANOVA showed overall significant differences between the five variants (F (4, 120) = 112.95, p <
0.001). Once again, I compared the Standard variant to the others in my post-hoc tests. Tukey HSD
tests showed no significant differences between the Standard⇔Emerging or Standard⇔Overlapping
pairs. However, significant differences were found for the Standard⇔Semi-Transparent and
Standard⇔Extended pairs. This means that the Semi-Transparent and Extended variants took
significantly longer to solve than the Standard variant, but the others showed no differences.
Skipped outcomes: The choice of background appears to have especially impacted the usability
of the Semi-Transparent variant. Participants most frequently skipped challenges for the Semi-
Transparent variant and found the Forest background especially difficult to use. Many users would
immediately skip any challenge that appeared with the Forest background because the transparent
letters were simply too difficult to see. For the Semi-Transparent variant, 35% of challenges
presented on the Forest background were skipped, compared 17-18% of challenges using the other
two backgrounds. Participants’ verbal and written comments confirm that they found the Forest
background very difficult, with some users mentioning that they could not even find the letters as
they scrolled over some parts of the image.
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Figure 3.18: Time taken to solve the MBOR CAPTCHAs.
Errors: Figure 3.19 shows the distribution of errors. It shows that the majority of errors were
made on the middle characters of the challenge. I also examined the types of errors, and found
that most were mistakes between characters that have similar appearances. The most commonly
confused pairs were: S/5, P/R, E/F, V/N, C/G, and 7/T. About half of the errors for the Extended
variant were due to confusing pairs of characters, while the other half involved either missing letters
or including extra ones. For the other variants, nearly all errors were due to confusing pairs of
characters.
User perception: Immediately after completing the set of challenges for each variant, partici-
pants completed a Likert-scale questionnaire to collect their opinion and perception of that variant.
For each variant, participants were asked to rate their agreement with the following statements:
1. It was easy to accurately solve the challenge
2. The challenges were easy to understand
3. This CAPTCHA mechanism was pleasant to use
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Figure 3.19: Location of errors within the codewords.
(a) Accuracy (b) Easy to understand (c) Pleasant to use (d) More error-prone (re-
sponses inverted)
Figure 3.20: Likert-scale responses: 1 is most negative, 10 is most positive.
4. This CAPTCHA mechanism is more prone to mistakes than traditional text-based CAPTCHAs
Figure 3.20 shows boxplots representing users’ responses. Since Q.4 was negatively worded,
responses were inverted for easier comparisons. In all cases, higher values on the y-axis indicate a
more favorable response.
The results show that users clearly preferred the Standard variant and rated the others consider-
ably lower on all subjective measures. Friedman’s Tests showed overall significant differences for
each question (p < 0.001). Pairwise Wilcoxon Tests with Bonferroni correction were used to assess
differences between the Standard variant and each of the other variants. Significant differences
were found between each pair compared. The only exceptions are that users felt that the Extended
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and Emerging variants were no more difficult to understand (Question 2) than the Standard variant.
This result appears to contradict the results observed in Figure 3.20 and I believe that this is because
the Wilcoxon test compares ranks rather than means or medians.
Comments: Participants had the opportunity to provide free-form comments about each variant
and offer verbal comments to the experimenter. Samples are included in Appendix B. Participants
clearly preferred the Standard variant, and most disliked the Extended variant. Of the remaining
schemes, the Emerging variant seemed most acceptable although it also had its share of negative
reactions (e.g., one subject found it to be hideous).
3.5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
My attack inherently leverages the temporal information in moving-image object recognition
(MIOR) CAPTCHAs, and also exploits the fact that only object recognition of known objects is
needed. My methods also rely on a reasonably consistent appearance or slowly varying appearance
over time. That said, they can be applied to any set of known objects or narrowly defined objects
under affine transformations that are known to work well with detection methods in computer
vision (Viola and Jones, 2001). For the specific case of NuCaptcha, I showed that not only
are there inherent weaknesses in the current MIOR CAPTCHA design, but that several obvious
countermeasures (e.g., extending the length of the codeword) are not viable attack countermeasures.
More importantly, my work highlights the fact that the choice of underlying hard problem by
NuCaptcha’s designers was misguided; its particular implementation falls into a solvable subclass
of computer vision problems.
In the case of emergent CAPTCHAs, my attacks fail for two main reasons. First, in each
frame there are not enough visual cues that help distinguish the characters from the background.
Second, the codewords have no temporally consistent appearance. Combined, these two facts pose
significant challenges to existing computer vision methods, which typically assume reasonably
consistent appearance and visually distinctive foregrounds (Yilmaz et al., 2006). Nevertheless, my
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user study showed that people had little trouble solving these CAPTCHAs. This bodes well for
emergent CAPTCHAs—for today’s attacks.
Looking towards the future, greater robustness would result if MIOR CAPTCHAs required
automated attacks to perform classification, categorization of classes with large inner class variance,
or to identify higher level semantics to understand the presented challenge. Consider, for example,
the case where the user is presented with two objects (a person and a truck) at the same scale, and
asked to identify which one is larger. To succeed, the automated attack would need to determine the
objects (without prior knowledge of what the objects are of) and then understand the relationship.
Humans can perform this task because of the inherent priors learned in daily life, but this feat
remains a daunting problem in computer vision. Therefore, this combination seems to offer the right
balance and underscores the ideas put forth by Naor (Naor, 1996) and von Ahn et al. (Ahn et al.,
2003)—i.e., it is prudent to employ hard (and useful) underlying AI problems in CAPTCHAs since
it leads to a win-win situation: either the CAPTCHA is not broken and there is a way to distinguish
between humans and computers, or it is broken and a useful problem is solved.
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CHAPTER 4: DEFEATING FACE LIVENESS DETECTION WITH VIRTUAL MODELS
4.1 Introduction
Over the past few years, face authentication systems have become increasingly popular as
an enhanced security feature in both mobile devices and desktop computers. As the underlying
computer vision algorithms have matured, many application designers and nascent specialist vendors
have jumped in and started to offer solutions for mobile devices with varying degrees of security
and usability. Other more well-known players, like Apple and Google, are posed to enter the market
with their own solutions, having already acquired several facial recognition software companies1.
While the market is segmented based on the type of technology offered (e.g., 2D facial recognition,
3D recognition, and facial analytics/face biometric authentication), Gartner research estimates
that the overall market will grow to over $6.5 billion in 2018 (compared to roughly $2 billion
today) (Gartner, 2014).
With this push to market, improving the accuracy of face recognition technologies remains
an active area of research in academia and industry. Google’s FaceNet system, which achieved
near-perfect accuracy on the Labeled Faces in the Wild dataset (Schroff et al., 2015), exemplifies
one such effort. Additionally, recent advances with deep learning algorithms (Taigman et al., 2014;
Parkhi et al., 2015) show much promise in strengthening the robustness of the face identification
and authentication techniques used today. Indeed, state-of-the-art face identification systems can
now outperform their human counterparts (Lu and Tang, 2014), and this high accuracy is one of the
driving factors behind the increased use of face recognition systems.
1 See, for example, “Apple Acquires Face Recognition, Expression Analysis firm, Emotient”, TechTimes, Jan, 2016;
“Google Acquires Facial Recognition Software Company PittPar,” WSJ, 2011.
81
However, even given the high accuracy of modern face recognition technologies, their appli-
cation in face authentication systems has left much to be desired. For instance, at the Black Hat
security conference in 2009, Duc and Minh (2009) demonstrated the weaknesses of popular face au-
thentication systems from commodity vendors like Lenovo, Asus, and Toshiba. Amusingly, Duc and
Minh (2009) were able to reliably bypass face-locked computers simply by presenting the software
with photographs and fake pictures of faces. Essentially, the security of these systems rested solely
on the problem of face detection, rather than face authentication. This widely publicized event led
to subsequent integration of more robust face authentication protocols. One prominent example is
Android OS, which augmented its face authentication approach in 2012 to require users to blink
while authenticating (i.e. as a countermeasure to still-image spoofing attacks). Unfortunately, this
approach was also shown to provide little protection, and can be easily bypassed by presenting the
system with two alternating images — one with the user’s eyes open, and one with her eyes closed.
These attacks underscore the fact that face authentication systems require robust security features
beyond mere recognition in order to foil spoofing attacks.
Loosely speaking, three types of such spoofing attacks have been used in the past, to varying
degrees of success: (i) still-image-based spoofing, (ii) video-based spoofing, and (iii) 3D-mask-
based spoofing. As the name suggests, still-image-based spoofing attacks present one or more still
images of the user to the authentication camera; each image is either printed on paper or shown
with a digitized display. Video-based spoofing, on the other hand, presents a pre-recorded video
of the victim’s moving face in an attempt to trick the system into falsely recognizing motion as an
indication of liveness. The 3D-mask-based approach, wherein 3D-printed facial masks are used,
was recently explored by Erdogmus and Marcel (2014).
As is the typical case in the field of computer security, the cleverness of skilled, motivated
adversaries drove system designers to incorporate defensive techniques in the biometric solutions
they develop. This cat-and-mouse game continues to play out in the realm of face authentication
systems, and the current recommendation calls for the use of well-designed face liveness detection
schemes (that attempt to distinguish a real user from a spoofed one). Indeed, most modern systems
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now require more active participation compared to simple blink detection, often asking the user to
rotate her head or raise an eyebrow during login. Motion-based techniques that check, for example,
that the input captured during login exhibits sufficient 3D behavior, are also an active area of
research in face authentication.
One such example is the recent work of Li et al. (2015) that appeared in CCS’2015. In that
work, the use of liveness detection was proposed as a solution to thwarting video-based attacks by
checking the consistency of the recorded data with inertial sensors. Such a detection scheme relies
on the fact that as a camera moves relative to a user’s stationary head, the facial features it detects
will also move in a predictable way. Thus, a 2D video of the victim would have to be captured under
the exact same camera motion in order to fool the system.
As mentioned in (Li et al., 2015), 3D-printed facial reconstructions offer one option for defeating
motion-based liveness detection schemes. In my view, a more realizable approach is to present
the system with a 3D facial mesh in a virtual reality (VR) environment. Here, the motion of the
authenticating camera is tracked, and the VR system internally rotates and translates the mesh to
match. In this fashion, the camera observes exactly the same movement of facial features as it would
for a real face, fulfilling the requirements for liveness detection. Such an attack defeats color-image-
and motion-based face authentication on a fundamental level because, with sufficient effort, a VR
system can display an environment that is essentially indistinguishable from real-world input.
In this paper, I show that it is possible to undermine modern face authentication systems using
one such attack. Moreover, I show that an accurate facial model can be built using only a handful of
publicly accessible photos — collected, for example, from social network websites — of the victim.
From a pragmatic point of view, I am confronted with two main challenges: i) the number of photos
of the target may be limited, and ii) for each available photo, the illumination setting is unknown
and the user’s pose and expression are not constrained. To overcome these challenges, I leverage
robust, publicly available 3D face reconstruction methods from the field of computer vision, and
adapt these techniques to fit my needs. Once a credible synthetic model of a user is obtained, I then
employ entry-level virtual reality displays to defeat the state of the art in liveness detection.
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The rest of this chapter is laid out as follows: §4.2 outlines the steps I take to perform my
VR-based attack. In §4.3, I evaluate the performance of my method on five commercial face
authentication systems and, additionally, on a proposed state-of-the-art system for liveness detection.
I suggest steps that could be taken to mitigate my attack in §4.4.
4.2 Our Approach
Figure 4.1: Overview of my proposed approach.
A high-level overview of my approach for creating a synthetic face model is shown in Figure
4.1. Given one or more photos of the target user, I first automatically extract the landmarks of
the user’s face (stage Ê). These landmarks capture the pose, shape, and expression of the user.
Next, I estimate a 3D facial model for the user, optimizing the geometry to match the observed 2D
landmarks (stage Ë). Once I have recovered the shape of the user’s face, I use a single image to
transfer texture information to the 3D mesh. Transferring the texture is non-trivial since parts of
the face might be self-occluded (e.g., when the photo is taken from the side). The texture of these
occluded parts must be estimated in a manner that does not introduce too many artifacts (stage Ì).
Once the texture is filled, I have a realistic 3D model of the user’s face based on a single image.
However, despite its realism, the output of stage Ì is still not able to fool modern face
authentication systems. The primary reason for this is that modern face authentication systems use
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the subject’s gaze direction as a strong feature, requiring the user to look at the camera in order to
pass the system. Therefore, I must also automatically correct the direction of the user’s gaze on
the textured mesh (stage Í). The adjusted model can then be deformed to produce animation for
different facial expressions, such as smiling, blinking, and raising the eyebrows (stage Î). These
expressions are often used as liveness clues in face authentication systems, and as such, I need to be
able to automatically reproduce them on my 3D model. Finally, I output the textured 3D model into
a virtual reality system (stage Ï).
Using this framework, an adversary can bypass both the face recognition and liveness detection
components of modern face authentication systems. In what follows, I discuss the approach I take
to solve each of the various challenges that arise in my six-staged process.
4.2.1 Facial Landmark Extraction
Starting from multiple input photos of the user, my first task is to perform facial landmark
extraction. Following the approach of Zhu et al. (2015), I extract 68 2D facial landmarks in each
image using the supervised descent method (SDM) (Xiong and De la Torre, 2013). SDM successfully
identifies facial landmarks under relatively large pose differences (±45 deg yaw, ±90 deg roll,
±30 deg pitch). I chose the technique of Zhu et al. (2015) because it achieves a median alignment
error of 2.7 pixels on well-known datasets (Baker and Matthews, 2004) and outperforms other
commonly used techniques (e.g., (Belhumeur et al., 2013)) for landmark extraction.
For my needs, SDM works well on most online images, even those where the face is captured
at a low resolution (e.g., 40× 50 pixels). It does, however, fail on a handful of the online photos I
collected (less than 5%) where the pose is beyond the tolerance level of the algorithm. If this occurs,
I simply discard the image. Example landmark extractions are shown in Figure 4.2.
4.2.2 3D Model Reconstruction
The 68 extracted 3D point landmarks from each of the N input images provide us with a set of
coordinates si,j ∈ R2, with 1 ≤ i ≤ 68, 1 ≤ j ≤ N . The projection of the 3D points Si,j ∈ R3 of
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Figure 4.2: Examples of facial landmark extraction
the face onto the image coordinates si,j follows what is called the “weak perspective projection”
(WPP) model (Horaud et al., 1997), computed as follows:
si,j = fjPRj (Si,j + tj) , (4.1)
where fj is a uniform scaling factor; P is the projection matrix
 1 0 0
0 1 0
; Rj is a 3 × 3 rotation
matrix defined by the pitch, yaw, and roll, respectively, of the face relative to the camera; and
tj ∈ R3 is the translation of the face w.r.t. the camera. Among these parameters, only si,j and P are
known, and so I must estimate the others.
Fortunately, a large body of work exists on the shape statistics of human faces. Following
Zhu et al. (2015), I capture face characteristics using the 3D Morphable Model (3DMM) (Paysan
et al., 2009) with an expression extension proposed by Chu et al. (2014). This method characterizes
variations in face shape for a population using principal component analysis (PCA), with each
individual’s 68 3D point landmarks being concatenated into a single feature vector for the analysis.
These variations can be split into two categories: constant factors related to an individual’s distinct
appearance (identity), and non-constant factors related to expression. The identity axes capture
characteristics such as face width, brow placement, or lip size, while the expression axes capture
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variations like smiling versus frowning. Example axes for variations in expression are shown in
Figure 4.3.
More formally, for any given individual, the 3D coordinates Si,j on the face can be modeled as
Si,j = S¯i + A
id
i α
id + Aexpi α
exp
j , (4.2)
where S¯i is the statistical average of Si,j among the individuals in the population, Aidi is the set
of principal axes of variation related to identity, and Aexpi is the set of principal axes related to
expression. αid and αexpj are the identity and expression weight vectors, respectively, that determine
person-specific facial characteristics and expression-specific facial appearance. I obtain S¯i and Aidi
using the 3D Morphable Model (Paysan et al., 2009) and Aexpi from Face Warehouse (Cao et al.,
2014).
Figure 4.3: Illustration of identity axes (heavy-set to thin) and expression axes (pursed lips to open
smile).
When combining Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2), I inevitably run into the so-called “correspondence
problem.” That is, given each identified facial landmark si,j in the input image, I need to find the
corresponding 3D point Si′,j on the underlying face model. For landmarks such as the corners of
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the eyes and mouth, this correspondence is self-evident and consistent across images. However,
for contour landmarks marking the edge of the face in an image, the associated 3D point on the
user’s facial model is pose-dependent: when the user is directly facing the camera, their jawline
and cheekbones are fully in view, and the observed 2D landmarks lie on the fiducial boundary on
the user’s 3D facial model. When the user rotates their face left (or right), however, the previously
observed 2D contour landmarks on the left (resp. right) side of the face shift out of view. As a result,
the observed 2D landmarks on the edge of the face correspond to 3D points closer to the center of
the face. This 3D point displacement must be taken into account when recovering the underlying
facial model.
Qu et al. (2015a) deal with contour landmarks using constraints on surface normal direction,
based on the observation that points on the edge of the face in the image will have surface normals
perpendicular to the viewing direction. However, this approach is less robust because the normal
direction cannot always be accurately estimated and, as such, requires careful parameter tuning.
Zhu et al. (2015) proposed a “landmark marching” scheme that iteratively estimates 3D head pose
and 2D contour landmark position. While their approach is efficient and robust against different face
angles and surface shapes, it can only handle a single image and cannot refine the reconstruction
result using additional images.
My solution to the correspondence problem is to model 3D point variance for each facial
landmark using a pre-trained Gaussian distribution (see Appendix C). Unlike the approach of Zhu
et al. (2015) which is based on a single image input, I solve for pose, perspective, expression, and
neutral-expression parameters over all images jointly. From this, I obtain a neutral-expression
model Si of the user’s face. A typical reconstruction, Si, is presented in Figure 4.4.
4.2.3 Facial Texture Patching
Given the 3D facial model, the next step is to patch the model with realistic textures that can be
recognized by the face authentication systems. Due to the appearance variation across social media
photos, I have to achieve this by mapping the pixels in a single captured photo onto the 3D facial
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Figure 4.4: 3D facial model (right) built from facial landmarks extracted from four images (left).
model, which avoids the challenges of mixing different illuminations of the face. However, this still
leaves many of the regions without texture, and those untextured spots will be noticeable to modern
face authentication systems. To fill these missing regions, the naı¨ve approach is to utilize the vertical
symmetry of the face and fill the missing texture regions with their symmetrical complements.
However, doing so would lead to strong artifacts at the boundary of missing regions. A realistic
textured model should be free of these artifacts.
To lessen the presence of these artifacts, one approach is to iteratively average the color
of neighboring vertices as a color trend and then mix this trend with texture details (Qu et al.,
2015b). However, such an approach over-simplifies the problem and fails to realistically model the
illumination of facial surfaces. Instead, I follow the suggestion of Zhu et al. (2015) and estimate
facial illumination using spherical harmonics (Zhang and Samaras, 2006), then fill in texture details
with Poisson editing (Pe´rez et al., 2003). In this way, the output model will appears to have a
more natural illumination. Sadly, I cannot use their approach directly as it reconstructs a planar
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normalized face, instead of a 3D facial model, and so I must extend their technique to the 3D surface
mesh.
The idea I implemented for improving my initial textured 3D model is as follows: Starting from
the single photo chosen as the main texture source, I first estimate and subsequently remove the
illumination conditions present in the photo. Next, I map the textured facial model onto a plane
via a conformal mapping, then impute the unknown texture using 2D Poisson editing. I further
extend their approach to three dimensions and perform Poisson editing directly on the surface of
the facial model. Intuitively, the idea behind Poisson editing is to keep the detailed texture in the
editing region while enforcing the texture’s smoothness across the boundary. This process is defined
mathematically as
∆f = ∆g, s.tf |∂Ω = f 0|∂Ω, (4.3)
where Ω is the editing region, f is the editing result, f 0 is the known original texture value, and g is
the texture value in the editing region that is unknown and needs to be patched with its reflection
complement. On a 3D surface mesh, every vertex is connected with 2 to 8 neighbors. Transforming
Eq. 4.3 into discrete form, I have
|Np|fp −
∑
q∈Np∩Ω
fq =
∑
q∈Np∩Ω
f 0q + (∆g)p, (4.4)
where Np is the neighborhood of point p on the mesh. My enhancement is a natural extension
of the Poisson editing method suggested in the seminal work of Pe´rez et al. (2003), although no
formulation was given for 3D. By solving Eq. 4.4 instead of projecting the texture onto a plane and
solving Eq. 4.3, I obtain more realistic texture on the facial model, as shown in Figure 4.5.
4.2.4 Gaze Correction
I now have a realistic 3D facial model of the user. Yet, I found that models at stage Ì were
unable to bypass most well-known face recognition systems. Digging deeper into the reasons why, I
observed that most recognition systems rely heavily on gaze direction during authentication, i.e. they
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Figure 4.5: Naı¨ve symmetrical patching (left); Planar Poisson editing (middle); 3D Poisson editing
(right).
fail if the user is not looking at the device. To address this, I introduce a simple, but effective,
approach to correct the gaze direction of my synthetic model (Figure 4.1, Stage Í).
The idea is as follows. Since I have already reconstructed the texture of the facial model, I
can synthesize the texture data in the eye region. These data contain the color information from
the sclera, cornea, and pupil and form a three-dimensional distribution in the RGB color space.
I estimate this color distribution with a 3D Gaussian function whose three principal components
can be computed as (b1, b2, b3) with weight (σ1, σ2, σ3), σ1 ≥ σ2 ≥ σ3 > 0. I perform the same
analysis for the eye region of the average face model obtained from 3DMM (Paysan et al., 2009),
whose eye is looking straight towards the camera, and I similarly obtain principal color components
(bstd1 , b
std
2 , b
std
3 ) with weight (σ
std
1 , σ
std
2 , σ
std
3 ), σ
std
1 ≥ σstd2 ≥ σstd3 > 0. Then, I convert the eye texture
from the average model into the eye texture of the user. For a texture pixel c in the eye region of
average texture, I convert it to
cconvert =
3∑
i=1
σi
σstdi
(c′bstdi )bi. (4.5)
In effect, I align the color distribution of the average eye texture with the color distribution of the
user’s eye texture. By patching the eye region of the facial model with this converted average
texture, I realistically capture the user’s eye appearance with forward gaze.
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4.2.5 Adding Facial Animations
Some of the liveness detection methods that I test require that the user performs specific actions
in order to unlock the system. To mimic these actions, I can simply animate my facial model using
a pre-defined set of facial expressions (e.g., from FaceWarehouse (Cao et al., 2014)). Recall that in
deriving in Eq. 4.2, I have already computed the weight for the identity axis αid, which captures
the user-specific face structure in a neutral expression. I can adjust the expression of the model
by substituting a specific, known expression weight vector αexpstd into Eq. 4.2. By interpolating the
model’s expression weight from 0 to αexpstd , I am able to animate the 3D facial model to smile, laugh,
blink, and raise the eyebrows (see Figure 4.6).
Figure 4.6: Animated expressions. From left to right: smiling, laughing, closing the eyes, and
raising the eyebrows.
4.2.6 Leveraging Virtual Reality
While the previous steps were necessary to recover a realistic, animated model of a targeted
user’s face, my driving insight is that virtual reality systems can be leveraged to display this model
as if it were a real, three-dimensional face. This VR-based spoofing constitutes a fundamentally
new class of attacks that exploit weaknesses in camera-based authentication systems.
In a VR system, the synthetic 3D face of the user is displayed on the screen of the device, and as
the device rotates and translates in the real world, the 3D face moves accordingly. To an observing
face authentication system, the depth and motion cues of the display exactly match what would be
expected for a human face. My experimental VR setup consists of custom 3D-rendering software
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displayed on a Nexus 5X smart phone. Given the ubiquity of smart phones in modern society, my
implementation is practical and comes at no additional hardware cost to an attacker. In practice, any
device with similar rendering capabilities and inertial sensors could be used.
On smart phones, accelerometers and gyroscopes work in tandem to provide the device with a
sense of self-motion. An example use case is detecting when the device is rotated from a portrait
view to a landscape view, and rotating the display, in response. However, these sensors are not
able to recover absolute translation — that is, the device is unable to determine how its position
has changed in 3D space. This presents a challenge because without knowledge of how the device
has moved in 3D space, I cannot move my 3D facial model in a realistic fashion. As a result, the
observed 3D facial motion will not agree with the device’s inertial sensors, causing my method to
fail on methods like that of Li et al. (2015) that use such data for liveness detection.
Fortunately, it is possible to track the 3D position of a moving smart phone using its outward-
facing camera with structure from motion (see §2.3.3.2). Using the camera’s video stream as input,
the method works by tracking points in the surrounding environment (e.g., the corners of tables)
and then estimating their position in 3D space. At the same time, the 3D position of the camera is
recovered relative to the tracked points, thus inferring the camera’s change in 3D position. Several
computer vision approaches have been recently introduced to solve this problem accurately and in
real time on mobile devices (Schops et al., 2015; Kolev et al., 2014; Tanskanen et al., 2013; Ventura
et al., 2014). In my experiments, I make use of a printed marker2 placed on a wall in front of the
camera, rather than tracking arbitrary objects in the surrounding scene; however, the end result is
the same. By incorporating this module into my proof of concept, the perspective of the viewed
model due to camera translation can be simulated with high consistency and low latency.3
An example setup for my attack is shown in Figure 4.7. The VR system consists of a Nexus 5X
unit using its outward-facing camera to track a printed marker in the environment. On the Nexus
2 See Goggle Paper at http://gogglepaper.com/
3 Specialized VR systems such as the Oculus Rift could be used to further improve the precision and latency of camera
tracking. Such advanced, yet easily obtainable, hardware has the potential to deliver even more sophisticated VR
attacks compared to what is presented here.
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5X screen, the system displays a 3D facial model whose perspective is always consistent with the
spatial position and orientation of the authentication device. The authenticating camera views the
facial model on the VR display, and it is successfully duped into believing it is viewing the real face
of the user.
Figure 4.7: Example setup using virtual reality to mimic 3D structure from motion. The authentica-
tion system observes a virtual display of a user’s 3D facial model that rotates and translates and the
device moves. To recover the 3D translation of the VR device, an outward-facing camera is used to
track a marker in the surrounding environment.
4.3 Evaluation
We now demonstrate that my proposed spoofing method constitutes a significant security
threat to modern face authentication systems. Using real social media photos from consenting
users, we successfully broke five commercial authentication systems with a practical, end-to-end
implementation of my approach. To better understand the threat, we further systematically run
lab experiments to test the capabilities and limitations of my proposed method. Moreover, we
successfully test my proposed approach with the latest motion-based liveness detection approach by
Li et al. (2015), which is not yet available in commercial systems.
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Participants
We recruited 20 volunteers for my tests of commercial face authentication systems. The
volunteers were recruited by word of mouth and span graduate students and faculty in two separate
research labs. Consultation with my IRB departmental liaison revealed that no application was
needed. There was no compensation for participating in the lab study. The ages of the participants
range between 24 and 44 years, and the sample consists of 6 females and 14 males. The participants
come from a variety of ethnic backgrounds (as stated by the volunteers): 6 are of Asian descent, 4 are
Indian, 1 is African-American, 1 is Hispanic, and 8 are Caucasian. With their consent, we collected
public photos from the users’ Facebook and Google+ social media pages; we also collected any
photos we could find of the users on personal or community web pages, as well as via image search
on the web. The smallest number of photos we collected for an individual was 3, and the largest
number was 27. The average number of photos was 15, with a standard deviation of approximately
6 photos. No private information about the subjects was recorded beside storage of the photographs
they consented to. Any display of images of subjects displayed in this chapter was done with the
consent of that particular volunteer.
For my experiments, we manually extracted the region around the user’s face in each image.
An adversary could also perform this action automatically using tag information on social media
sites, when available. One interesting aspect of social media photos is they may capture significant
physical changes of users over time. For instance, one of my participants lost 20 pounds in the prior
6 months, and my reconstruction had to utilize images from before and after this change. Two other
users had frequent changes in facial hair styles – beards, moustaches, and clean-shaven – all of
which we used for my reconstruction. Another user had only uploaded 2 photos to social media
in the past 3 years. These variations all present challenges for my framework, both for initially
reconstructing the user’s face and for creating a likeness that matches their current appearance.
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Industry-leading Solutions
We tested my approach on five advanced commercial face authentication systems: KeyLemon4,
Mobius5, True Key (Intel Security, 2015), BioID (Jesorsky et al., 2001), and 1U App6. Table 4.1
summarizes the training data required by each system when learning a user’s facial appearance, as
well as the approximate number of users for each system, when available. All systems incorporate
some degree of liveness detection into their authentication protocol. KeyLemon and the 1U App
require users to perform an action such as blinking, smiling, rotating the head, and raising the
eyebrows. In addition, the 1U App requests these actions in a random fashion, making it more
resilient to video-based attacks. BioID and True Key are motion-based systems and detect 3D facial
structure as the user turns their head. Mobius checks for 3-dimensionality by detecting motion
differences between the foreground face and the background scene.
Methodolgy
System Training Method # Installs
KeyLemon3 Single video ∼100,000
Mobius2 10 still images 18 reviews
True Key1 Single video 50,000-100,000
BioID2 4 videos unknown
1U App1 1 still image 50-100
Table 4.1: Summary of the face authentication systems evaluated. The second column lists how
each system acquires training data for learning a user’s face, and the third column shows the number
approximate number of installations or reviews each system has received according to (1) the
Google Play Store, (2) the iTunes store, or (3) softpedia.com. BioID is a relatively new app and
does not yet have customer reviews on iTunes.
All participants were registered with the 5 face authentication systems under indoor illumination.
The average length of time spent by each of the volunteers to register across all systems was 20
minutes. As a control, we first verified that all systems were able to correctly identify the users
4 http://www.keylemon.com
5 http://www.biomids.com
6 http://www.1uapps.com
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in the same environment. Next, before testing my method using textures obtained via social
media, we evaluated whether my system could spoof the recognition systems using photos taken
in this environment. We thus captured one front-view photo for each user under the same indoor
illumination and then created their 3D facial model with my proposed approach. We found that
these 3D facial models were able to spoof each of the 5 candidate systems with a 100% sucess rate,
as shown in the second column of Table 4.2
Following this, we reconstructed each user’s 3D facial model using the images collected from
public online sources. As a reminder, any source image can be used as the main image when
texturing the model. Since not all textures will successfully spoof the recognition systems, we
created textured reconstructions from all source images and iteratively presented them to the system
(manually selected in order of what we believed to be the best reconstruction, followed by the
second best, and so on) until either authentication succeeded or all reconstructions had been tested.
Findings
We summarize the spoofing success rate for each system in Table 4.2. Except for the 1U system,
all facial recognition systems were successfully spoofed for the majority of participants when using
social media photos, and all systems were spoofed using indoor, frontal view photos. Out of my
20 participants, there were only 2 individuals for whom none of the systems was spoofed via the
social-media-based attack.
Looking into the social media photos we collected of my participants, we observe a few trends
among my results. First, we note that moderate- to high-resolution photos lend substantial realism to
the textured models. In particular, photos taken by professional photographers (e.g., wedding photos
or family portaits) lead to high-quality facial texturing. Such photos are prime targets for facial
reconstruction because they are often posted by other users and made publicly available. Second, we
note that group photos provide consistent frontal views of individuals, albeit with lower resolution.
In cases where high-resolution photos are not available, such frontal views can be used to accurately
recover a user’s 3D facial structure. These photos are easily accessible via friends of users, as well.
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Third, we note that the least spoof-able users were not those who necessarily had a low number
of personal photos, but rather users who had few forward-facing photos and/or no photos with
sufficiently high resolution. From this observation, it seems that creating a realistic texture for user
recognition is the primary factor in determining whether a face authentication method will be fooled
by my approach. Only a small number of photos are necessary in order to defeat facial recognition
systems.
Indoor Social Media
Spoof % Spoof % Avg. # Tries
KeyLemon 100% 85% 1.6
Mobius 100% 80% 1.5
True Key 100% 70% 1.3
BioID 100% 55% 1.7
1U App 100% 0% —
Table 4.2: Success rate for 5 face authentication systems using a model built from (second column)
an image of the user taken in an indoor environment and (third and fourth columns) images obtained
on users’ social media accounts. The fourth column shows the average number of attempts needed
before successfully spoofing the target user.
We found that my failure to spoof the 1U App, as well as my lower performance on BioID,
using social media photos was directly related to the poor usability of those systems. Specifically,
we found the systems have a very high false rejection rate when live users attempt to authenticate
themselves in different illumination conditions. To test this, we had 5 participants register their
faces indoors on the 4 mobile systems.7 We then had each user attempt to log in to each system 10
times indoors and 10 times outdoors on a sunny day, and we counted the number of accepted logins
in each environment for each system. True Key and Mobius, which we found were easier to defeat,
correctly authenticated the users 98% and 100% of the time for indoor logins, respectively, and 96%
and 100% of the time for outdoor logins. Meanwhile, the indoor/outdoor login rates of BioID and
the 1U App were 50%/14% and 96%/48%, respectively. These high false rejection rates show that
the two systems have substantial difficulty with the face recognition part of their authentication. As
7 As it is a desktop application, KeyLemon was excluded.
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evidenced by the second column in Table 4.2, my method still handily defeats the liveness detection
modules of these systems.
My findings also suggest that my approach is able to successfully handle significant changes in
facial expression, illumination, and for the most part, physical characteristics such as weight and
facial hair. Moreover, the approach seems to generalize to users regardless of gender or ethnicity.
Given that it has shown to work on a varied collection of real-world data, we believe that the attack
presented herein represents a realistic security threat model that could be exploited in the present
day.
Next, to gain a deeper understanding of the realism of this threat, we take a closer look at what
conditions are necessary for my method to bypass the various face authentication systems we tested.
We also consider what main factors contribute to the failure cases of my method.
4.3.1 Evaluating System Robustness
To further understand the limitations of the proposed spoofing system, we test its robustness
against resolution and viewing angle, which are two important factors for the social media photos
users upload. Specifically, I answer the question: what is the minimum resolution and maximum
head rotation allowed in an uploaded photo before it becomes unusable for spoofing attacks like
mine? I further explore how low-resolution frontal images can be used to improve my success rates
when high-resolution side-view images are not available.
4.3.1.1 Blurry, Grainy Pictures Still Say A Lot
To assess my ability to spoof face authentication systems when provided only with low-
resolution images of a user’s face, I texture the 3D facial models of my sample users using an indoor,
frontal view photo. This photo is then downsampled at various resolutions such that the distance
between the user’s chin and forehead ranges between 20 and 50 pixels. Then, I attempt to spoof
the True Key, BioId, and KeyLemon systems with facial models textured using the down-sampled
photos. If I am successful at a certain resolution, that implies that that resolution leaks the user’s
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identity information to my spoofing system. The spoofing success rate for various image resolutions
is shown in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8: Spoofing success rate with texture taken from photos of different resolution.
The result indicates that my approach robustly spoofs face authentication systems when the
height of the face in the image is at least 50 pixels. If the resolution of an uploaded photo is less than
30 pixels, the photo is likely of too low-resolution to reliably encode useful features for identifying
the user. In my sample set, 88% of users had more than 6 online photos with a chin-to-forehead
distance greater than 100 pixels, which easily satisfies the resolution requirement of my proposed
spoofing system.
4.3.1.2 A Little to the Left, a Little to the Right
To identify the robustness of the proposed system against head rotation, I first evaluate the
maximum yaw angle allowed for my system to spoof baseline systems using a single image. For all
20 sample users, I collect multiple indoor photos with yaw angle varying from 5 degrees (approxi-
mately frontal view) to 40 degrees (significantly rotated view). I then perform 3D reconstruction for
each image, for each user, on the same three face authentication systems. The spoofing success rate
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Figure 4.9: Spoofing success rate with different yaw angles. Left: Using only a single image at the
specified angle. Right: Supplementing the single image with low-resolution frontal views, which
aid in 3D reconstruction.
for a single input image as a function of head rotation is illustrated in Figure 4.9 (left). It can be
seen that the proposed method successfully spoofs all the baseline systems when the input image
has a largely frontal view. As yaw angle increases, it becomes more difficult to infer the user’s
frontal view from the image, leading to a decreased spoofing success rate.
4.3.1.3 For Want of a Selfie
The results of Figure 4.9 (left) indicate that my success rate falls dramatically if given only a
single image with a yaw angle larger than 20 degrees. However, I argue that these high-resolution
side-angle views can serve as base images for facial texturing if additional low-resolution frontal
views of the user are available. I test this hypothesis by taking, for each user, the rotated images
from the previous section along with 1 or 2 low-resolution frontal view photos (chin-to-forehead
distance of 30 pixels). I then reconstruct each user’s facial model and use it to spoof my baseline
systems. Alone, the provided low-resolution images provide insufficient texture for spoofing, and
the higher-resolution side view does not provide adequate facial structure. As shown in Figure 4.9
(right), by using the low-resolution front views to guide 3D reconstruction and then using the side
view for texturing, the spoofing success rate for large-angle head rotation increases substantially.
From a practical standpoint, low-resolution frontal views are relatively easy to obtain, since they
can often be found in publicly posted group photos.
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4.3.2 Seeing Your Face Is Enough
My approach not only defeats existing commercial systems having liveness detection — it
undermines the state-of-the-art liveness detection schemes in academia. To illustrate this, I use my
method to attack the recently proposed authentication approach of Li et al. (2015), which obtains a
high rate of success in guarding against video-based spoofing attacks. This system adds another
layer to motion-based liveness detection by requiring that the movement of the face in the captured
video be consistent with the data obtained from the motion sensor of the device. Fortunately, as
discussed in §4.2, the data consistency requirement is automatically satisfied with my virtual reality
spoofing system because the 3D model rotates in tandem with the camera motion.
Central to Li et al. (2015)’s approach is to build a classifier that evaluates the consistency of
captured video and motion sensor data. In turn, the learned classifier is used to distinguish real faces
from spoofed ones. Since their code and training samples have not been made public, I implemented
my own version of Li et al. (2015)’s liveness detection system and trained a classifier with my own
training data. I refer the reader to (Li et al., 2015) for a full overview of the method.
Following the methodology of (Li et al., 2015), I capture video samples (and inertial sensor
data) of ∼4 seconds from the front-facing camera of a mobile phone. In each sample, the phone is
held at a distance of 40cm from the subject and moved back-and-forth 20cm to the left and right. I
capture 200 samples of real subjects moving the phone in front of their face, 200 samples where
a pre-recorded video of a user is presented to the camera, and 200 samples where the camera is
presented with a 3D reconstruction of a user in my VR environment. For training, I use a binary
logistic regression classifier trained on 100 samples from each class, with the other samples used for
testing. Due to the relatively small size of my training sets, I repeat my classification experiments
four times, with random train/test splits in each trial, and I report the average performance over all
four trials.
The results of my experiments are shown in Table 4.3. For each class (real user data, video
spoof data, and VR data), I report the average number (over 4 trials) of test samples classified as
real user data. I experiment with three different training configurations, which are listed in the first
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Training Data Real Video VR
Real+Video 98.00 / 100 1.00 / 100 99.50 / 100
Real+Video+VR 67.00 / 100 0.00 / 100 50.00 / 100
Real+VR 67.00 / 100 — 51.00 / 100
Table 4.3: Number of testing samples classified as real users. Values in the first column represent
true positive rates, and the second and third columns represent false positives. Each row shows the
classification results after training on the classes in the first column. The results were averaged over
four trials.
column of the table. The first row shows the results when using real user data as positive samples
and video spoof data as negative samples. In this case, it can easily be seen that the real-versus-video
identification is almost perfect, matching the results of (Li et al., 2015). However, my VR-based
attack is able to spoof this training configuration nearly 100% of the time. The second and third rows
of Table 4.3 show the classification performance when VR spoof data is included in the training
data. In both cases, my approach defeats the liveness detector in 50% of trials, and the real user
data is correctly identified as such less than 75% of the time.
All three training configurations clearly point to the fact that my VR system presents motion
features that are close to real user data. Even if the liveness detector of (Li et al., 2015) is specifically
trained to look for my VR-based attack, one out of every two attacks will still succeed, with the
false rejection rate also increasing. Any system using this detector will need to require multiple
log-in attempts to account for the decreased recall rate; allowing multiple log-in attempts, however,
allows my method more opportunties to succeed. Overall, the results indicate that the proposed
VR-based attack successfully spoofs Li et al. (2015)’s approach, which is to my knowledge the state
of the art in motion-based liveness detection.
4.4 Defense in Depth
While current facial authentication systems succumb to my VR-based attack, several features
could be added to these systems to confound my approach. Here, I detail three such features, namely
random projection of light patterns, detection of minor skin tone fluctuations related to pulse, and
the use of illuminated infrared (IR) sensors. Of these, the first two could still be bypassed with
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additional adversary effort, while the third presents a significantly different hardware configuration
that would require non-trivial alterations to my method.
Light Projection. The principle of using light projection for liveness detection is simple: using an
outward-facing light source (e.g., the flashlight commonly included on camera-equipped mobile
phones), flash light on the user’s face at random intervals. If the observed change in illumination
does not match the random pattern, then face authentication fails. The simplicity of this approach
makes it appealing and easily implementable; however, an adversary could modify my proposed
approach to detect the random flashes of light and, with low latency, subsequently add rendered
light to the VR scene. Random projections of structured light (Zhang et al., 2002), i.e. checkerboard
patterns and lines, would increase the difficulty of such an attack, as the 3D-rendering system must
be able to quickly and accurately render the projected illumination patterns on a model. However,
structured light projection requires specialized hardware that typically is not found on smart phones
and similar devices, which decreases the feasibility of this mitigation.
Pulse Detection. Recent computer vision research (Wu et al., 2012; Balakrishnan et al., 2013)
has explored the prospect of video magnification, which transforms micro-scale fluctuations over
time into strong visual changes. One such application is the detection of human pulse from a
standard video of a human face. The method detects small, periodic color changes related to pulse
in the region of the face and then amplifies this effect such that the face appears to undergo strong
changes in brightness and hue. This amplification could be used as an additional method for liveness
detection by requiring that the observed face have a detectable pulse. Similar ideas have been
applied to fingerprint systems that check for blood flow using light emitted from beneath a prism.
Of course, an attacker using my proposed approach could simply add subtle color variation to the
3D model to approximate this effect. Nevertheless, such a method would provide another layer of
defense against spoofed facial models.
Infrared Illumination. Microsoft released Windows Hello as a more personal way to sign into
Windows 10 devices with just a look or a touch. The new interface supports biometric authentication
that includes face, iris, or fingerprint authentication. The platform includes Intel’s RealSense
IR-based, rather than a color-based, facial authentication method. In principle, their approach works
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in the same way as contemporary face authentication methods, but instead uses an IR camera to
capture a video of the user’s face. The attack presented in this chapter would fail to bypass this
approach because typical VR displays are not built to project IR light; however, specialized IR
display hardware could potentially be used to overcome this limitation.
One limiting factor that may make IR-based techniques less common (especially on mobile
devices) is the requirement for additional hardware to support this enhanced form of face authenti-
cation. Indeed, as of this writing, only a handful of personal computers support Windows Hello.8
Nevertheless, the use of infrared illumination offers intriguing possibilities for the future.
8 See “PC platforms that support Windows Hello” for more info.
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CHAPTER 5: RECONSTRUCTING TYPED INPUT FROM REPEATED
REFLECTIONS
5.1 Introduction
Gone are the days when mobile phones were used exclusively for voice communication. Today,
as these handheld devices have become more sophisticated, they are routinely used for a myriad of
everyday activities that include checking email, text messaging, performing financial transactions,
and finding directions to a location of interest. Inevitably, as my day-to-day reliance on these devices
increases, the sensitive information (e.g., passwords) input on these devices becomes increasingly
valuable to prying eyes.
While the academic community has long acknowledged that the ubiquity of these devices
provides new opportunities for privacy abuse (as users communicate private data in ways more
vulnerable to eavesdropping than ever before), the severity of the threat posed by advancements in
computer vision techniques is only now being well understood (Backes et al., 2009; Raguram et al.,
2011). As a case in point, both Raguram et al. (2011) and Maggi et al. (2011) recently showed
that modern touch-screen smartphones may offer a greater privacy threat than their traditional
counterparts. The increased risk comes from the fact that many touch-screen smartphones utilize
virtual keyboards that overcome the perceived lack of tactile feedback by providing users with visual
confirmation (a key “pop-out” effect) as a key is pressed. These effects, however, provide strong
visual cues that can be exploited by an attacker to help identify the keys tapped on the victim’s
device.
The techniques used to leverage the so-called compromising reflections in these prior works
have raised my collective awareness of the realism of these threats. However, they all suffer from
a similar, and profound, weakness — namely the requirement that the adversary is either within
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Figure 5.1: Some example threat scenarios that we investigated. Top left: Through reflection from
sunglasses and toaster; Top right: Through reflection from eyeball and mirror; Bottom left: Through
reflection from sunglasses; Bottom Right: Direct long-distance view. Note: As with the remaining
figures in this work, this image is best viewed in color.
visual range of the victim (e.g., to ensure that the pop-out events in reflections in the victim’s
sunglasses can be discerned (Raguram et al., 2011)) or is close enough to the target to avoid the use
of expensive telescopes (Backes et al., 2009).
In this chapter, I push the limits of these attacks by exploiting even more fundamental, and
harder to conceal, observable events. That is, unlike prior work, I do not rely on the attacker’s ability
to capture detail (e.g., a key pop-out event) on the screen, but instead target a common factor in
user interaction with mobile devices: the relationship between a user’s fingers and the keyboard. By
tracking the positions of a user’s fingers as they move across the virtual keyboard, I can successfully
reconstruct the typed input. In particular, I show that even using inexpensive consumer devices (e.g.,
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small hand-held camcorders), I can successfully perform a reconstruction attack as long as both the
device’s orientation and the user’s fingers are detectable.
Tracking fingers, rather than recognizing displayed images, broadens the class of vulnerable
devices to include those without any pop-out effect, such as Apple’s iPad. Moreover, my approach
is capable of operating at significant distances from the victim (e.g., up to 50 meters away with
a camcorder). Perhaps most importantly, my approach operates effectively even for repeated
reflections, i.e., reflections of reflections in nearby objects. This feat allows us to reconstruct typed
input from the image of a mobile phone’s screen on a user’s eyeball as reflected through a nearby
mirror (see Figure 5.1), extending the privacy threat to include situations where the adversary is
located around a corner from the user.
My approach operates despite low resolution images (a natural consequence of increasing the
distance between target and camera) and high noise levels (due to reduced light levels in reflections
of objects as compared to the originals). To overcome these challenges and achieve my goals,
I extend a large body of work on object detection and tracking in the area of computer vision.
Specifically, I extend existing finger tracking mechanisms to consider spatial context in order to
reliably locate fingertips in the images. In addition, I propose a novel method for identifying
fingertip trajectories based on robust estimation.
5.2 Automated Transcription
My proposed method successfully transcribes the text typed on a keyboard by exploiting video
of the user typing (either directly or through up to two reflections from nearby objects). In practice,
I must overcome all of the aforementioned challenges of image resolution, diffraction, and noise.
To do so, I devise techniques that are resistant to low resolution, blurring, and noise. Figure 5.2
shows a high-level depiction of my approach.
I take as input a recording of the target device while the user types on its keyboard. First, I
roughly estimate the location of the device in the image (Stage Ê). Next, the image of the device
is aligned to a known reference template of the device’s keyboard layout (Stage Ë). Then, the
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Figure 5.2: Overall design depicting the stages of my approach. First I track the motion of the
mobile device (StageÊ). Then the mobile device is aligned to a template (StageË). In the stabilized
image the finger is extracted (Stage Ì) and its fingertip trajectory is computed (Stage Í). From the
trajectories the likely pressed keys are identified (Stage Î). As an optional step, I apply a language
model to improve the quality of the reconstructed text (Stage Ï).
fingertips are identified in the video and the locations of the fingertips over the video frames are
combined into trajectories (Stage Ì). These trajectories are then analyzed to identify the pressed
keys (Stage Í). From these pressed keys I then reconstruct the typed text (Stage Î). Finally, as an
optional post-processing step, I apply a language model in order to improve the readability of the
final text (Stage Ï). Aside from some initial input in Stage Ê to identify the first frame containing
the target device, the entire process is fully automated. In what follows, I discuss each step in turn.
StageÊ: Tracking
With a recording in hand, I first identify the device (phone, iPad, etc.) in the video so that I can
focus my remaining analyses on only the relevant parts of the image. Depending on the number of
reflections and the distance between the victim and the observer, the device is often only seen in a
small region of each video frame (refer to Figure 5.3 for an example of reflection in an eyeball).
In order to identify the device’s location in every frame, I utilize a tracking framework based on
AdaBoost (Grabner et al., 2006). The basic idea is as follows. First, the user selects the region of the
first video frame (corresponding to the device) that should be localized. Given this initial position,
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Figure 5.3: The captured image showing a reflection (of the victim’s screen) as observed in the
eyeball.
AdaBoost learns the appearance of the target object, and then automatically determines its location
in all succeeding video frames. Since AdaBoost tracking works relatively well even in the presence
of noise, I can successfully track small or even partially occluded objects in the image. The latter is
important because the device is usually occluded by the fingers as the victim types on the keyboard.
That said, despite its robustness to noise, a straightforward application of AdaBoost tracking
frequently fails in my setting. This is because tracking relies on the target device maintaining
a similar appearance between frames, which is not necessarily the case with the noisy images I
must process. In order to mitigate this problem, I average each video frame with the temporally
preceding and trailing frame in the sequence. In this manner, each image is the combination of
three consecutive frames, which reduces noise as random variation will be smoothed.1 Although
averaging could cause motion blur if there is significant scene motion between the frames, I found
that in practice this is not a significant issue because of the high frame rate (30 frames per second)
and the small motion of both the device and the user between frames.
1 Gaussian noise is reduced by a factor of
√
3.
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StageË: Alignment
Stage Ê acquired the rough position of the device in each frame. The task in Stage Ë is to
determine the exact location of each key in the video frame (so that later stages can identify the
keys which were most likely pressed). In general, the device will have varying orientation, scale,
and image position in the video. In order to determine a mapping between the image in the video
and a reference keyboard layout of the device (lifted, for example, from a manual), I must estimate
the transformation that will align the device in the video to a reference image of the device’s layout.
Prior work (Raguram et al., 2011; Maggi et al., 2011) faced a similar challenge, and used
salient points in the image as visual features to determine the transformation. In my setting,
however, those visually distinct salient feature points are no longer visible. Thus I must overcome
this challenge in a different manner. The approach I take is to utilize a line detection technique that
provides a more robust set of features to achieve the same goal.
Preliminary Alignment: As an initial step, I first reduce the noise present in the images
by employing anisotropic filtering (Weickert, 1998). This technique (detailed in Appendix D) can
be used to intelligently preserve line structure in the image (otherwise often lost in normal noise
reduction techniques), while simultaneously suppressing noise in the remaining parts of the image.
To determine the correct orientation of the device, I transform the video image so that all of
the device’s lines become either horizontal or vertical. This is accomplished by detecting edges
within the image (Duda and Hart, 1972), and then using the lines to vote for the device’s orientation
using a Hough transform. The Hough transform is a voting scheme, where each detected line in the
image votes for all possible orientations of the device that conform with the line’s own orientation.
For robustness, my voting scheme exploits the fact that lines of the same orientation will have
a common vanishing point; hence each line is voting for its corresponding vanishing point (see
Appendix E). Then, the vertical and horizontal vanishing points with the most votes represent the
dominant vertical and horizontal line directions in the image. With this information at hand, I can
successfully transform the device to its proper orientation.
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Note, however, that even with the correct orientation, the image is still not aligned with the
reference keyboard layout (i.e., the template) as the size and position may still differ. To handle
this, I once again turn to a Hough transformation to vote on the translation and scale for aligning
the image to the reference image of the device. The voting process relies on correspondences
between the detected lines in the current frame and the lines in the template. A descriptor is built
for each line in the current frame and the reference image, representing the appearance of each
line’s surroundings. The lines then vote for possible translation and scaling settings, and their votes
are weighted by the similarity of the lines’ descriptors. This voting results in a translation and scale
in each of the x and y directions. Although the scale should be equal in both directions, I allow
different scales (allowing affine transformation) to overcome small artifacts of slightly misaligned
rotations. Appendix F details the computed transformation.
Refinement: A result of the Hough transform above is that the voting space will be quan-
tized, leading to small residual misalignments. To provide an alignment that is stable across multiple
frames and is as precise as possible I include a final refinement step (termed dense alignment (Baker
and Matthews, 2004; Szeliski, 2006)). As opposed to relying on only lines, this step considers
all pixels in the image to compute the final alignment. I employ a non-linear optimization in the
parameters of the alignment (rotation, scale, translation) using the sum of squared differences
between the overlapping pixels of the current and the first frame as an error metric for the residual
misalignment. The final alignments are more stable and accurate (to sub-pixel precision) and are
thus better suited for further analysis. An example alignment is shown in Figure 5.4.
StageÌ: Fingertip Extraction
At this point, the images are now aligned to the reference layout, and I am now primarily
concerned with identifying the fingers as they interact with the device.
Similar to Jin et al. (2007) and Nguyen et al. (2009), I leverage Gaussian modeling of the
appearance of the fingers as well as the appearance of the device. Intuitively, at this point, I
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Figure 5.4: Cropped image (left) and alignment result (right) from Stage Ë (overlaid with a
reference device layout).
consider the keyboard area in my input image as consisting primarily of two main colors: a lighter
color corresponding to the bright screen, and a darker color corresponding to the user’s fingers.
Gaussian modeling allows us to represent their respective appearance by two different Gaussian
distributions. The idea is to assign each pixel in the keyboard area of the image to either one of the
two distributions based on whichever has the highest likelihood for the pixel under consideration.
To learn the different distributions, I analyze the pixel colors of the first n = 50 frames.
In essence, by assigning each pixel to one of the two Gaussian distributions I convert the input
image into a binary image (e.g., the right image in Figure 5.5). This strategy effectively segments
the fingers and the device’s screen and allows us to isolate the position and orientation of the fingers.
To isolate the position, I simply model the user’s finger as an ellipse, and then attempt to fit an
ellipse to the boundary of the segmentation. In practice, this means that I must identify points of
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high curvature along the boundary of the finger’s segmentation and then apply an ellipse-fitting
regression function to determine the best fit (see Figure 5.5).
To identify the location of the tip of the finger, I assume that the fingertip corresponds to
one of the four apexes of the ellipse. In practice, only three of the four apexes are reasonable
fingertip locations because the finger only covers the keyboard from the left, right, or bottom. To
determine which of the three cases is present, I consider the intersection of the ellipse with the
device’s boundary and select the appropriate apex. Specifically, if the ellipse intersects with the left
and bottom edges of the device, then I assume that the finger is moving into view from the left; if
the ellipse intersects with the right and bottom, it moves in from the right, and if the ellipse only
intersects with the bottom, then it is moves into view from the bottom. Notice that by repeating the
above process several times (and ignoring already identified fingers) I can detect multiple fingers on
the screen and locate the fingertip for each.
StageÍ: Fingertip Motion Analysis
I now turn my attention to how I identify the relative position of the fingers when keys are
pressed. I take advantage of the insight that when one presses a key, the finger typically hovers at a
certain position or suddenly changes direction in order to move to the next key. That observation
allows us to use the location of the fingertip to identify when a key is pressed. To infer the series of
likely keys pressed as the victim types, I combine the locations of the fingertips extracted in Stage
Ì into trajectories for each fingertip. The trajectory of a fingertip represents its path through time,
and by analyzing this path, I can deduce when a key was pressed.
To accomplish this, I propose a robust method that represents the fingertip trajectories as a
curve in 3D space (where the dimensions are the u, v location in the image, corresponding to the
x-y plane, and the video frame number). When a fingertip stops moving, the location in the x-y
plane will cease to change, but the frame number will still increase. Hence a stopped fingertip
describes a line segment in the frame number direction that is perpendicular to the x-y plane and
originates at the stopping position u, v.
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Figure 5.5: Input aligned image (left) and finger region extraction (right). Shown in the right image
is the ellipse fitting (blue ellipse), segmentation (cyan), points with high curvature (yellow), detected
fingertip (red circle), and an overlaid reference device layout.
To find these stopping positions or the direction changes, I approximate the entire 3D curve
as a set of line segments. In order to identify the individual line segments, I use a robust model
fitting technique called RANSAC (Fischler and Bolles, 1981b). Loosely speaking, the RANSAC
algorithm will find a consistent model (a 3D line in this case) in the presence of noisy data even
with a small number of correct data points complying with the model. Every time I run RANSAC, I
model a part of the 3D curve as a line segment. Next, I remove the previously modeled part of the
curve, and focus on the remaining portions. By running RANSAC repeatedly, and removing the
modeled parts, I obtain a set of 3D line segments that approximate the original fingertip trajectory.
115
Given the set of line segments, stopping positions (u, v) are determined by line segments that
are nearly perpendicular to the x-y plane. Likewise, sudden changes in direction are detected by
finding two adjacent lines with a large change of direction between them. Figure 5.6 shows an
example trajectory and the inferred line segment approximation.
Figure 5.6: Fingertip trajectory (left) and line modeling (right). The red circles indicate stopping
positions for the word “hello”, where the size of the circle corresponds to uncertainty in the stopping
position.
StageÎ: Inferring the Keys Pressed
Given the stopping positions inferred in Stage Í, I now move on to determining what keys
were likely pressed. This task is somewhat complicated by the fact that users rarely make contact
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with the surface of the device with the precise tip of their finger(s). Moreover, when a user types,
her fingers will not necessarily be at the same place each time they hit a particular key. Therefore,
to determine which key was most likely pressed, I apply image recognition techniques to identify
different positions of the user’s finger with respect to the keyboard when pressing a key.
To learn the appearance of different key presses, I manually labeled 87 videos, recording the
time and position of each key that was pressed. For each key on the keyboard, I collect a sample of
its surrounding area as a pixel patch that is 60 × 100 pixels (matching the aspect ratio of a typical
keyboard key). When the key under consideration is pressed, I identify the patch as a positive
training sample for that key, and also use it as a negative training sample for all of the other keys on
the keyboard. For each of these patches, I extract dense SIFT descriptors (Vedaldi and Fulkerson,
2010) and use these to train an AdaBoost classifier. In the end, I have a classifier for each key,
where the sole purpose of the classifier is to determine whether or not its associated key has been
pressed given an example pixel patch as input.
With this set of classifiers, I then analyze the key-press events detected in StageÍ. My analyses
show that each event typically lasts anywhere from 10 to 20 frames, and during this time the finger
stays at a relatively fixed location. I collect three adjacent frames from the middle of the duration,
and extract from each a 60 by 100 pixel patch (corresponding in size to the training patch above)
centered at the detected fingertip location. These patches are then fed into each of the nearby
classifiers, with each classifier outputting its confidence of a key-press as a value in a range of
[0, 1] (with 1 being high confidence). By averaging the confidence scores of each classifier (one for
each key) from the three chosen frames, I create a set of possible key-presses and their associated
confidence levels. If the maximum confidence in the set falls below a predefined threshold (δ = 0.5),
I assume the key-press was invalid and discard the event. For a valid event with key-press confidence
above δ, I record all the possible keys and their scores. By repeating this process for each key-press
event, the final output of this stage is a sequence of key-press sets, where each set has a list of keys
and their associated confidence values.
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Note also that I do not explicitly detect presses of the “space” button, but instead treat longer
pauses between key-press events as the space character. Likewise, shorter pauses are identified as
the gaps between different letters in a word. Similar ideas for detecting spaces were utilized by
Raguram et al. (2011) and Balzarotti et al. (2008b).
StageÏ: Language Model
As an optional post-processing step, I can feed the candidate keys and associated confidence
values from the previous stage into a language model in order to achieve more accurate and readable
results.
Similar to Raguram et al. (2011), we view the language modeling task as a noisy channel
decoding problem and adapt techniques from the speech recognition community to perform this
inference (a process known as maximum likelihood decoding). In particular, we employ a cascade
of models, each of which represents a stage in the process of transforming a sequence of candidate
character sets with associated confidence values into words and phrases. Each model in the cascade
is represented as a weighted finite state transducer (WFST), i.e., a finite state machine with an output
tape in addition to the input tape, which maps sequences in one representation to sequences in
another. For instance, speech recognition systems often include a component (known as the lexicon)
which maps sequences of phones, the distinct sounds which comprise speech, to (valid) words. A
sequence of such component models can then be used to model more complex mappings, such
as that from an acoustic signal to a sequence of words and phrases, by composition of the WFST
representations of the component models. With a lexicon as the first component, taking as input
a sequence of phones, a second component (often an n-gram language model) maps the resulting
sequence of words to likely phrases. The composition of these two models, itself a WFST, maps
sequences of phones to likely phrases.
One advantage of the uniform representation of these components as WFSTs is that the
decoding or inference step (i.e., finding the most likely phrase corresponding to the input sequence
of sounds) can be performed on the composition of the component models rather than proceeding
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sequentially through component models. In other words, traditional speech recognition cascades
were effectively Markov chains: the output of each component depended only on the output of the
previous component. Often, the resource-intensive nature of the speech recognition task forced the
pruning of unlikely sequences, e.g., phones after the application of a component model. Thus a
sequence of phones which might be considered unlikely (but not impossible) in the absence of a
language model might be pruned in the early stages of such a speech recognition system. A WFST
cascade, on the other hand, can be represented as a single WFST, which allows for inference from
all components simultaneously and mitigates many problems resulting from pruning.
In our case, the input for the language modeling stage is a sequence of key-press events with
character labels and associated confidence values, including marked spaces. We then employ a
composite WFST model to smooth over any potential errors in the earlier stages by modifying the
output words and phrases to more closely match natural English language. We first apply an edit
distance model E for error correction. Conceptually, the edit distance model produces, for each
input string, a set of similar strings each weighted by (keyboard) edit distance from the input string.
We then employ a dictionary model D, which prunes those strings which do not result in dictionary
words, and an n-gram language model L, which promotes sequences of words that appear more
frequently in English and demotes those which appear rarely. Then the cascade model can be
represented as C = E ◦ D ◦ L. To find the most likely sequence of words corresponding to an input
sequence of character sets (as output by the previous stage), the input is first represented as a finite
state acceptor I. Then the shortest path through the WFST I ◦ C gives the most likely series of
English words given the input sequence of predicted character sets.
Our n-gram language model L is a unigram model trained on the Brown corpus (Francis and
Kucera, 1979). The dictionary model D is based on the ‘medium’ word list from the Spell Checker
Oriented Word Lists2 with roman numerals, unusual abbreviations, and proper nouns removed. For
the keyboard edit distance, we define the distance between two keys as the normalized product of
the difference in rows (on a ‘vertical’ axis through Q and Z) plus one and the difference in keys (on
2 wordlist.sourceforge.net
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Device Name Focal Length Aperture Sensor Size Resolution
Canon 60D DSLR, 400mm Lens 400mm F/5.6 22.3× 14.9mm 5184× 3456
Canon VIXIA HG21 Camcorder 57mm F/3.0 4.84× 3.42mm 1920× 1080
Table 5.1: Specifications of the cameras used in my evaluation.
a ‘horizontal’ axis through A and L) plus one. For instance, the (unnormalized) distance between A
and B is (1 + 1) ∗ (4 + 1) = 10, since A and B are a single row apart vertically and four keys apart
horizontally. We offset by one in each case to avoid zero values if the keys are in the same row or
column.
5.3 Evaluation
Recall that one of the key motivating scenarios driving my design is the ability to reconstruct
the typed input from repeated reflections. From an adversarial point of view, I am also interested in
understanding the realism of the threat posed by an adversary performing such an attack from as far
as possible, yet relying on inexpensive equipment. In what follows, I provide an analysis of my
results under these conditions.
For the case of multiple reflections, I make use of a Canon 60D digital SLR ($700) with 400mm
Lens ($1340). For experiments with direct line-of-sight and a single reflection, I use a Canon
VIXIA HG21 Camcorder ($1000). These devices are considerably smaller than the telescopes used
previously (Backes et al., 2008, 2009; Kuhn and Kuhn, 2003) and are also more affordable. The
specifications are listed in Table 5.1.
For my lab-based evaluation, five different subjects took part in my experiments. To explore
different typing conditions, I asked the subjects to perform 3 different styles of typing: typing
a specific sentence, providing a quick response to a question (e.g., as one might do when text
messaging), and typing a password of their choosing. The chosen sentences are from “The Art of
the War” and the questions from SMS messages collected by NUS (Chen and Kan, 2011). In all,
I collected 73 responses containing 584 total words. In addition, I collected 15 passwords (each
consisting of 5 to 8 lower-case characters).
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Figure 5.7: METEOR scores for my approach, broken down by scenario.
To gauge my performance, I evaluate the reconstruction results for sentences and passwords
using separate metrics. The reason is obvious: the use of a natural language model can easily
improve the result of the former, while for passwords a better measure is to examine how many
guesses are required to recover the password given my initial hypothesis.
For evaluating the quality of my reconstructed text, I use the METEOR metric proposed by
Lavie and Denkowski (2009). Essentially, METEOR scores machine translation hypotheses (i.e.,
my guesses) by aligning them to one or more reference translations. It estimates human perception
of the readability of the sentence in terms of the adequacy and fluency of the translation. METEOR
assigns scores on a scale from 0.0 to 1.0, with 1.0 indicating a perfect translation. As a guide
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Scenario Distance
Reference Sentence Reconstructed Results
ME-
TEOR
Score
Toaster+Sunglasses[C1]
3m
when your round is a
short one you take a
walk
when your round is a
short one he take a
walk
0.88
3m
when it is a long one
you take a cab
when a is a long is you
the a can
0.43
Mirror+Eyeball[C1]
3m when it is a long one when it is a long one 1.00
3m i am busy tonight i at be tonight 0.33
Sunglasses[C2]
4m
if you know your
enemy and you know
yourself you need not
fear the results of a
hundred battles
if you know your
enemy and you know
yourself you need not
fear the results of a
hundred battles
1.00
10m
if you know neither
the enemy nor
yourself you will
succumb in every
battle
if you his neither the
enemy for yourself to
will succumb in every
battle
0.71
Direct view[C2]
30m
when your round is a
short one you take a
walk
when your round is a
short one you take a
walk
1.00
50m i plan to stay at home i men to stay at home 0.74
Table 5.2: Example reconstructions. [C1]: Using Canon 60D DSLR($700) with 400mm
Lens($1340). [C2]: Using Canon VIXIA HG21 Camcorder($1000).
for interpreting METEOR scores, Lavie (2010) suggests that scores of 0.5 or higher indicate
understandable translations, while scores of 0.7 or higher indicate good or fluent translations.
Examples from my experiments are shown in Table 5.2.
5.3.1 Results
The aggregate results of my approach, including confidence intervals, are illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.7. Notice that in every circumstance, my reconstruction results in an average METEOR score
above 0.5, indicating an understandable level. Additionally, I reconstructed 23% (17/73) of the
sentences perfectly, and 92% (67/73) of all the sentences have a METEOR score above 0.5. All of
the captured videos were within the automatic focus and exposure limits of the cameras, leading
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to no unusable videos which might occur in more challenging environments. I remind the reader
that these results are already obtained in situations where previous efforts (Raguram et al., 2011,
2013; Maggi et al., 2011) fail, either due to an increased distance from the target or an additional
reflection. These results, as well as the individual examples in Table 5.2, indicate that my attack is
quite stable to changes in the distance to the target and the number and type of reflecting surfaces.
Closer look: Double Reflections
In order to evaluate the performance of double-reflection attacks I conducted the following
experiments. First, I position a user with sunglasses at a desk with a nearby toaster. The user then
types on an iPhone 4, and an attacker observes the typed input from a concealed location around a
corner of 60 to 90 degrees by leveraging the two reflections. For the second setup, the user is once
again at a desk, but instead of relying on the reflection from sunglasses, I use the reflection from the
user’s own eye. To enable this attack, I utilized a small mirror instead of the toaster. The use of the
mirror does not influence the image quality but provides the additional ability to attack around the
corner. The results without the mirror are similar (Figure 5.7). These scenarios are illustrated in
Figure 5.8.
Figure 5.8: Left: the cellphone image reflects from the user’s sunglasses, off the toaster’s surface,
and is then captured by the camera. Right: the cellphone image reflects from user’s eyeball, off the
mirror, and then is captured by the camera.
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Figure 5.9: Example double-reflection from sunglasses and a toaster. Left: Captured image; Right:
(correctly) identified keypress (T, with confidence 0.55). The brightness of the detected image
(right) is adjusted for viewing convenience and has been overlaid with a reference device layout.
The use of multiple reflections naturally limits the information I can acquire from the target.
With the double reflection, the main limitation of the system is the contrast between the user’s
fingers and the device’s screen. After two reflections, the device’s screen can barely be recognized
by a human (see Figure 5.9). The contrast between the device screen and the background is so low
that it is much harder to extract the device screen and finger regions. Yet I am still able to achieve
results with an understandable level (0.65). In Figure 5.10, I illustrate the effect that contrast has
on the final result. Reflections significantly reduce the contrast of the image. The RMS contrast
(standard deviation of the pixel intensities) takes values in the range [0.0, 0.5], where 0.0 corresponds
to an image with uniform color and 0.5 corresponds to a checkerboard pattern of black and white
squares. The RMS contrast in my experiments drops from around 0.35 in direct view to 0.03 with
two reflections. This leads to difficulties in finger region extraction and therefore lower METEOR
scores.
In the reflection off the eyeball (Figure 5.11), the finger and keyboard are even more difficult
to discern. The image is both small and significantly blurred. Backes et al. (2008) discuss the
theoretical boundary that a telescope with a 62 cm aperture from a distance of 2 m would be required
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Figure 5.10: Plot of captured RMS contrast versus METEOR score for the three different scenarios
(direct, single-reflection, and repeated reflections).
in order to obtain a full resolution image from the reflection of an eyeball. In my setting (i.e., a lens
with a 7.1 cm aperture from a distance of 3 m), I achieve understandable reconstruction results with
less than 1/10th of the full resolution. The main problem with the reflection from the eyeball is the
blurring caused by diffraction and noise, as discussed in Section 2.4.1.1, as well as partial occlusion
by the eyelashes.
Closer look: Single Reflection and Direct Sight
Compared with the prior state of the art, my attack can be executed from a much farther
distance, as illustrated in Figure 5.12. For example, using the same equipment (Canon VIXIA
HG21 Camcorder), the approach of Raguram et al. (2013) can only run a direct attack at 24 m
and a single-reflection attack at 4 m, while my work increased the distance to be 50 m and 10 m
respectively (see Figure 5.7) while maintaining comparable results.
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Figure 5.11: Example double-reflection from an eyeball and mirror. Left: Captured image;
Right: candidate keys (I with confidence 0.10, L with confidence 0.07, and the correct key O with
confidence 1.00). The right image has been overlaid with a reference device layout.
Devices without Pop-ups
As a final experiment to demonstrate that my design is applicable to a broad range of devices,
I include a preliminary study on a device (a first generation iPad) with a virtual keyboard but no
pop-out events. In this case, the iPad was placed at a distance of 4 meters from a pair of sunglasses
which were in turn situated 4 meters from my camera. As the iPad’s screen is considerably larger
than the iPhone 4, it is perhaps not surprising that I am able to perfectly reconstruct all 8 sentences
tested.
5.3.1.1 Password Guessing
I also apply my approach to the reconstruction of passwords. While passwords typically chosen
by users may follow certain distributions that make them easier to guess, I assume that passwords
are chosen with sufficient randomness to mitigate any language modeling, and therefore exclude the
optional Stage Ï from this portion of the analysis. I instead examine the classification results from
Stage Î directly. One advantage of my approach is that the output of Stage Î is a sequence of sets
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Figure 5.12: Example single reflection from 10m. Left: Single reflection from 10m (correctly
predicting I with confidence 1.0). Right: Direct view from 50m (correctly predicting T with
confidence 1.0). Both images have been overlaid with a reference device layout.
of candidate keys with associated confidence values. I therefore have a natural ordering with which
I can prioritize my password guessing strategy.
I implement this ordering with a best-first search, where the ‘best’ candidate password is the
string which maximizes the product of the confidence values for the individual keypresses. I can
calculate this product for each child of a given candidate password, where a child is identical to the
candidate except that a single character has been replaced with the next most likely character for
that position. Beginning with the most likely candidate, i.e., that for which the individual confidence
values are maximized, I check if the candidate matches the password for which I am looking. If
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Scenario Distance Reference (Typed) Top Guess Number of Guesses
Direct
Sight
30m
bjtam bjtam 1
mstys matya 47
dlxmzd elxmad 64
zywmxq atahxq 5967
50m
wabjta ewbjta 3
tatsta tatata 10
wdlxmzd wdiebae 277
Eyeball
and
Mirror
3m
jrairbf jfairbf 3
hvgcjyx hvccnyx 620
bgditv cgcitv 3
Sunglasses
and
Toaster
3m
sjyfh sjyfn 2
aluhe aauce 14
kydhwria kydhwria 1
jyerpsk jynraak 21
5m hdyeri hdierx 6
Table 5.3: Expected number of guesses required to identify user passwords given a ranking, by
decreasing confidence, of candidates.
not, I add each child of the candidate to a priority queue, ordered by the product of the confidence
values. Once the children of one candidate are added, the candidate is discarded, the highest priority
candidate is drawn from the queue, and the process begins anew.
Letters outside of the candidate set are assigned a weight of 10−6, which is significantly smaller
than the weights of any observed keypresses. This accounts for cases where the actual key is not
contained within the predicted set. I break ties randomly, i.e., I report the average-case estimates
when multiple candidates have the same value for the product of the confidence values.
Table 5.3 shows my password guessing results. Of the 15 passwords used, 6 were reconstructed
in 3 or fewer guesses, 12 in less than 100 guesses, and all 15 in less than 6000 guesses. Random
guessing of passwords would result in almost 6 million guesses for 5-letter passwords and almost
155 million guesses for 6-letter passwords, in expectation. Accordingly, my approach results in
a speedup of four orders of magnitude. That said, I remind the reader that the passwords used
were those chosen by my test subjects. Unfortunately, my test subjects chose passwords which
were between 5 and 8 characters long and consisted of only lower-case letters. However, since the
mobile devices in which I am interested simply overlay the lower-case keyboard with an upper-case,
128
Stage Name Time Spent (sec/frame) Percentage
Stage 1: Tracking 0.228 8.4%
Stage 2: Alignment 1.054 38.9%
Stage 3: Finger Extraction 1.042 38.4%
Stage 4: Fingertip Analysis 0.123 4.5%
Stage 5: Key Weight Generation 0.256 9.4%
Stage 6: Language Model 0.007 0.2%
Total 2.708 100.0%
Table 5.4: Runtime performance of my approach.
numeric, or symbolic keyboard as necessary, extending my analysis to cover these cases would not
be difficult.
5.3.1.2 Runtime Performance
The overall performance is 0.37 frames per second, the composition of which is shown in Table
5.4. The current version of my approach is mainly implemented in MATLAB; only the tracking
scheme in Stage Ê is optimized with C++ and the use of a GPU. As such, re-implementation of the
remainder of my approach in C++ and/or on the GPU would likely result in a significant speedup.
5.4 Mitigations
My attack invalidates a significant portion of prior defences (e.g., like eliminating key pop-up
events (Raguram et al.)). Perhaps the most natural mitigation is to apply a privacy screen/film to
the device. This will limit the amount of light emitted, making reconstruction of reflected images
(with inherently reduced brightness) extremely difficult. Moreover, it will significantly limit the
possibility of direct sight attacks by narrowing the angle of screen observation. However, many
materials are diffuse reflectors (reflection in all directions), which may lift the restriction on viewing
angle imposed by privacy films by allowing an adversary to exploit the reflection rather than a direct
view of the screen.
More esoteric mitigations that are focused on hindering the recovery of sensitive input (e.g.,
passwords) call for the application of gaze-based passwords (Kumar et al., 2007; Weaver et al.,
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2011), shoulder-surfing resistant graphical password schemes (e.g., (Sobrado and Birget, 2002;
Hoanca and Mock, 2008)), and randomized keyboards (Tan et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2012). Gaze-
based password systems, for example, take into consideration the focus of the user’s eyes on the
screen as the source of input, greatly reducing the ability of an adversary without an unobstructed
view of the user’s eyes and orientation with respect to the screen (Kumar et al., 2007; Weaver et al.,
2011). Likewise, randomized keyboards permute on-screen keyboard layouts as the user enters her
password (Tan et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2012), effectively thwarting shoulder-surfing attacks during
such times.
Clearly, these proposals would hamper the ability to reconstruct entered passwords using
approaches similar to mine; in particular, attacking either the graphical password schemes or the
randomized keyboard schemes would require the ability to discern detail on the screen of the device.
That said, all of these proposals are limited to password entry, and as such, only offer a partial
solution to this challenge of limiting recovery of typed input exposed via compromising reflections.
Moreover, the real-world usability of these proposals remains unclear.
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I provide a technique for accurately reconstructing the text typed on a mobile
device, with a broader range of credible threats that underscore the realism of the attack. Specifically,
I show that it is possible to perform such attacks in a number of challenging scenarios: on devices
with any type of virtual or physical keyboard, without direct line-of-sight, and at distances farther
away from the victim than previously thought possible. My attack can even directly use reflections
on the eye-ball, which was not possible before due to the noise and physical boundaries of the
optics in prior work. My empirical analysis, which covers a number of scenarios (including direct
line-of-sight, single reflections, and repeated reflections) as well as a range of distances (3 m - 50 m),
demonstrates the success of my approach and underscores the significance of this privacy threat.
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CHAPTER 6: INFERRING TV CONTENT FROM LIGHT EFFUSIONS
6.1 Introduction
To most of us, it would come as no surprise that much of the population is addicted to watching
television, due in part to the wide variety of entertainment (e.g., reality TV, game shows, movies,
premium channels, political commentary, 24hr news, etc.) that is offered in today’s competitive
market place — be that online or via broadcast TV. Indeed, so-called streaming TV and Internet
connectivity now liberate viewers from restrictive schedules, making watching shows part of a
wider and richer experience in homes. Admittedly, although the physical TV sets of the past are
not as popular as they once were, TV is here to stay and its role in delivering compelling viewing
experiences will continue for decades.
The markedly richer content offered today has helped sustain living room screens as a dominant
communication medium — both collectively (e.g., for watching a big game or season finale) and
individually (e.g., for accessing specific content on demand). In fact, even though consumer viewing
habits have undergone change in recent years (e.g., phone, tablet and computer viewing habits
have steadily increased), nearly every U.S. home still owns at least one TV and 67% of Americans
regularly watch television while having dinner (Gomery, 1993). The flickering lights of the scenes
that play out on these TVs are easy to see when one walks through the street at nights. Yet, many
of us may not have given a second thought to the amount of information these flickering patterns
(caused by changes in brightness) might reveal about the programs we watch.
My findings, however, suggest that these compromising emissions of changes of brightness
provide ample opportunity to confirm what specific content is being watched on a remote TV screen,
even from great distances outside the home. The key intuition behind why this threat to privacy is
possible lies in the fact that much of the content we watch induces flickering patterns that uniquely
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identify a particular broadcast once a suitable amount of light emissions (i.e., on the order of a
few minutes) has been recorded by the adversary. This surprisingly effective attack has significant
privacy implications given that the video and TV programs that people watch can reveal a lot of
information about them, including their religious beliefs, political view points or other private
interests. For that reason, subscribers’ viewing habits are considered sensitive under the U.S. Video
Protection Privacy Act of 1998, which states that an individual’s video viewing records must be kept
confidential. Recently, a popular electronics firm came under investigation when it was revealed
that its Smart TV was surreptitiously sending information on viewing habits back to the parent
company in an effort to “deliver more relevant advertisements” 1.
While the observations I leverage in this chapter are just a demonstration of potential capabilities,
to the best of my knowledge, I present the first automated, end-to-end, approach for realizing the
attack. Undoubtedly, the academic community has long acknowledged that video viewing records
are vulnerable to different attacks (e.g., due to electromagnetic or power line behavior (Enev et al.,
2011; Greveler et al., 2012; Kuhn, 2013)), but these attacks have not received widespread attention
because they require access to smart power meters and other specialized equipment in order to
capture the required signal. Moreover, because these attacks rely on specific TV/computer screen
electronic properties they remain difficult to implement in practice.
In this chapter, I push the boundaries of these attacks by exploiting compromising emissions
which are far easier to capture. In fact, I do not rely on the adversary’s ability to capture an image
of the screen, or its reflection on a nearby surface (e.g., (Backes et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2013)).
Instead, my attack works by analyzing the changes in brightness in a room where the content is
being watched, and matching the captured signal in real-time with reference signals stored in a large
database. The attack can be successfully carried out with inexpensive consumer devices (e.g., web
cameras, digital SLRs) and is successful when illumination changes caused by the TV screen are
perceptible to the camera’s sensor.
1 See J. Brookman, Eroding Trust: How New Smart TV Lacks Privacy by Design and Transparency at http://www.
privacyassociation.org/, Nov. 2013.
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To ensure that the attack is resilient to noise (e.g., from a passing vehicle, the turning on/off of
a light switch, or from human movement), my approach focuses squarely on significant changes
in the captured sequence, instead of directly leveraging all of the captured signal. Said another
way, I exploit temporal brightness information that is not adversely affected by device-specific or
environmental conditions. These environmental conditions (e.g., reflections off a wall) might result
in a weakened and distorted overal signal, but the temporal information of significant intensity
changes will remain largely intact.
A key contribution in this chapter lies in the techniques I use to take advantage of temporal
information to find matches among reference and captures signals, even in the face of significant
noise and signal distortions. To do so, I extend traditional correlation measures to utilize temporal
information when computing similarity scores between sequences. The resulting strategy signifi-
cantly outperforms traditional correlation measures (e.g., (Greveler et al., 2012)), for which I present
an on-line approximation method. My empirical analysis covering 54,000 videos shows that I can
perform this confirmation attack with surprising speed and accuracy.
6.2 Overview
Figure 6.1: The high-level workflow of my approach. Features are extracted from the captured
video and then compared with features from reference videos in a database. The reference video
with the most similar feature is output as the most probable candidate.
The key insight I leverage is that the observable emanations of a display (e.g., a TV or monitor)
during presentation of the viewing content induces a distinctive flicker pattern that can be exploited
by an adversary. This pattern is observable in a wide range of scenarios, including videos capturing
the window of the room housing the display, videos from cameras pointed at a wall in the room but
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not at the TV directly, videos observing the watcher’s face (for example, via a Kinect or similar
front-mounted camera), and of course, from video capturing the TV directly. To facilitate my attack,
I convert the observed pattern of intensity changes into a suitable feature vector that is amenable
to rapid matching of other stored feature vectors within the adversary’s large corpus of processed
videos.
In this chapter, I compute the average pixel brightness of each frame in the video, resulting in
a mean brightness signal for the video. To capture the sharp changes in brightness, I then use the
gradient of the signal as the descriptor for the video. The overall process is illustrated in Figure 6.1.
Similar to the captured video, every video in the adversary’s collection is represented by a feature
based on the gradient of the brightness signal. Note that while the mean brightness signal of the
reference video and the captured videos signal may vary, their gradient-based features share more
characteristics in common, and it is those commonalities that are used to identify the content being
watched.
6.3 Automated Video Retrieval
My approach (as shown in Figure 6.1) consists of two main parts that comprise a feature
extraction step from the captured recording and a video retrieval step using a precomputed library of
features from reference content (i.e., the set of videos for which the adversary wishes to confirm her
hypotheses against). The feature extraction stage converts the captured video into a representative
encoding that encodes the changes in brightness. This feature is then compared during the video
retrieval to the features in the database to identify the content on the victim’s display.
6.3.1 Feature Extraction
Intuitively, in my feature representation I want to preserve the brightness changes of the
displayed image. Hence, for each frame t of the video, with M frames, I calculate the average
intensity s(t) with t = 0, . . . ,M , by averaging all the brightness values of all pixels in the image.
The sequence s of these average brightness values s(t) with t = 0, . . . ,M , provides us with a coarse
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characterization of the captured video’s brightness. An example brightness sequence for a video
sc captured through the window and the corresponding original video sd is provided in Figure 6.2.
Notice that while the variation of the two signals is comparable, the magnitude of the brightness
signals s(t) is significantly different.
Figure 6.2: The intensity signal (top) and respective features (middle and bottom). For illustrative
purposes, the sequences are manually aligned. Noises occur as peaks or masked out peaks in the
feature sequence
To achieve comparability of the two signals sc and sd I characterize them by their frame-wise
intensity gradient over time ds(t). Given the average intensity signals sc and sr respectively, the
temporal gradient ds(t) can be calculated as ds(t) = s(t+ 1)− s(t).
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Based on my conjecture that the brightness changes uniquely characterize a video, I convert the
temporal gradient ds into a feature f by only preserving its significant (|ds(t)| > 1) local maxima
and minima
f(t) =

ds(t), if |ds(t)| > 1 ∧ |ds(t)| > |ds(t− 1)|
∧|ds(t)| > |ds(t+ 1)|
0, else
(6.1)
If the video sequence’s brightness does not have scene changes, flashes or other sudden changes,
the average intensity is nearly constant, leading to zero values in f(t). By contrast, if there is a
sudden intensity change (e.g., a drastic scene change or flashes of gun shots) f(t) will capture a
”peak” which is either positive or negative, representing a sudden increase or decrease in average
intensity. Accordingly, f(t) can be viewed as a composition of peaks. For a captured video, some
of the peaks might correspond to noise or noise might mask some peaks in f . Additionally, the
magnitude of the peaks might be still scaled by an unknown factor. Example features fc and fd for
a captured video and the retrieved database video are shown in Figure 6.2 (middle, bottom).
6.3.2 Creating the Reference Library
My video retrieval requires a database of reference videos to retrieve the corresponding video
being watched. This database is typically obtained ahead of time by obtaining all content of interest.
If only the content for live TV is of interest to the adversary, she can just record all the currently
running TV channels. If the adversary is interested in online videos, a database of popular videos
(e.g., from YouTube, Netflix, or her home collection) would be helpful. Once all videos of interest
are obtained, they are converted to feature vectors using the same feature extraction technique used
for the captured sequences (see Section 6.3.1).
6.3.3 Locating the Best Matching Sequences
To identify the best match I use a nearest neighbor search across subsequences because the
captured sequence typically only covers a small part of the overall content being watched on the
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display. For ease of exposition, I first introduce my similarity metric for the case that both the
captured length length(fc) and the reference video length length(f) are the same and start at the
same time. Later, I generalize the metric to account for different lengths and starting points of the
captured and the reference videos.
Intuitively, to measure the similarity of the feature vectors for the captured video fc and a
reference video fi ∈ {fref}, I can examine how many extrema match between the features. The
amount of disturbance caused by erroneous noise peaks is represented by
Enoise(fi, fc) =
ΣLt=1fc(t)
21(fi(t) == 0)
ΣLt=1fc(t)
2
(6.2)
where L is the length of the videos and 1(x) is the indicator function, which is one if x is true and
zero otherwise. Similarly
Emiss(fi, fc) =
ΣLt=1fi(t)
21(fc(t) == 0)
ΣLt=1fi(t)
2
(6.3)
measures the energy of missing peaks in the reference sequence. Note that while Enoise and Emiss
characterize the magnitude of difference in the number of peaks, I must also measure the amount of
difference in energy of the peaks by characterizing how similar the extrema themselves are. This
can be measured as the correlation Corr(fi, fc)
Corr(fi, fc) =
ΣLt=1fc(t)fi(t)√
(ΣLt=1fc(t)
2)(ΣLt=1fi(t)
2)
(6.4)
between the two sequences, which has a value between -1 and 1. In this chapter, I use a similarity
metric d that combines Enoise, Emiss and Corr(fi, fc) into a single metric:
d(fc, fi) =α (Enoise(fi, fc) + Emiss(fi, fc))
+ (1− Corr(fi, fc))
(6.5)
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with α representing the weighting between the energy of the missing or noise peaks and the
correlation between the correct extrema; the latter is necessary when distinguishing features in the
case of perfectly agreeing peaks. Given that the magnitudes of the peaks may be different between
the captured and reference signals, I rely on the temporal information which is more accurate.
As such, I empirically chose α = 50 for all my experiments so that the temporal agreement of
peaks dominates the metric. It is only when the temporal position of peaks matches perfectly that
Corr(fi, fc) is used to evaluate their similarity based on magnitude.
Returning to §2.4.1.2, it is important to remind the reader that my metric is based on the gradient
of average intensity. Therefore, it captures sharp intensity changes and ignores smooth terms such
as ambient light condition, the auto exposure of camera and other gradual changes. Even impulse
noise (e.g. turning on/off the room light) only results in a single extra peak in the feature vector
and thus has minor impact on the overall result. Other alternatives such as using the correlation
directly (e.g., as proposed by Greveler et al. (2012)) fail in my scenario since these approaches are
significantly impacted by signal magnitudes which are often heavily distorted. Likewise, the FFT
transformation used in sequence matching schemes (Faloutsos et al., 1994; Moon et al., 2002) also
fails because the peaks are too sparse for frequency analysis and the localized changes are too subtle
to be useful.
In my evaluations that follow, the reference video that best matches under my similarity metric
d is reported as the likely content being watched. I note that in practice the temporal position of
the extrema may vary by one frame due to encoding and sampling of the original video sequence.
Therefore, when determining whether fi(t) or fc(t) is non-zero, I consider the adjacent two frames
(t − 1, t + 1) in addition to the frame at time t by using the modified indicator function 1˜(x) in
Equations (6.2)-(6.5), which is one if none of x or its temporal neighbors is true.
Notice that thus far, the retrieval using the similarity metric d from Equation (6.5) assumes
equal length and starting point of the videos. To relax this assumption, for a recording of length
lc = length(fc) I search all subsequences of length lc among all database sequences of length
greater than or equal to lc. This has the added benefit that I not only identify what content was
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watched, but also what part of the video was watched at the time the recording was taken. The
problem, however, is this type of exhaustive search comes with a significant computational burden.
In what follows, I discuss how to achieve a more efficient solution in practice.
6.4 Illuminati: Efficient Attacks using Compromising Effusions
To tackle large-scale databases of tens of thousands of videos, I employ a matching algorithm
that only needs to search a small fraction of the database. Recall that my similarity metric (Equation
6.5) mainly matches significant intensity changes (peaks in my feature representation) in the
captured video with the peaks in the database videos. Next, I leverage the fact that these peaks are
only present in a small fraction of the video frames and propose a new peak-feature that efficiently
characterizes the distribution of peaks. This distribution can then be used to narrow down the search
space and speed up the search by an order of magnitude. My proposed algorithm consists of two
steps. The first step is the extraction of the features based on only the peaks and the second step
uses an efficient index-based search.
6.4.1 Peak-feature Extraction
My proposed peak-feature aims at capturing the distribution of the peaks caused by sudden
intensity changes in the video. As shown in Figure 6.3, the peak-feature is computed within a sliding
window, of size w = 512, over the gradient feature, i.e. the peak-feature is computed from the w
consecutive feature values. The value 512 is chosen empirically since my experiments indicate
that subsequences shorter than 512 frames (at 10 Hz video frame rate) do not provide enough
information for retrieval. To limit sensitivity to peaks caused by noise, all peaks with a magnitude
lower than a predefined threshold (30% in my experiments) of the strongest peak’s magnitude are
omitted. The remaining dominant peaks are assumed to stably represent the gradient feature within
the window and are encoded into my proposed peak-feature.
The encoding scheme works as follows. A histogram of the pairwise distances between all
pairs of peaks is computed. The histogram uses a bin size of eight, which roughly corresponds
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Figure 6.3: Depiction of a sliding window for extracting the peak-descriptor. To suppress noise
related peaks, peaks below a predefined threshold are ignored. Effective peaks pairs create a
histogram and the cumulation is used as the descriptor of the window.
to a one second distance quantization. The resulting histogram has 64 bins for my window size
of 512 frames. Each pair of peaks increases the count in the bin corresponding to their distance
(measured by their frame number difference). To model the fact that the stronger peaks are more
reliable, the amount of increase is equal to the product of the peaks magnitude. In that way, peaks
with larger magnitudes contributes more significantly to the histogram. To ensure comparability
between feature windows with different numbers of peaks, I normalize the histogram to sum to one.
My peak-feature is the cumulative histogram of the normalized histogram. For the remainder of
this chapter, I use this cumulative histogram as it is less prone to the influence of noise caused, for
example, by the quantization through the histogram bins.
In summary, my proposed peak-feature is a monotonically increasing 64-dimensional vector
with the final element being 1. An example histogram and the corresponding peak-feature is
illustrated in Figure 6.3. The distance between two peak-features can be measured by the Euclidean
distance of the 64 dimensional vectors. The peak-feature is invariant to the starting point of the
window given that it only encodes the pairwise peak distances. When the window slides across the
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feature, the peak-feature remains stable as long as there is no peak coming in or going out. For
completeness, the exact process is given in Algorithm 1.
An entire video can then be represented as the set of its peak-features, which typically leads to
a large set of features describing the video. However, since the peak-feature only depends on the
peaks within the window, shifting the window by one frame often results in the same peak-feature
(as long as all peaks remain in the window). Empirically, this is the case for about 95% of the
peak-features. Accordingly, I represent a video using only its unique peak-features and remove all
redundant peak-features from the set of computed peak-features.
Algorithm 1 Extracting peak-feature from window fwin
1: Threshold← 0.3
2: for i = 1 to N do
3: if |fwin[i]| < Threshold ∗max(|fwin|) then
4: fwin[i]← 0
5: end if
6: end for
7: for i = 1 to 64 do
8: Histogram[i]← 0
9: end for
10: for every 2 peaks pi, pj in fwin do
11: Histogram[dist(pi, pj)]← Histogram[dist(pi, pj)] + |pipj|
12: end for
13: Histogram← Histogram/sum(Histogram)
14: for i = 1 to 64 do
15: PeakFeature[i] = Σik=1Histogram[k]
16: end for
17: return PeakFeature
6.4.2 Efficient Searching
Next, I detail my proposed efficient search algorithm, which leverages the introduced peak-
feature for efficient search. Algorithm 2 provides the pseudo-code for my method and will be
detailed below. Given a recording of interest, I first extract the peak-features for the video (see line
6). Peak features with a high number of strong peaks are typically very distinguishing, having a
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Euclidian norm that is typically larger than peak-features with weaker or fewer peaks. During the
matching process, I select the peak-feature with the largest norm first (see line 7).
To search the database for a likely match (see line 9), I index the peak-features using a
data-structure known as K-d tree, which is widely used for search in high-dimensional search
spaces (Bentley, 1975). The main idea of the K-d tree is to recursively split the space with
hyperplanes, which iteratively refines the possible location of the data point under examination. In
my empirical evaluations, the reference library contains 27-million peak-features representing the
54,000 videos. By leveraging a K-d-tree, I can quickly search for all reference videos that are likely
matches. Here, a likely matching video has to be within a Euclidean distance of δ ≤ 0.7 from the
peak-feature of the captured video2.
From the likely matches I select the one with the smallest Euclidian distance to the captured
video (see line 10). For this video my similarity metric from Equation 6.5 is computed. If the
similarity is the best observed similarity thus far, this video is retained as the top candidate and its
confidence is increased (see line 16). Then, the next strongest peak-feature is obtained (see line 18)
and evaluated in the same manner (see line 9-16). If the retrieved video is the same as the previously
selected one, the confidence assigned to this potential match increases (see line 16). Otherwise the
newly found best match replaces the previously selected best video (see line 12-14). This process is
repeated until the best-matching video remains stable for three consecutive trials.
The algorithm proposed above is an offline approach, which can be extended to operate in
an online fashion. For offline retrieval, I have access to all the peak-features at once. Hence, I
have the luxury of ranking the features by strength. In contrast, for online operation, the video
is streamed. Once a new frame is captured a new peak-feature is computed using the 512 most
recent frames. If the newly computed feature is unique for the video, i.e., has not been extracted
from the video before, the K-d tree is used to search for likely matches within the reference library.
Then the best video (i.e., with the smallest Euclidian distance) is fully evaluated using my proposed
2 The value for δ was empirically chosen based on a rudimentary analysis of the resulting accuracy.
142
Algorithm 2 Efficient searching captured feature fc
1: BestScore← INF // best so far score
2: BestId← INF // database id of best candidate
3: ConsecutiveHits← 0 // number of consecutive confirmation of best candidate
4: MaxHits← 3
5: Radius← 0.7
6: PeakFeature← extractPeakFeature(fc)
7: CurFea← featureOfStrongestPeak(PeakFeature)
8: while exist(CurFea) and ConsecutiveHits < MaxHits do
9: RefFea← searchKdtree(CurFea,Kdtree,Radius)
10: [CurScore, CurId]← findMinSMetric(CurFea,RefFea)
11: if CurScore < BestScore then
12: BestScore← CurScore
13: BestId← CurId
14: ConsecutiveHits← 0
15: else
16: ConsecutiveHits← ConsecutiveHits+ 1
17: end if
18: CurFea← featureOfNextStrongestPeak(PeakFeature)
19: end while
20: return BestId
similarity metric from Equation (6.5). If the best video is identical to the previously identified one,
its confidence is increased. Otherwise it replaces the current best choice.
On Efficiency: Levering the peak-features and the K-d tree based search reduces the search time
on average to less than 10s (2.8 seconds for each K-d tree search) for a database of 54,000
reference videos. The achieved query time is more than an order of magnitude faster than searching
exhaustively through the database, which took 188s. The online search can in fact be executed
in real time when allowing a latency of 512 frames due to the required temporally preceding
information for the peak-feature computation.
6.5 Evaluation
For my empirical evaluation, I collected a large collection of reference videos spanning a wide
variety of content. My reference library contains 10,000 blockbuster movies of at least an hour in
length, 24,000 news clips ranging from 5 min to 20 min each, 10,000 music videos ranging from 2
143
min to 7 min each, and 10,000 TV-shows ranging from 5 min to 20 min each. In total, the library
indexes over 18,800 hours of video. All features and peak-features from the library are precomputed
by leveraging my proposed methods from Sections 6.3 and 6.4. For my experimental evaluation I
randomly selected 62 sequences as my test set of videos.
For the first set of evaluations the test videos were played on a 24 inch screen with no additional
room lighting turned on. I then capture the reflection of the screen emanation from a white wall at a
distance of three meters from the screen. To capture the video, a Logitech HD Pro Webcam C920
and a 60D canon DSLR were used. I run the experiment in a home environment as well as in a lab
environment. The setting of my experiment is illustrated in Figure 6.4. These captured videos were
then used to execute my attack. For these evaluations I assess the success of the attack with respect
to the duration of the captured video and the size of the reference library.
Figure 6.4: Lab environment (left) and home environment setting (right)
Lights Off
First I evaluate the success rate of my method using a room with the lights off, as commonly
occurs when watching TV. A success is the correct identification of the video being watched. I do
not leverage any knowledge about the video being played nor do any of my experiments use any
knowledge of the scene or the capture distances. The time at which the adversary starts capturing
the emanations from the display is chosen at random.
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Capture Length 60s 90s 120s 180s 240s 270s
Success Rate 39% 49% 54% 70% 85% 94 %
Table 6.1: Retrieval success rate with random start point.
For the 62 test sequences I analyzed segments from 60 to 270 seconds long. These segments
are processed by the feature and peak-feature extraction procedures. The resulting features and
peak-features are then used to infer the best match among the reference library. The experiment is
repeated 100 times for each of the different segment lengths, each time choosing a random starting
position. Table 6.1 shows the resulting average success rate over all starting positions. As expected,
the longer the captured sequence, the higher the attack’s success rate. The results shows that the
success rate increases from 39% for a 60 second segment to 94% for 270 seconds, and has nearly a
50% success rate using only 90 seconds of captured emanations. A more detailed analysis of the
data reveals that in the limit, the success rate is 100% for each video as subsequences within these
videos can always be uniquely identified.
Figure 6.5: The median ratio within the dataset of 54,000 references.
To better quantify the robustness of my approach, I evaluate the ratio in similarity between
the video sequence returned as the best match and the true positive. If the ratio is larger than one,
that implies the correct video will always be identified. The higher that ratio, the more distinct the
145
retrieval result. Obviously, the outcome also depends on the contents of the reference library itself.
The experimental results of the ratio evaluation are shown in Figure 6.5. The median similarity score
ratio rises above one (successful retrieval) between 100 and 120 seconds. For longer sequences, it
monotonically increases with increasing segment length.
Figure 6.6: Rank of correct video in the best case (blue) and worst case (red).
Beyond the average success rate and robustness, it is also important to understand the best and
worst case results. The worst case is especially useful since it provides a measurement for an attacker
of how much video is needed to reliably achieve a successful attack. To measure these boundaries I
evaluate the retrieval success rates for all possible sub-sequences longer than 10 seconds and all
possible starting points for my 62 test sequences. For each of these tests I then rank the retrieved
videos by their similarity scores and report the rank of the ground-truth video. If the corresponding
video is ranked first the retrieval was successful, otherwise it was not.
Figure 6.6 shows the rank of the corresponding video with respect to the captured video’s length
for one of my test videos. The results for the other videos are comparable. In the best case, the
corresponding reference video is always ranked first, which means if the attacker is lucky enough,
she will be able to retrieve the correct video even if she only captures 10 seconds of video. The
results also shows that any captured segment longer than 120 seconds within this particular video
can always be successfully retrieved.
Next, I summarize the results on a per-video basis by assigning a video its worst segment’s
similarity ranking, i.e., its worst possible ranking obtained by any of the corresponding video for
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Illumination settings SNR Segment Length
Normal brightness level room light off 70 180s
50% brightness level room light off 33 270s
Normal brightness level room light on 15 300s
Table 6.2: Worst case capture length with different illumination settings.
any of its segments. This captures the lower bound of the attacks performance for each of my 62
test videos. The results are shown in Figure 6.10. Expectedly, the variation is the largest for the
shortest segments of less than 100 seconds and converges to one with capture length longer than
240 seconds.
6.5.1 Lights On
The illumination of a scene (e.g., both room and natural light) contribute significantly to the
amount of light entering the camera, which in turn influences the brightness level of the captured
video. Obviously, screens with lower brightness naturally reduce the light emanation. Therefore,
I evaluate the influence of the illumination on the performance of my proposed attack. In this
experiment I use a 24 inch screen, and the attacker’s camera captures the reflection of the screen of
a white wall, which is three meters away from the screen. The camera used in the attack is a Canon
Rebel T4i DSLR. I captured five videos in each of three different illumination settings: 1) normal
screen brightness with room light off, 2) 50% reduced screen brightness level with room light off, 3)
normal screen brightness with the room light on. The obtained retrieval results are shown in Table
6.2 and Figure 6.7.
The results indicate that higher screen brightness levels make the retrieval slightly more
successful as it takes shorter segment lengths for successful retrieval and the similarity ratio is
higher. However, the influence of the screen brightness seems marginal. It can also be seen
from Table 6.2 and Figure 6.7 that even with the room light on, my attack is successful with
moderate segment length, which I attribute that to my robust similarity metric. The only effect
that both the lower screen brightness and the active room light have is that it mandates that longer
segments are necessary for successful retrieval in the worst case. This is expected, as in both cases,
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Figure 6.7: Ratio to second-best under different illumination conditions.
smaller, less significant brightness changes are not detectable anymore. Accordingly, there are
fewer distinguishing elements I can use. In the case of the active room light, I only failed once
when retrieving a video based on a segment that was 270 seconds, but succeeded with a 300 second
segment. It is worth noting that in the case of an active room light, a human observer is not able to
perceive the resulting subtle intensity changes on the wall.
6.5.2 Impact of Screen Size
Figure 6.8: Boxplot of the second-best ratio w.r.t. different screen sizes.
The amount of light captured by a camera not only depends on the screen’s illumination setting
but also on the actual screen size as it influences the amount of light emitted into the environment.
Generally, bigger screens emanate more light, which leads to higher quality video capture. To
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evaluate the impact of screen size, I performed an experiment in which I used differently sized LCD
displays. In particular, I used displays with 24 inch, 30 inch, and 50 inch screen sizes. I again use a
Canon Rebel T4i DSLR to capture the video of the back wall, which is 3 m away from the screen.
For each screen size I capture five videos. The resulting required worst case segment lengths for
successful retrieval are shown in Table 6.3 while Figure 6.8 shows their distribution. The SNR
is lower because the experiment was performed in a different room with a lot of light-absorbing
materials.
Screen Size SNR Worst Case Length
24 inch 5 270s
30 inch 48 180s
50 inch 109 180s
Table 6.3: Worst case capture length with different screen size.
Expectedly, the larger screen size supports better retrieval for shorter segments. The shorter
segments that fail on the 24 inch screen can often be successfully retrieved with the 30 and the 50
inch screens. The similarity ratio is higher on larger screens leading to more robust identification.
6.5.3 Impact of Reference Library Size
The retrieval results are influenced by the distribution of the videos within the database and the
size of the database. To characterize the change in behavior I compute the worst case ranking for
two reference libraries consisting of 1000 and 4000 videos respectively. The results are shown in
Figure 6.9. As expected, it can be seen that the larger the database, the longer the segments have to
be to guarantee a successful retrieval. However, the increase in segment length with respect to the
increase in database size is moderate. For example, for an increase in database size from 4,000 to
54,000 videos (13.5x), the segment length only increases by 20% (from approximately 200 seconds
to 240 seconds). I predict that this increase will decline even more for larger databases as the
probability of two identical video segments appearing in different videos exponentially decreases
with the length of the segment.
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Figure 6.9: Rank of correct video among libraries of size 1,000 and 4,000.
Figure 6.10: Rank of correct video (among 54,000 videos).
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6.5.4 As Seen From Outdoors
Figure 6.11: TV reflection in the room is captured from a distance of 13.5 meters (left). The worst
case results (right) are illustrated for different types of videos: TV shows, music and film from top
to bottom. All segments longer than 180s were successfully retrieved.
To further demonstrate the practicality of my proposed attack, I tested its effectiveness from
outdoors. I captured the emanations seem on an outside window of a room with a TV showing 60
of my test sequences. In this scenario, the attacker was positioned on the sidewalk observing the
third floor office window of the room with the TV (see Figure 6.11). The TV emanations reflected
off the beige ceiling of the room and towards the window which was situated orthogonal to the TV.
The TV is 13.5 meters away from the adversary. For completeness, I evaluated my approach using
videos from varying categories of media that include TV shows, music videos and films. 20 samples
of each video type were captured. Figure 6.11 (right) shows the worst case result with respect to
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different subsequences. The results indicate similar success across all videos tested, and in all cases,
I was able to perform the confirmation attack.
To guage the robustness of my approach, I further experimented with recordings captured
at much further distances. In this case, the attacker was positioned on the sidewalk 70.9 meters
from the building; the TV was playing in the same third-floor room as in the previous experiment.
TV emanations were captured from the ceiling reflection with the same Canon Camrecorder.
20 sequences randomly selected from different categories are tested. The proposed approach
successfully retrieved 18 sequences out of them within 5 minutes. The experimental setting and
results are depicted in Figure 6.12. The results are compared with that of direct view and 13.5 meter
reflection (Figure 6.12 bottom). In the worst case, the sequence can usually be retrieved within 100
seconds at 13.5 meters away, compared to 190 seconds, on average, from 70 meters away.
6.6 Mitigations
The simplest mitigation is to cover the windows of the room with blackout curtains to effectively
avoid the leakage of the light to the outside. To guage the effectiveness of such a defense I performed
a rudimentary experiment with vinyl blinds and curtains (see Figure 6.13)3. The setup was the same
as for the attack carried out at 13.5 meters outdoors, except for the use of shades. In this experiment,
only two samples were tested in each case. For the case of vinyl blinds and a standard beige curtain
with brown stripes, I were still able to determine 3 of the 4 videos being watched after capturing
270s worth of footage. The other video failed to be recovered even after 5 mins. I was unable to
confirm any of the watched content when thicker, room darkening, (black) curtains were used.
If the use of curtains is not desired the screen brightness could be lowered to increase the SNR
of any captured video. My experimental evaluation demonstrated though that this has only a limited
effect on twarting the attack. My experiments show that retrieval will still be possible as long as the
brightness change is perceptible. Although this strategy would not prevent the attack altogether,
lowering the screen brightness will increase the burden on the attacker as longer observations
3 The brighter pattern in the middle picture is caused by a reflection on the vinyl blinds from an outside street lamp.
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Figure 6.12: TV reflection in the room is captured from a distance of 70.9 meters(top). The camera
and the window are labelled in red(top right). The required capture length is compared with direct
view and 13.5 meter reflection (bottom). It takes longer for successful retrieval with longer distance.
would be required to successfully carry out the attack. Similarly, the burden on the attacker can be
increased if a bright room light is used as that would increase the noise level in the captured signal.
Another defensive strategy may be to install a flood light next to any window of the room so as
to effectively blind a camera that tries to observe the diffusions through the window. Doing so would
prevent the camera from capturing the subtle brightness changes required to successfully execute
the attack. That said, a motivated attacker could overcome this defense by using sophisticated
high dynamic range image cameras, which can capture a large dynamic range of light intensities.
Alternatively, my attack could be mitigated by installing an adaptive lighting system, which measures
the emitted light and counters any brightness change of the emitted light. Doing so would help
maintain a constant amount of light emission and would not reveal the brightness change information
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Figure 6.13: Captured image directly from window (left), through vinyl blinds (middle) and through
a curtain (right).
to an outside observer. Obviously, these defenses would not be popular in densely populated areas
as the outdoor light emissions would likely not be appreciated by neighbors.
6.7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, I propose a novel method to identify the video content shown on a victim’s
screen using recordings collected in a number of practical scenarios (e.g., observations of light
effusions through the windows or off the walls) and at great distances (e.g., 70m away). My attack
shows reliable identification of the content being watched in a wide range of evaluated scenarios.
The robustness of the attack is due to a novel application of unique feature sets, a well suited
similarity metric, and the development of efficient indexing structures for performing rapid matches
in near real-time. My empirical results show that I can successfully confirm hypotheses while
capturing short recordings (typically less than 4 minutes long) of the changes in brightness from the
victim’s display.
Beside TV-content retrieval, my proposed method can be easily applied to detecting co-
occurrence in a dataset. Specifically, I can take advantage of my preliminary work which shows that
the light emitted by viewing devices or any other modulated or random pattern light source (e.g.,
flashes of cameras) induces a distinctive flicker pattern that can be used to find linkages among
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videos. In this way, I can identify the co-occurrence of two videos even if their viewing perspective
have no spatial overlap.
To see why the use of illumination changes offers a powerful capability for link-analysis,
consider the example shown in Figure 6.14. The light emitted from a screen is used to infer
connections among videos from cameras pointing in opposite directions. The first might be video
captured by an on-body police camera, while the other might come from a bystander in the same
vicinity, but with her camera turned away from the police officer and instead recording the actions
of others nearby. As preliminary work, I explored two capabilities: i) given the video sequence
from camera 1, find the best matching sequence from a reference library (that includes video from
camera 2), and ii) identify the relationship between the two videos without any a priori knowledge
of video from either camera. In both cases, the temporal information inferred from intensity changes
was successfully used to match the footage from camera 1 and camera 2 among a larger database
of 54000 videos. More importantly, once a positive match is found, their linkage can be used to
provide even more information for forensic investigations. For instance, known information from
one of the videos (e.g., GPS location, captions or other visual text) could be used to automatically
populate labels of other matching video(s). For example, given a query video with ashing lights,
co-occurrence matches from videos from nearby surveillance or witnesses’ cameras that capture
similar intensity changes can be linked together.
The preliminary experiment above was conducted in controlled lab settings. In practice, my
ability of discovering co-occurrence would be affected by camera movement and surrounding
light that is only captured by one camera, which add strong noise peaks in the extracted temporal
derivative feature. Therefore, my original approach may need to be extended for the robustness
against these factors in order to be effective for co-occurrence detection in the real world. I leave
these discussions to future work.
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Figure 6.14: (Left): Cameras facing opposite directions; (Right): Encoded intensity signals.
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CHAPTER 7: DETECTING COPIES FROM LARGE VIDEO COLLECTIONS
7.1 Introduction
Love it or loathe it, the spread of “pirated” media is here to stay due to its significant economic
gain for the pirates. While hard to quantify exactly, the significant economic impact of video piracy
can be observed in recent events. The takedown of Megaupload alone has led to 6.5−8.5% increase
in annual revenue, over $20 million, for three major motion picture studios (Danaher and Smith,
2014). More recently, the Annual State of Application Security Report from Arxan Technologies
(Arxan Technologies, 2015) revealed $91.6 billion worth of movies and TV series changed hands
via illegal distribution networks in 2014. In this chapter, I address the detection of these pirated
movies. To comply with the DMCA’s safe harbor protections and stem the tide against such lawsuits,
the popular user-generated content (UGC) platforms have turned to automated copyright violation
detection. The most popular method is the proprietary Content ID algorithm (YouTube), which
inspects daily over 400 years worth of videos.
While these techniques (such as Content ID) have been successful, they have been widely
criticized for false detections (Bartholomew, 2014), particularly impacting independent content
creators1. Improving the accuracy of such systems has garnered much attention from both academia
and industry given that it remains an important social problem and immense business opportunity.
In 2008 the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) included a separate
challenge on video copy detection in their annual TREC Video Retrieval Evaluation (TRECVID)
within the IACC dataset (developed in 2006, with over 200 hours of video) (Smeaton et al.,
2006). Another challenge dataset was the MUSCLE-VCD-2007 dataset (with over 100 hours of
1 See also P. Tassi, “The Injustice of the YouTube Content ID Crackdown Reveals Google’s Dark Side” Forbes Magazine,
2013.
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video) (Law-To et al., 2007). These datasets used synthetic video-based transformations to test
the performance of different content detection approaches. After just four years, the TRECVID
challenge was prematurely terminated, claiming that near-duplicate video detection was a solved
problem. However, in 2014 Jiang et al. (Jiang et al., 2014) showed that the current state of the
art — which showed near-perfect results on the simulated benchmarks — are far from satisfactory
in detecting complex real-world copies. To highlight the problem, Jiang et al. (Jiang et al., 2014)
released a new dataset (called VCDB) that contains pirated videos available on YouTube and
MetaCafe. Their preliminary evaluations suggest that the transformations observed in the real world
are very different from the synthetic transformations considered by the academic community to
date. For instance, the most widely studied transformation in the TRECVID evaluations, “picture in
picture,” is rarely seen in real cases, while the more commonly observed transformations in online
pirated videos are far more complex than the synthetic ones tested in past evaluations. As a result,
the techniques that appear to be robust in simulated benchmarks fail miserably in the wild. The work
of Jiang et al. (Jiang et al., 2014) demonstrated that the assumptions made in the NIST challenges
were far too naı¨ve and did not generalize well to what real-world adversaries would do. Common
transformations observed in the real world are cam recording (filming the screen), brightness and
color adjustments, flipping (mirroring on vertical axis), and scaling. I show examples of these in
Figure 7.1 . The VCDB dataset itself is a dataset that includes samples which are not detected by
current commercial systems, in particular ContentID. Although the dataset is biased, it contains
exactly the pirated videos of interest for improving the state of the art. Hence, I use this dataset to
evaluate my method for its potential for improving copyright violation (see Section 7.3).
I leverage the observations of Jiang et al. (Jiang et al., 2014) regarding temporal consistency
for practical content-based copy detection. They observed that in the real world there is a limited
range within which the pirates modify the temporal information, i.e. frame rate, of a copied video.
Outside of this range, it is empirically difficult to thwart copy detection systems without significantly
degrading the user’s viewing experience, which would clearly be contrary to the pirates’ goals.
I leverage this key observation along with the robustness of the mean image brightness gradient
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Figure 7.1: Copy-reference pairs in the VCDB dataset
signal (Xu et al., 2014a) to propose a novel approach based on exploiting temporal consistency. In
contrast to the existing state of the art, my approach shows significantly improved simultaneous
robustness against both spatial transformations and commonly used temporal transformations.
7.2 Approach
Figure 7.2: Overview of the proposed approach
My proposed method (Figure 7.2) consists of two main components: a knowledge extraction
stage and a video sub-sequence matching (“copy detection”) stage. In the knowledge extraction
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stage, I first pre-process the reference library by extracting derivative features for all its videos (i.e. ,
computing their “fingerprints” in stage Ê). As noted by Xu et al. (Xu et al., 2014a), these derivative
features encode the temporal position of illumination changes (peaks) in the videos, which can be
leveraged to find linkages to a collection of videos.
To build an indexing structure that is robust against temporal transformations, local temporal
features covering a short temporal windows around a peak are extracted from the derivative features
of each video (stage Ë)2. They encode the gradient signal profile of significant illumination changes
in a manner that is robust to temporal transformations. A K-d tree structure is built upon the local
features of all reference videos.
The detection stage is used to determine if a video contains infringing material. It also
computes the uploaded video’s derivative and local features. The local features are then used as a
first approximation (stage Ì) to retrieve reference videos with similar local intensity profiles. Each
retrieved local feature provides a set of potential candidates for matching reference videos. The
collection of possible matches is then considered for further scrutiny using full video information
(stage Í). The comparison to the full video, or large segments thereof, requires a known temporal
transformation. This temporal transformation is provided by a scale factor estimation based on a
classifier (SVM) based subsequence alignment. The sequence alignment is then iteratively refined.
The aligned video subsequences are finally classified into infringing and genuine videos.
7.2.1 Derivative Feature Extraction
My derivative features are computed as the temporal gradient of the video frames’ average
intensity signal st. The temporal gradient is calculated as ∆s(t) = s(t+ 1)− s(t). Based on the
observation of our previous work (Xu et al., 2014a) that brightness changes uniquely characterize
a video, I convert the temporal gradient ∆s(t) into the derivative feature f by only preserving its
2 For ease of readability, I henceforth use the term “local temporal feature” and “local feature” interchangeably as my
methods does not use spatial features.
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significant local extrema (i.e. |∆s(t)| > 1), given by
f(t) =

∆s(t), |∆s(t)| > 1 ∧ |∆s(t)| > min{|∆s(t− 1)|, |∆s(t+ 1)|}
0, else
(7.1)
I extend the single feature per frame of Xu et al. (Xu et al., 2014a) to a hierarchical representation
also computing the temporal feature on a grid of n× n image tiles, which span the entire image
(n = 3 in all experiments). This results in a 10-dimensional feature for each frame.
These features are then used to obtain an alignment between a potential uploaded copy (query)
and the potential original (database) videos. I pose this alignment problem as a classification
problem of the element-wise difference of the feature of a query and a database video. This yields a
10-dimensional similarity score vector. This score vector mainly encodes the difference between
temporal positions of changes in illumination between the query and the database video. To consider
the intrinsic properties of the uploaded video’s segment, I concatenate the similarity score vector
with the length of the uploaded video and the peak rate to form a 12 dimension vector. To classify
for alignment, I then train an SVM on these vectors, using a training set of 20% of my manually
labeled sequence-pairs as positive samples and an equivalent number of randomly selected negative
samples. The classifier outputs a score that can be interpreted as the likelihood that a particular
sequence pair is a copy. If the score is higher than a threshold κ, I declare the sequence pair to be a
near-duplicate.
7.2.2 Local Feature Extraction
For efficient retrieval, local features are computed from the derivative feature values using a
sliding window of t = 5 seconds at a 10 Hz video sampling rate (as shown on the left of Figure
7.3). I focus on the sliding window position where there is a peak at the center of the window.
Moreover, I only consider the sliding windows where the magnitude of the center peak is larger
than at least 60% of other peaks in the window. This choice is guided by the intuition that high
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peaks — representing strong changes in illumination — are less likely to be noise and are therefore
more likely to be preserved during the creation of a pirated version of the original video.
To achieve robustness to temporal transformations, each peak in the window of a reference
video casts votes in its corresponding temporal neighborhood of the query video. The votes for
the temporal positions follow a Gaussian distribution. Given the fact that the temporal uncertainty
quadratically increases with its distance to the window center, the standard deviation parameter
of the Gaussian can be computed based on the expected range of temporal transformations (see
left-middle in Figure 7.3 for an example). The resulting vote vector for the window defines its local
feature when is normalized to L2-norm of one. Next, I discuss on how to index these local features
for efficient retrieval.
Figure 7.3: Left : sliding window on derivative feature. Left middle: local feature with bounded
uncertainty w.r.t. temporal adjustments. Right middle: local feature in uploaded video and (right)
its closest neighbor in the reference set.
7.2.3 Indexing and Retrieval
I use a K-d tree (Bentley, 1975) to efficiently index the local features. I note that the VCDB
dataset contains over 27 hours of video, wherein I identified 17,438 local features. Given a new
video, I extract local features, after which the N strongest features of every five-minutes-long
sub-sequence are used to locate similar local features among all reference videos using the K-d tree
structure.
For each of these N features, I retrieve the nearest α fraction of local features from K-d
tree. Figure 7.3 shows an example of a sample video’s local feature and its closest neighbor. I
empirically found that this fraction only needs to grow marginally (sub-linearly) with database size
(see Section 7.3). This produces a list of potentially infringing sub-sequences of the query and their
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correspondences in the database. However, given the limited temporal context of the local features,
these correspondences almost certainly contain false positives.
7.2.4 Detecting Copied sub-sequences
To minimize false positives, I use the frame correspondences as seeds for a more thorough
duplicate sub-sequence detection step. This step determines the sub-sequence that has most likely
been copied. To correctly identify these copied sub-sequences, I need to determine both their
temporal positions and the applied temporal scales.
Sub-sequence estimation: To achieve this goal, I begin my sub-sequence estimation by assuming
a scaling factor of one. Then I align the reference video and the uploaded video by matching the
suggested frame correspondence. Next, I exhaustively evaluate all sub-sequences containing the
frame correspondence with length less than Θ = 60 seconds. The choice of Θ is guided by the fact
that 60 seconds is already enough for the trained classifier to determine if the sub-sequence pair is a
copy. The actual copy sub-sequence is then determined as the one with the largest SVM score.
Temporal scale estimation Once a sub-sequence is identified as containing potentially infringing
content, I refine the scale estimate for that sub-sequence. Given that, in practice, the observed
range of temporal scales is limited (see §2.5), for practical reasons I explore scales from 0.8 to 1.2
quantized into 100 steps. The scale that yields the highest similarity between the sub-sequence
from the uploaded and the reference video is selected as the scale of the sub-sequence. In order to
normalize temporal uncertainties of the peaks, I change the sub-sequence’s temporal domain to its
logarithmically transformed time axis with the center peak at the origin. In this logarithmic domain,
the uncertainty caused by the scale estimation error becomes uniform across the sub-sequence, and
the impact of quantization error is mitigated when estimating the scaling factor. I use this modified
scoring scheme to determine the best scale estimation for the identified overlapping sub-sequence
(see Section 7.2.4). I then iterate over subsequence estimation and temporal scale estimation. In
practice, I found this process to converge within three iterations. An example of a correctly scaled
and matched sub-sequence for a pirated video is shown in Figure 7.4. As a final optimization, I only
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consider sub-sequences flagged as potential copies if their score from SVM classifier is higher than
Φ. The threshold Φ can be tuned to balance precision and recall rate.
Figure 7.4: Final result of comparing the uploaded video and the selected reference video. Green:
matched segment; Blue: Unmatch segment; Red: reference sequence.
7.3 Evaluation
In order to address the piracy of longer content such as movies, TV-series, sports events, pod
casts, etc., I evaluated the performance of my approach on videos in the VCDB dataset that are
longer than 30 seconds in length. To provide a comparison with the state of the art, I use the same
evaluation methodology used in the VCDB benchmark, whereby performance is measured using
the standardized metrics of precision and recall. Specifically, the segment-level precision (SP ) and
recall (SR) in these benchmarks are:
SP =
|correctly retrieved segments|
|all retrieved segments| , SR =
|correctly retrieved segments|
|ground− truth copy segments|
To plot the precision-recall curves, I vary the threshold of the minimum copy-segment length Φ.
I set α = 1.7% and N = 8 for all my experiments.
To directly compare my results with the current state of the art, I implemented the best-
performing approach on the VCDB benchmark, Tan et al. (Tan et al., 2009)’s temporal network
approach (TNP), which achieves benchmark performance of 60.92% mean average precision. My
implementation reproduced the results reported by Jiang et al. (Jiang et al., 2014). In contrast, my
method reaches a mean average precision of 69.72% and clearly outperforms the TNP approach.
Figure 7.5 shows the precision-recall curves for the two methods. To further evaluate performance
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Figure 7.5: Left: the Precision-Recall curve of my approach and TNP on the VCDB +50,000
dataset., Right: The Precision-Recall curve for TNP and my approach for different genres of videos.
with respect to database size, I added 50,000 YouTube videos (total length 4300 hrs) to the VCDB
dataset (precision-recall curves in Figure 7.5). This reduced my method’s mean average precision to
63.76% whereas TNP’s (Tan et al., 2009) mean average precision had a 15% degradation to 44.56%.
Notice that my approach not only yields a 19.2% better mean average precision, but also improved
recall by 18.2% over TNP (Tan et al., 2009), at the same precision of 90.0%.
Influence of Video Type: Naturally, my accuracy depends on the characteristics of the pirated
content; the more illumination changes in the original material, the better. As noted earlier, Xu
et al. (Xu et al., 2014a) observed that these illumination changes differ among categorizes of videos
(e.g., movies, news and politics, sports, and commercials). To further evaluate the performance
of my method, I grouped the videos in the VCDB dataset by category. The results based on this
categorization are shown in Figure 7.5. My analysis shows that news clips tend to perform the worst
with my approach, which is not surprising given that the news clips in VCDB are of anchormen
seated at their desks covering news stories or political commentary of the day, leading to few average
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intensity changes. My overall performance decreased due to the fact that 26% of the VCDB dataset
are such clips. For comparison, I also evaluated the accuracy of TNP (Tan et al., 2009) considering
the different grouping of videos. The results (dashed lines in Figure 7.5) show that the approach of
Tan et al. (Tan et al., 2009) has slightly better performance on only a handful of the news videos.
Detailed Findings: I further investigated specific samples from the VCDB dataset where I succeed
but the current state of the art such as TNP performs poorly. Through my empirical evaluations, I
found that the temporal network approach of Tan et al. (Tan et al., 2009) mostly fails on detecting
copies that are modified by spatial flipping, brightness adjustments, or insertion of captions —
which are all important classes of spatial transformations present in real world piracy and to which
my approach is robust. The sensitivity to spatial flipping could be dealt with in the techniques of
Tan et al. (Tan et al., 2009) by flipping the uploaded video before the matching process is performed,
but the illumination changes and insertion of captions would still pose significant challenges to the
frame-retrieval-based framework. Specifically, the currently widely used spatial features such as
SIFT and SURF provide weak performance against illumination changes (Juan and Gwun, 2009),
which are 20% of the VCDB videos. I also observed a severe limitation with respect to their ability
to distinguish between different types of inserted captions (8.9% of the VCDB videos). As a result,
the pirated video sub-sequences with illumination changes cannot be detected, and captions copied
into the pirated video lead to false detections because they are incorrectly matched to random text
in the database.
Component Analysis: My method builds on the gradient feature of Xu et al. (Xu et al., 2014a) and
provides two major improvements. First, I take temporal transformations (e.g. scaling, cropping,
editing, and reversing) into consideration; second, I use a hierarchical feature leveraging a 3× 3
tiling in each frame and use a classifier for copy detection based on this hierarchical feature. To
better understand the contribution of each of the components of my approach with respect to Xu
et al. (Xu et al., 2014a) and evaluate their effect on the mAP, I test it using my approach without
tiling, i.e. only taking temporal transformations into account. I also compare it to my full approach
to measure the impact of the tiling. The results are illustrated in Figure 7.6. It can be seen that both
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Figure 7.6: Left: Precision-Recall curve for my approach with(red)/without(purple) 3× 3 tiling, Xu
et al. (Xu et al., 2014a) (green) and TNP (blue). Right: Precision-Recall curve of the TNP approach
vs my approach with different accuracies.
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Temporal Scaling 50% 80% 90% 100% 110% 120% 150%
Recall Rate (My Approach) 56.0% 77.1% 84.7% 97.8% 83.3% 78.7% 58.7%
Recall Rate ( (Xu et al., 2014a)’s Approach) 2.2% 5.1% 5.7% 100.0% 4.4% 2.2% 1.6%
Table 7.1: Recall rate for different temporal scaling
components of my approach significantly improve the accuracy of the copy detection. Xu et al.’s
(Xu et al., 2014a) original work has a mAP of 40.66%, while my proposed approach without tiling
reaches 63.58% (already outperforming TNP). Moreover, with the 3× 3 tiling, the mean average
precision of my approach further improves to 69.72%, which is significantly higher than the 60.92%
of TNP approach (Tan et al., 2009). Further investigating the tiling effect, I empirically find that
tiling enables us to detect copies for videos having little global brightness change, e.g., sports videos
from static cameras where the players cross the field. In these situations, there are no peaks for the
video. However, a player crossing from one image-tiling zone into the next will create a local peak
for the two zones. This enables the tiling to detect the pirated video.
Robustness Against Temporal Scaling: To demonstrate the robustness of my approach against
temporal scaling, I scale the number of frames of each video in VCDB dataset from 50% (half the
frames, i.e. doubling the speed) to 150% (adding 50% frames, i.e. 25% slower speed) and retrieve
the adjusted video using the original video with my approach. I set parameters such that I achieve a
precision of 95% and a recall of 58% for the standard VCDB database. The results are listed in
Table 7.1. It can be seen that when adjusting the temporal speed with 20%, my approach is still able
to detect around 78% of the copies. Even if the temporal speed is adjusted as much as 50%, my
recall rate is still higher than 56%. For comparison, the recall rate of Xu et al. (Xu et al., 2014a)’s
work completely drops below 6% when the temporal speed is adjusted as little as 8%.
Computational Overhead: While precision and recall rates are important considerations, the com-
putational complexity of a content-based detection system is equally important, particularly given
the fact that as much as 300 hours of videos are uploaded to UGC platforms per minute(Youtube,
2015). In general, the computational cost of any copy detection algorithm depends on its required
accuracy, the length of the uploaded video, and the size of the reference dataset.
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The bottleneck of our approach lies in the sub-sequence matching process, where we evaluate the
most likely copy sub-sequence correspondences. The more correspondences we test, and the longer
the uploaded video, the more computation time is required. Specifically, our proposed approach
has computational complexity O(HL), where H is the number of tested frame correspondences
and L is the length of the uploaded video. In practice, this is also affected by other factors such as
peak-rate.
Speed versus Accuracy: The design of our approach allows us to explore the tradeoff between
accuracy and speed. The parameter that has the largest influence on accuracy is α, that is, the number
of hypotheses that are tested during the copy detection phase. To achieve a good compromise
between recall, precision, and computational cost, we examined a range of values for α. The results
are shown in Figure 7.6.
Regarding speed, we note that our current implementation consists of two components: the local
feature correspondence retrieval and the sub-sequence estimation. The correspondence retrieval is
implemented through the VLFeat library(Vedaldi and Fulkerson, 2010) for the K-d tree search, and
the sub-sequence estimation is implemented using Matlab. To study the computational overhead
of our approach, we use a six-core computer with 2.40GHz CPU and 24GB memory. Our results
indicate that to obtain near optimal precision, the top 17% of the hypotheses would have to be tested,
which results in an average evaluation time of 70 ms per frame with a standard deviation of 4.5 ms.
The results depicted in Figure 7.6 show that we can improve computational performance by
only testing the top 1.7% of the hypotheses while reducing the recall rate by only about 3%. When
α is set to 1.7%, the average detection time reduces to 8.6 ms per frame with a standard deviation
of 0.8 ms. These results validate that the sub-sequence estimation component of our proposed
approach is linearly related to the number of tested frame correspondences. Moreover, on the 540
hrs dataset, TNP (Tan et al., 2009) requires almost twice as much time per frame (3.06s) compared
to our method (1.7s). When executing our method on a database of 4,300 hours (160x VCDB core
dataset size) we observe a sublinear increase of compute time (a factor of 48).
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Query Length: Given that the entire query video has to be checked for potential infringement, it is
obvious that the computational cost is related to the length of the uploaded video. The performance
evaluation in Figure 7.7 shows that when the query length increases, the computational cost of our
techniques increases modestly from 14 seconds for a 40-second video to 64-seconds for a 20 minute
one. This is a dramatic improvement over the state-of-the-art system (Tan et al., 2009), whose
computational time ranges from 8 minutes to nearly 4.7 hours — making it clearly impractical for
real world use. It is prudent to note that our implementation of the benchmark approach follows
Figure 7.7: The influence of query length on computation cost
the guidelines presented by Jiang et al. (Jiang et al., 2014) and is consistent with the computation
time of the semi-brute-force matching used by Wu et al. (Wu et al., 2007). The significantly higher
computation time of the baseline approach can be attributed to the fact that it requires a frame
retrieval stage that takes place twice for every second in the uploaded video. Tan et al. (Tan et al.,
2005) suggest to only use the most likely candidate keyframe correspondences, which would boost
the frame retrieval process by a factor of 58 at the expense of a minor loss of precision. However,
our approach still outperforms theirs by an order of magnitude.
Reference library size: An increase in the size of the reference library will affect the computational
performance of any CBCD approach. For our approach, a larger dataset influences efficiency in two
ways: first, a larger dataset results in a longer time to retrieve the local feature correspondences,
which leads to longer retrieval time; second, a larger dataset necessitates more local feature corre-
spondences to be evaluated for copied sub-sequences, leading to higher sub-sequence estimation
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times. To test the impact of increased library size, we run our proposed approach with the above
described 50,000 additional videos from YouTube added to the VCDB dataset and α remaining at
1.7%. The results show that the average computational time increased from 8.6 ms per frame to
410 ms per frame. While this overhead is higher than is demanded by practice, we do believe our
prototype implementation can be greatly improved (e.g., if rewritten in C). We leave that as an goal
for future work.
Limitations: While my proposed approach significantly outperforms the current state of the art, there
are a number of modifications that skilled adversaries could apply to degrade my copy detection
rates. My technique relies on the existence of temporal gradient information. A digital pirate
could temporally smooth the video’s gradient feature to hide these sudden illumination changes.
Doing so would degrade the detection and retrieval performance of my method. Furthermore,
my approach assumes a piecewise consistent temporal transformation. Thus, an adversary may
attempt to transform the video by constantly changing the frame rate to undermine the sub-sequence
detection stage and thereby impair my retrieval process. Similarly, the modifications would also
thwart the current state of the art such as Tan et al. (Tan et al., 2009)’s TNP approach. For
instance, the temporal smoothing will undermine the spatial feature extraction phase of the TNP
approach, making it difficult to match a query frame and its reference. However, it remains unclear
whether these are acceptable avenues for piracy in the real world. Transformations such as temporal
smoothing can seriously influence the video’s visual quality, which would be at odds with the
pirater’s intent of monetizing revenue generated from views of the transformed video.
7.4 Conclusion
I propose a novel method for efficiently and robustly detecting pirated video content on user-
generated content platforms. My method is robust against the frequently used spatial and temporal
transformations observed in the wild. The techniques I propose for enhanced subsequence matching
of video-based content allows us to achieve significantly improved precision and substantially
better computational performance and scalability than the current state-of-the-art approaches.
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More importantly, my technique narrows the detection gap in the important area of temporal
transformations applied by would-be pirates. My large-scale evaluation on real-world data shows
that I can successfully detect infringing content from movies, commercials, and sports clips with
90.0% precision at a 75.1% recall rate, and can achieve this with an average time expense of merely
19 seconds, outperforming the state of the art by an order of magnitude.
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION
This dissertation has presented applications of video event detection and retrieval techniques
under different adversary settings.
In Chapter 3, I explored the robustness and usability of MIOR CAPTCHAs, designing and
implementing automated attacks based on video event detection techniques. My attack inherently
leverages the temporal information in moving-image object recognition (MIOR) CAPTCHAs,
and also exploits the fact that only object recognition of known objects is needed. My methods
also rely on a reasonably consistent appearance or slowly varying appearance over time. That
said, they can be applied to any set of known objects or narrowly defined objects under affine
transformations that are known to work well with detection methods in computer vision (Viola and
Jones, 2001). Looking towards the future, greater robustness would result if MIOR CAPTCHAs
required automated attacks to perform classification, categorization of classes with large inner class
variance, or to identify higher level semantics to understand the presented challenge. Consider, for
example, the case where the user is presented with two objects (a person and a truck) at the same
scale, and asked to identify which one is larger. To succeed, the automated attack would need to
determine the objects (without prior knowledge of what the objects are of) and then understand
the relationship. Humans can perform this task because of the inherent priors learned in daily life,
but this feat remains a daunting problem in computer vision. Therefore, this combination seems
to offer the right balance and underscores the ideas put forth by Naor (Naor, 1996) and von Ahn
et al. (Ahn et al., 2003)—i.e., it is prudent to employ hard (and useful) underlying AI problems in
CAPTCHAs since it leads to a win-win situation: either the CAPTCHA is not broken and there is a
way to distinguish between humans and computers, or it is broken and a useful problem is solved.
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In Chapter 4, I introduced a novel approach to bypass modern face liveness detection systems.
I leveraged a handful of pictures of the target user taken from social media to create a realistic,
textured, 3D facial model that undermines the security of widely used face authentication solutions.
My work outlines several important lessons for both the present state and the future state of security,
particularly as it relates to face authentication systems. First, my exploitation of social media photos
to perform facial reconstruction underscores the notion that online privacy of one’s appearance is
tantamount to online privacy of other personal information, such as age and location. The ability of
an adversary to recover an individual’s facial characteristics through online photos is an immediate
and very serious threat, albeit one that clearly cannot be completely neutralized in the age of social
media. Therefore, it is prudent that face recognition tools become increasingly robust against such
threats in order to remain a viable security option in the future. At a minimum, it is imperative that
face authentication systems be able to reject synthetic faces with low-resolution textures, as I show
in my evaluations. Of more concern, however, is the increasing threat of virtual reality, as well as
computer vision, as an adversarial tool. It appears to us that the designers of face authentication
systems have assumed a rather weak adversarial model wherein attackers may have limited technical
skills and be limited to inexpensive materials. This practice is risky, at best. Unfortunately, VR
itself is quickly becoming commonplace, cheap, and easy-to-use. Moreover, VR visualizations are
increasingly convincing, making it easier and easier to create realistic 3D environments that can
be used to fool visual security systems. As such, it is my belief that authentication mechanisms
of the future must aggressively anticipate and adapt to the rapid developments in the virtual and
online realms. Specifically, face authentication should rely on visual cues that cannot be easily
simulated. For instance, the temporal information of stylish facial expressions (e.g., breathing and
pulsing patterns) can be viable alternative features. Firstly, these temporal information cannot be
easily modeled and simulated by the adversary from still images of the user. Moreover, since it is
already known that gait reveals the identity of a person (Stevenage et al., 1999), it is possible that
these stylish expressions are also distinguishable features of the user’s identity. I leave these to my
future work.
174
In Chapter 5, I provided an approach which broadens the scope of compromising emanation
attacks on mobile devices. My approach overcomes the limitation of low image resolution encoun-
tered by previous work by extending computer vision methods to operate on small, high-noise
images of the mobile device, using fingertip motion for key-press detection. Specifically, I show
that it is possible to perform such attacks in a number of challenging scenarios: on devices with
any type of virtual or physical keyboards, without direct line-of-sight, and at distances farther away
from the victim than previously thought possible. My attack can even directly use reflections on the
eye-ball, which was not possible before due to the noise and physical boundaries of the optics in
prior work. At the current stage, my approach does not consider the switching between alphabetical
and numeric keyboard. It also does not apply to swipe-typing keyboard. I leave these possible
extensions to my future work.
In Chapter 6, I introduced an attack that exploits the emanations of changes of light (e.g., as seen
through the windows and recorded several meters away) to reveal the programs we watch. My attack
shows reliable identification of the content being watched in a wide range of evaluated scenarios.
The robustness of the attack is due to a novel application of unique feature sets, a well suited
similarity metric, and the development of efficient indexing structures for performing rapid matches
in near real-time. My empirical results show that I can successfully confirm hypotheses while
capturing short recordings (typically less than 4 minutes long) of the changes in brightness from
the victim’s display. As a possible extension in future work, my proposed method could be easily
applied to detecting co-occurrence in a dataset. Specifically, my work shows that the light emitted
by viewing devices or any other modulated or random pattern light source (e.g., flashes of cameras)
induces a distinctive flicker pattern that can be used to find linkages among videos. Therefore, I
could potentially leverage these flicker patterns to identify the co-occurrence of two videos even if
they have no visually overlap. In my preliminary experiments, I have already demonstrated that this
is viable in controlled lab settings. However, in practice, my ability of discovering co-occurrence
would be affected by camera movement and surround light that is only captured by one camera,
which add strong noise peaks in the extracted temporal derivative feature. Therefore, my original
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approach may need to be extended for robustness against these factors in order to be effective for
co-occurrence detection in the wild. I leave these discussions to future work.
Finally, in Chapter 7, I proposed a novel method for efficiently and robustly detecting pirated
video content on user-generated content platforms. My method is robust against the frequently used
spatial and temporal transformations observed in the wild. The techniques I propose for enhanced
subsequence matching of video-based content allows us to achieve significantly improved precision
and substantially better computational performance and scalability than the current state-of-the-art
approaches. More importantly, my technique narrows the detection gap in the important area of
temporal transformations applied by would-be pirates. My large-scale evaluation on real-world data
shows that I can successfully detect infringing content from movies, commercials, and sports clips
with 90.0% precision at a 75.1% recall rate, and can achieve this with an average time expense of
merely 19 seconds, outperforming the state of the art by an order of magnitude. It is also worth
noting that my technique relies on the existence of temporal gradient information. A digital pirate
could temporally smooth the video’s gradient feature to hide these sudden illumination changes.
Doing so would degrade the detection and retrieval performance of my method. Similarly, the
modifications would also thwart the current state of the art such as Tan et al. (Tan et al., 2009)’s
TNP approach. However, it remains unclear whether these are acceptable avenues for piracy in
the real world. Transformations such as temporal smoothing can seriously influence the video’s
visual quality, which would be at odds with the pirater’s intent of monetizing revenue generated
from views of the transformed video. We leave these analysis to future work.
To summarize, in Chapter 3-6, I mainly explores the vulnerabilities of existing security systems
(Chapter 3, Chapter 4) and possible side-channel attacks (Chapter 5, Chapter 6). By exploring these
security flaws, researchers have better understanding of the adversary’s constraints, and mitigate
these attacks to enhance the security of existing systems. On the other hand, in Chapter 7, I think
from the defender’s perspective and proposed a novel method for content-based copy detection
using video retrieval techniques. In my approaches above, I do not simply integrate well developed
computer vision techniques. Instead, I extend the boundary of video event detection and retrieval
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techniques to better fitting the adversary constraints, making contributions in the computer vision
domain.
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APPENDIX
A Parameters for video generation
Similar to NuCaptcha’s videos, my sequences have letters that move across a background
scene with constant velocity in the horizontal direction, and move up and down harmonically
(i.e., y(t) = A ∗ sin(ωt+ ψ), y is the vertical position of the letter, t is the frame id, and A, ω, ψ
are adjustable parameters). The horizontal distance between two letters is a function of their
average width. If their widths are width1, width2, the distance between their centers are set to be
α ∗ width1+width2
2
, where α is an adjustable parameter that indicates how much two letters overlap.
My letters also rotate and loop around. The angleθ to which a letter rotates is also decided by a sin
function θ = θ0 ∗ sin(ωθt+ ψθ), where θ0, ωθ, ψθ are adjustable parameters. For the standard case,
I set the parameters the same as in NuCaptcha’s videos. I adjust these parameters based on the type
of defenses I explore (in Section 3.3.2).
B Comments from User Study
Table B1 highlights some of the free-form responses written on the questionnaire used in my
study.
C Multi-Image Facial Model Estimation
In §4.2.2, I outline how to associate 2D facial landmarks with corresponding 3D points on
an underlying facial model. Contour landmarks pose a substantial difficulty for this 2D-to-3D
correspondence problem because the associated set of 3D points for these features is pose-dependent.
Zhu et al. (2015) compensate for this phenomenon by modeling contour landmarks with parallel
curved line segments and iteratively optimizing head orientation and 2D-to-3D correspondence. For
a specific head orientation Rj , the corresponding landmark points on the 3D model are found using
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Variant Comments
Standard - User friendly
- It was too easy
- Much easier than traditional CAPTCHAs
Extended - My mother would not be able to solve these
- Giant Pain in the Butt! Sheer mass of text was overwhelming and I got
lost many times
- Too long! I would prefer a shorter text
- It was very time consuming, and is very prone to mistakes
Overlapping - Letters too bunched – several loops needed to decipher
- Takes longer because I had to wait for the letter to move a bit so I can
see more of it
- Still had a dizzying affect. Not pleasant
- Some characters were only partially revealed, ‘Y’ looked like a ‘V’
Semi-Transparent - Tree background is unreadable, any non-solid background creates too
much interference
- With some backgrounds I almost didn’t realize there were red letters
- It was almost faded and very time consuming. I think I made more
mistakes in this mechanism
Emerging - Not that complicated
- I’d feel dizzy after staring at it for more than 1 min
- It was hideous! Like an early 2000s website. But it did do the job. It
made my eyes feel ‘fuzzy’ after a while
- It was good, better than the challenges with line through letters
Table B1: Sample participant comments for each variant
an explicit function based on rotation angle:
si,j = fjPRj(Si′,j + tj)
Si′,j = S¯i′ + A
id
i′ α
id + Aexpi′ α
exp
j
i′ = land(i, Rj),
(1)
where land(i, Rj) is the pre-calculated mapping function that computes the position of landmarks i
on the 3D model when the orientation is Rj . Ideally, the first equation in Eq. (1) should hold for
all the landmark points in all the images. However, this is not the case due to the alignment error
introduced by landmark extraction. Generally, contour landmarks introduce more error than corner
landmarks, and this approach actually leads to inferior results when multiple input images are used.
Therefore, different from Zhu et al. (2015), I compute the 3D facial model with Maximum a Pos-
teriori (MAP) estimation. I assume the alignment error of each 3D landmark independently follows
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a Gaussian distribution. Then, the most probable parameters θ := ({fj}, {Rj}, {tj}, {αexpj }, αid)
can be estimated by minimizing the cost function
θ = argmin
θ
{
68∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
1
(σsi )
2
||si,j − fjPRj(Si′,j + tj)||2+
N∑
j=1
(αexpj )
′Σ−1expα
exp
j + (α
id)′Σ−1id α
id}.
(2)
Here, Si′,j is computed using Eq. (1). Σid and Σexp are covariance matrices of αid and α
exp
j ,
which can be obtained from the pre-existing face model. (σsi )
2 is the variance of alignment error of
the i-th landmark and is obtained from a separate training set consisting 20 images with hand-labeled
landmarks. Eq. (2) can be computed efficiently, leading to the estimated identity weight αid, with
which I can compute the neutral-expression model Si(= S¯i′ + Aidi′ α
id).
D Anisotropic Diffusion
My alignment to the reference layout (Section 5.2) is based on image edges. Hence I opt for
anisotropic diffusion, which is a noise suppression algorithm that maintains edges in the image. My
anisotropic diffusion is in the spirit of the method proposed by Weickert (Weickert, 1998), which
was designed to preserve all detected edges in the image. In my work however, I only preserve
images edges that are along the dominant directions of the boundaries of the mobile device. This
not only reduces noise but also effectively suppresses spurious lines, as for example, caused by
reflections on the screen. The diffusion process is described by:
u′ =

∂tu = div((1− c(φ)(1−D(Jρ(Ouσ))))Ou)
c(θ) = KΣ(φ−Dir1) +KΣ(φ−Dir2)
D(Jρ(Ouσ)) = UT
 1/(1 + λ1) 0
0 1
U
(3)
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where u is the pixel value of the original image, u′ is the new pixel value, and φ is the angle of the
eigenvector of the biggest eigenvalue λ1 of Jρ (the Jacobian matrix of the image at pixel u). The
matrix U is the unitary matrix consisting of the eigenvectors of Jρ. KΣ is a Gaussian kernel with
parameter Σ, and Dir1, Dir2 are the pre-calculated dominant directions. The resulting filter output
has the following properties:
1) If the edge is strongly deviating from the main direction (i.e. has a large angle to the dominant
direction), it will be blurred since Equation (3) converges to ∂tu = div(Ou).
2) Edges along the dominant directions will be enhanced along the edge since D(Jρ(Ouσ))
becomes very small. This means the edge will not be blurred and will maintain its high contrast.
3) In addition, the areas alongside the edges in the dominant directions will be smoothed in the
direction parallel to the edge to suppress the noise since in this direction I also have ∂tu = div(Ou).
In summary this will ensure an effective noise suppression while maintaining edges in the
dominant directions, which are then used to align the device image to the reference layout.
E Vanishing Points
Vanishing points are points in the 2D projected image where lines that are parallel converge.
There is a large body of work on estimating vanishing points. Most of the methods are based on
pre-marked points and mainly aim to solve problems when there is significant skew in the directions
of the lines, such as (Magee and Aggarwal, 1984). However, these methods fail in my application
because the vanishing points are so far away that the data matrix becomes singular. Alternative
methods are based on transformations such as the Hough transform (Lutton et al., 1994) and Sphere
representation (Collins and Weiss, 1990).
Due to its ability to detect multiple vanishing points at once I chose to use a Hough transform
to calculate the vanishing points. The Hough transform is a voting scheme in the parameter space
where every pixel along a line segment votes for all compatible parameterizations of its line.
The detected lines are then chosen as the local maxima in the voting space. I use the angular
representation xcosθ + ysinθ = ρ of line segments for the voting, which avoids the singularity
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of vertical lines in the slope and bias parameterization of lines. The Hough transformation then
provides the θi, ρi of all lines li in the image. These lines are then used to compute the vanishing
point v = (x, y) through solving:
 x
y
 =
 ρdθdρ cos θ − sin θ
ρdρ
dθ
sin θ + cos θ
 ∗ 1
dθ/dρ
(4)
for each of the lines. To combine the information from all lines along each of the major directions I
use regression to compute dθ/dρ and θ. This is then used in solving for the vanishing points (x, y)
with Equation (4), which results in the horizontal vanishing point vx and the vertical vanishing point
vy. Assuming vx, vy are normalized to satisfy ‖vx‖ = ‖vy‖ = 1 the camera rotation matrix R is
given by
R =

vx
vy
vx × vy

Applying the inverse rotation ensures the device screen plane and the coordinate systems x-y-plane
are parallel, effectively removing any rotation-related distortion from the image.
F Translation Alignment
The transformation of a given image to the template can be viewed as rotation of the camera
followed by translation and zoom. My method uses the Hough transformation to extract the camera’s
rotation, translation, and scale as explained in Section 5.2. Here, I introduce how to compute the
resulting transformation given estimated parameters.
The vanishing points reveal the rotation information. For instance, all the horizontal lines
on the device correspond to a vanishing point (x, y) on the image plane, which is calculated as
described above. The direction of these lines can be calculated as the direction from the center of the
camera to the pixel (x, y). For a pinhole camera, this 3D direction Direction can be represented as:
(x− cx, y− cy, f)T with (cx, cy) being the coordinate of the center of the image and f representing
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the focal length of the camera normalized by the physical size of the pixels. These are intrinsic
parameters modeling the imaging parameters of the camera sensor and lens.
With the vanishing points, I acquire the two dominant directions of the edges of the device
as Directionh = (xh, yh, zh) and Directionv = (xv, yv, zv). The edges of the device can be
transformed to become horizontal and vertical with following equation:
 x′
y′
 =
 x−cxf xh + y−cyf yh + zh
x−cx
f
xv +
y−cy
f
yv + zv
 ∗ f
det

xh yh zh
xv yv zv
x−cx
f
y−cy
f
1

+
 cx
cy

Here, point (x, y) in the image is transformed to (x′, y′). This equation virtually rotates the
camera in the 3D space so that the coordinate systems x-y-plane is parallel with the device’s
boundary. As discussed in Section 5.2, the translation parameters are calculated using a Hough
transform using the weighted line voting. Considering the parameters acquired by the line matching
(translations tx, ty and scaling sx, sy in x-direction and y-direction respectively), the transformation
performing translation and scale alignment is given as: (x′′, y′′)T = (sxx′ + tx, syy′ + ty)T . This
maps the previous transformation result (x′, y′) to the point (x′′, y′′). In this way, I successfully
transform the device screen’s image into the template’s coordinate system.
183
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aggarwal, J. K., Cai, Q., Liao, W., and Sabata, B. (1994). Articulated and elastic non-rigid motion:
A review. In Motion of Non-Rigid and Articulated Objects, 1994., Proceedings of the 1994
IEEE Workshop on, pages 2–14. IEEE.
Ahn, L. V., Blum, M., Hopper, N. J., and Langford, J. (2003). CAPTCHA: using hard AI problems
for security. In Eurocrypt, pages 294–311.
Arxan Technologies (2015). https://www.arxan.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/state-of-
application-security-report-vol-4-2015.pdf.
Aslandogan, Y. A. and Yu, C. T. (1999). Techniques and systems for image and video retrieval.
Knowledge and Data Engineering, IEEE Transactions on, 11(1):56–63.
Asonov, D. and Agrawal, R. (2004). Keyboard acoustic emanations. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy.
Backes, M., Chen, T., Du¨rmuth, M., Lensch, H., and Welk, M. (2009). Tempest in a teapot:
Compromising reflections revisited. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy.
Backes, M., Durmuth, M., and Unruh, D. (2008). Compromising reflections-or-how to read LCD
monitors around the corner. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
Baker, S. and Matthews, I. (2004). Lucas-kanade 20 years on. International Journal of Computer
Vision, 56(3):221–255.
Balakrishnan, G., Durand, F., and Guttag, J. (2013). Detecting pulse from head motions in video.
In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, pages
3430–3437.
Balzarotti, D., Cova, M., and Vigna, G. (2008a). Clearshot: Eavesdropping on keyboard input from
video. In Security and Privacy, 2008. SP 2008. IEEE Symposium on, pages 170–183. IEEE.
Balzarotti, D., Cova, M., and Vigna, G. (2008b). ClearShot: Eavesdropping on keyboard input from
video. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
Bao, W., Li, H., Li, N., and Jiang, W. (2009). A liveness detection method for face recognition
based on optical flow field. In Image Analysis and Signal Processing, International Conference
on, pages 233–236.
Bartholomew, T. B. (2014). Death of fair use in cyberspace: Youtube and the problem with content
id, the. Duke L. & Tech. Rev., 13:66.
Basso, A. and Bergadano, F. (2010). Anti-bot strategies based on human interactive proofs. In
Stavroulakis, P. and Stamp, M., editors, Handbook of Information and Communication Security,
pages 273–291. Springer.
184
Baumberger, C., Reyes, M., Constantinescu, M., Olariu, R., De Aguiar, E., and Oliveira Santos,
T. (2014). 3d face reconstruction from video using 3d morphable model and silhouette. In
Graphics, Patterns and Images (SIBGRAPI), Conference on, pages 1–8.
Belhumeur, P. N., Jacobs, D. W., Kriegman, D. J., and Kumar, N. (2013). Localizing parts of faces
using a consensus of exemplars. Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, IEEE Transactions
on, 35(12):2930–2940.
Bentley, J. L. (1975). Multidimensional binary search trees used for associative searching. Commu-
nications of the ACM, 18(9):509–517.
Bhardwaj, D. and Mahajan, S. (2015). Review paper on automated number plate recognition
techniques.
Blanz, V. and Vetter, T. (1999). A morphable model for the synthesis of 3d faces. In Proceedings of
the 26th annual conference on Computer graphics and interactive techniques, pages 187–194.
ACM Press/Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.
Blanz, V. and Vetter, T. (2003). Face recognition based on fitting a 3d morphable model. Pattern
Analysis and Machine Intelligence, IEEE Transactions on, 25(9):1063–1074.
Buades, A., Coll, B., and Morel, J.-M. (2005). A review of image denoising algorithms, with a new
one. Multiscale Modeling & Simulation, 4(2):490–530.
Bursztein, E. (2012). How we broke the NuCaptcha video scheme and what we proposed to fix
it. See http://elie.im/blog/security/how-we-broke-the-nucaptcha\
discretionary{-}{}{}video-scheme-and-what-we-propose-to-fix-it/.
Bursztein, E., Beauxis, R., Paskov, H., Perito, D., Fabry, C., and Mitchell, J. C. (2011a). The
failure of noise-based non-continuous audio CAPTCHAs. In IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, pages 19–31.
Bursztein, E. and Bethard, S. (2009). DeCAPTCHA: breaking 75% of eBay audio CAPTCHAs. In
Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies.
Bursztein, E., Bethard, S., Fabry, C., Mitchell, J. C., and Jurafsky, D. (2010). How good are humans
at solving CAPTCHAs? a large scale evaluation. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
pages 399–413.
Bursztein, E., Martin, M., and Mitchell, J. (2011b). Text-based CAPTCHA strengths and weaknesses.
In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 125–138.
Cai, L. and Chen, H. (2011). Touchlogger: inferring keystrokes on touch screen from smartphone
motion. In USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Security (HotSec).
Cai, L. and Chen, H. (2012). On the practicality of motion based keystroke inference attack. Trust
and Trustworthy Computing, pages 273–290.
185
Cao, C., Weng, Y., Zhou, S., Tong, Y., and Zhou, K. (2014). Facewarehouse: A 3d facial expression
database for visual computing. Visualization and Computer Graphics, IEEE Transactions on,
20(3):413–425.
Cedras, C. and Shah, M. (1994). A survey of motion analysis from moving light displays. In
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 1994. Proceedings CVPR’94., 1994 IEEE Computer
Society Conference on, pages 214–221. IEEE.
Cedras, C. and Shah, M. (1995). Motion-based recognition a survey. Image and Vision Computing,
13(2):129–155.
Chaudhary, A., Raheja, J., and Raheja, S. (2012). A vision based geometrical method to find fingers
positions in real time hand gesture recognition. Journal of Software, 7(4):861–869.
Chellapilla, K., Larson, K., Simard, P. Y., and Czerwinski, M. (2005a). Building segmentation
based human-friendly human interaction proofs (hips). In Human Interactive Proofs, Second
International Workshop, pages 1–26.
Chellapilla, K., Larson, K., Simard, P. Y., and Czerwinski, M. (2005b). Designing human friendly
human interaction proofs (HIPs). In ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing
Systems, pages 711–720.
Chellappa, R., Wilson, C. L., and Sirohey, S. (1995). Human and machine recognition of faces: A
survey. Proceedings of the IEEE, 83(5):705–741.
Chen, L. and Stentiford, F. (2008). Video sequence matching based on temporal ordinal measure-
ment. Pattern Recognition Letters, 29(13):1824–1831.
Chen, T. and Kan, M.-Y. (2011). Creating a live, public short message service corpus: The NUS
SMS corpus. Language Resources and Evaluation.
Chenot, J.-H. and Daigneault, G. (2014). A large-scale audio and video fingerprints-generated
database of tv repeated contents. In Content-Based Multimedia Indexing (CBMI), 2014 12th
International Workshop on, pages 1–6. IEEE.
Chikkerur, S., Sundaram, V., Reisslein, M., and Karam, L. J. (2011). Objective video quality
assessment methods: A classification, review, and performance comparison. Broadcasting,
IEEE Transactions on, 57(2):165–182.
Chiu, C.-Y., Chen, C.-S., and Chien, L.-F. (2008). A framework for handling spatiotemporal varia-
tions in video copy detection. Circuits and Systems for Video Technology, IEEE Transactions
on, 18(3):412–417.
Chiu, C.-Y., Yang, C.-C., and Chen, C.-S. (2007). Efficient and effective video copy detection
based on spatiotemporal analysis. In Multimedia, 2007. ISM 2007. Ninth IEEE International
Symposium on, pages 202–209. IEEE.
Chu, B., Romdhani, S., and Chen, L. (2014). 3d-aided face recognition robust to expression and
pose variations. In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), Conference on, pages
1907–1914.
186
Collins, R. and Weiss, R. (1990). Vanishing point calculation as a statistical inference on the unit
sphere. In Computer Vision, 1990. Proceedings, Third International Conference on, pages
400–403. IEEE.
Cui, J., Zhang, W., Peng, Y., Liang, Y., Xiao, B., Mei, J., Zhang, D., and Wang, X. (2010a). A
3-layer Dynamic CAPTCHA Implementation. In Workshop on Education Technology and
Computer Science, volume 1, pages 23–26.
Cui, J.-S., Mei, J.-T., Wang, X., Zhang, D., and Zhang, W.-Z. (2009). A CAPTCHA Implementation
Based on 3D Animation. In International Conference on Multimedia Information Networking
and Security, volume 2, pages 179 –182.
Cui, J.-S., Mei, J.-T., Zhang, W.-Z., Wang, X., and Zhang, D. (2010b). A CAPTCHA Imple-
mentation Based on Moving Objects Recognition Problem. In International Conference on
E-Business and E-Government, pages 1277–1280.
Danaher, B. and Smith, M. D. (2014). Gone in 60 seconds: the impact of the megaupload shutdown
on movie sales. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 33:1–8.
Derpanis, K. G., Sizintsev, M., Cannons, K., and Wildes, R. P. (2010). Efficient action spotting based
on a spacetime oriented structure representation. In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
(CVPR), 2010 IEEE Conference on, pages 1990–1997. IEEE.
DiCarlo, J. J. and Cox, D. D. (2007). Untangling invariant object recognition. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 11:333–341.
Dollar, P., Wojek, C., Schiele, B., and Perona, P. (2012). Pedestrian detection: An evaluation
of the state of the art. Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, IEEE Transactions on,
34(4):743–761.
Driver, J. and Baylis, G. (1996). Edge-assignment and figure-ground segmentation in short-term
visual matching. Cognitive Psychology, 31:248–306.
Duc, N. and Minh, B. (2009). Your face is not your password. In Black Hat Conference, volume 1.
Duda, R. O. and Hart, P. E. (1972). Use of the Hough transformation to detect lines and curves in
pictures. Communications of the ACM, 15(1):11–15.
Eddy, S. R. (1996). Hidden markov models. Current opinion in structural biology, 6(3):361–365.
Efros, A., Berg, A. C., Mori, G., Malik, J., et al. (2003). Recognizing action at a distance. In
Computer Vision, 2003. Proceedings. Ninth IEEE International Conference on, pages 726–733.
IEEE.
Egele, M., Bilge, L., Kirda, E., and Kruegel, C. (2010). Captcha smuggling: hijacking web browsing
sessions to create captcha farms. In ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, pages 1865–1870.
Elibol, F., Sarac, U., and Erer, I. (2012). Realistic eavesdropping attacks on computer displays with
low-cost and mobile receiver system. In Proceedings of the 20th European Signal Processing
Conference.
187
Elson, J., Douceur, J. R., Howell, J., and Saul, J. (2007). Asirra: a CAPTCHA that exploits
interest-aligned manual image categorization. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pages 366–374.
Enev, M., Gupta, S., Kohno, T., and Patel, S. N. (2011). Televisions, video privacy, and powerline
electromagnetic interference. In Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and
communications security, pages 537–550. ACM.
Erdogmus, N. and Marcel, S. (2014). Spoofing face recognition with 3d masks. Information
Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on, 9(7):1084–1097.
Esmaeili, M. M., Fatourechi, M., and Ward, R. K. (2011). A robust and fast video copy detec-
tion system using content-based fingerprinting. Information Forensics and Security, IEEE
Transactions on, 6(1):213–226.
Faloutsos, C., Ranganathan, M., and Manolopoulos, Y. (1994). Fast subsequence matching in
time-series databases. ACM International Conference on Management of Data (SIGMOD),
23(2).
Fidaleo, D. and Medioni, G. (2007). Model-assisted 3d face reconstruction from video. In Analysis
and modeling of faces and gestures, pages 124–138. Springer.
Fiona, A. H. Y. (2006). Keyboard acoustic triangulation attack. PhD thesis, Citeseer.
Fischler, M. and Bolles, R. (1981a). Random sample consensus: A paradigm for model fitting with
applications to image analysis and automated cartography. Comm. of the ACM, 24(6):381–395.
Fischler, M. and Bolles, R. (1981b). Random sample consensus: a paradigm for model fitting
with applications to image analysis and automated cartography. Communications of the ACM,
24(6):381–395.
Francis, W. N. and Kucera, H. (1979). Brown corpus manual. Technical report, Dept. of Linguistics,
Brown University.
Friedman, N. and Russell, S. (1776). Image segmentation in video sequences: A probabilistic
approach. University of California, Berkeley, 94720.
Gartner (2014). Gartner backs biometrics for enterprise mobile authentication. Biometric Technology
Today.
Gengembre, N., Berrani, S.-A., and Lechat, P. (2008). Adaptive similarity search in large databases-
application to image/video copy detection. In Content-Based Multimedia Indexing, 2008.
CBMI 2008. International Workshop on, pages 496–503. IEEE.
Geronimo, D., Lopez, A. M., Sappa, A. D., and Graf, T. (2009). Survey of pedestrian detection
for advanced driver assistance systems. IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis & Machine
Intelligence, (7):1239–1258.
Godin, C. and Lockwood, P. (1989). Dtw schemes for continuous speech recognition: a unified
view. Computer Speech & Language, 3(2):169–198.
188
Golder, S. (2008). Measuring social networks with digital photograph collections. In Proceedings
of the nineteenth ACM conference on Hypertext and hypermedia, pages 43–48.
Golle, P. (2008). Machine learning attacks against the Asirra CAPTCHA. In ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pages 535–542.
Gomery, D. (1993). As the dial turns. The Wilson Quarterly, pages 41–46.
Grabner, H., Grabner, M., and Bischof, H. (2006). Real-time tracking via on-line boosting. In
Proceedings of the British Machine Vision Conference, volume 1, pages 47–56.
Greveler, U., Justus, B., and Loehr, D. (2012). Multimedia content identification through smart
meter power usage profiles. Computers, Privacy and Data Protection.
Grill-Spector, K. and Kanwisher, N. (2005). Visual recognition: as soon as you know it is there,
you know what it is. Psychological Science, 16(2):152–160.
Hampapur, A., Hyun, K., and Bolle, R. M. (2001). Comparison of sequence matching techniques
for video copy detection. In Electronic Imaging 2002, pages 194–201. International Society
for Optics and Photonics.
Harris, C. and Stephens, M. (1988). A combined corner and edge detection. In Proceedings of The
Fourth Alvey Vision Conference, volume 15, pages 147–151.
Healey, G. E. and Kondepudy, R. (1994). Radiometric ccd camera calibration and noise estimation.
Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, IEEE Transactions on, 16(3):267–276.
Hicks, M. (2011). A continued commitment to security.
Hidalgo, J. M. G. and Alvarez, G. (2011). CAPTCHAs: An Artificial Intelligence Application to
Web Security. Advances in Computers, 83:109–181.
Highland, H. J. (1986). Electromagnetic radiation revisited. Computer Security, 5:85–93.
Hoanca, B. and Mock, K. J. (2008). Password entry scheme resistant to eavesdropping. In Security
and Management.
Horaud, R., Dornaika, F., and Lamiroy, B. (1997). Object pose: The link between weak perspective,
paraperspective, and full perspective. International Journal of Computer Vision, 22(2):173–
189.
Horn, B. K. and Schunck, B. G. (1981). Determining optical flow. In 1981 Technical symposium
east, pages 319–331. International Society for Optics and Photonics.
Hua, X.-S., Chen, X., and Zhang, H.-J. (2004). Robust video signature based on ordinal measure.
In Image Processing, 2004. ICIP’04. 2004 International Conference on, volume 1, pages
685–688. IEEE.
Ikizler, N. and Forsyth, D. (2007). Searching video for complex activities with finite state models.
In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2007. CVPR’07. IEEE Conference on, pages 1–8.
IEEE.
189
I˙kizler, N. and Forsyth, D. A. (2008). Searching for complex human activities with no visual
examples. International Journal of Computer Vision, 80(3):337–357.
Ilia, P., Polakis, I., Athanasopoulos, E., Maggi, F., and Ioannidis, S. (2015). Face/off: Preventing
privacy leakage from photos in social networks. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, pages 781–792.
Intel Security (2015). True Key by Intel Security: Security white paper 1.0.
Iturbe, X., Altuna, A., Ruiz de Olano, A., and Martinez, I. (2008). VHDL described finger tracking
system for real-time human-machine interaction. In International Conference on Signals and
Electronic Systems.
Jain, A., Murty, M., and Flynn, P. (1999). Data clustering: a review. ACM computing surveys
(CSUR), 31(3):264–323.
Jain, A. K. and Kumar, A. (2010). Biometrics of next generation: An overview. Second Generation
Biometrics, 12(1):2–3.
Jazayeri, A., Cai, H., Zheng, J. Y., and Tuceryan, M. (2011). Vehicle detection and tracking in
car video based on motion model. Intelligent Transportation Systems, IEEE Transactions on,
12(2):583–595.
Jee, H.-K., Jung, S.-U., and Yoo, J.-H. (2006). Liveness detection for embedded face recognition
system. International Journal of Biological and Medical Sciences, 1(4):235–238.
Jeni, L. A., Cohn, J. F., and Kanade, T. (2015). Dense 3d face alignment from 2d videos in real-time.
In Automatic Face and Gesture Recognition (FG), 2015 11th IEEE International Conference
and Workshops on, volume 1, pages 1–8. IEEE.
Jesorsky, O., Kirchberg, K. J., and Frischholz, R. W. (2001). Robust face detection using the
hausdorff distance. In Audio-and video-based biometric person authentication, pages 90–95.
Springer.
Jiang, H., Drew, M. S., and Li, Z.-N. (2006). Successive convex matching for action detection.
In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2006 IEEE Computer Society Conference on,
volume 2, pages 1646–1653. IEEE.
Jiang, H., Drew, M. S., and Li, Z.-N. (2010). Action detection in cluttered video with successive
convex matching. Circuits and Systems for Video Technology, IEEE Transactions on, 20(1):50–
64.
Jiang, Y.-G., Jiang, Y., and Wang, J. (2014). Vcdb: A large-scale database for partial copy detection
in videos. In Computer Vision–ECCV 2014, pages 357–371. Springer.
Jiang, Y.-G., Ngo, C.-W., and Yang, J. (2007). Towards optimal bag-of-features for object catego-
rization and semantic video retrieval. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM international conference
on Image and video retrieval, pages 494–501. ACM.
190
Jin, L., Yang, D., Zhen, L., and Huang, J. (2007). A novel vision-based finger-writing character
recognition system. Journal of Circuits, Systems, and Computers, 16(03):421–436.
Jolliffe, I. (2002). Principal component analysis. Wiley Online Library.
Joly, A., Buisson, O., and Frelicot, C. (2007). Content-based copy retrieval using distortion-based
probabilistic similarity search. Multimedia, IEEE Transactions on, 9(2):293–306.
Jones, S. and Shao, L. (2013). Content-based retrieval of human actions from realistic video
databases. Information Sciences, 236:56–65.
Juan, L. and Gwun, O. (2009). A comparison of sift, pca-sift and surf. International Journal of
Image Processing (IJIP), 3(4):143–152.
Karu, K. and Jain, A. K. (1996). Fingerprint classification. Pattern recognition, 29(3):389–404.
Ke, Y., Sukthankar, R., and Hebert, M. (2007). Event detection in crowded videos. In Computer
Vision, 2007. ICCV 2007. IEEE 11th International Conference on, pages 1–8. IEEE.
Ke, Y., Sukthankar, R., and Hebert, M. (2010). Volumetric features for video event detection.
International journal of computer vision, 88(3):339–362.
Ke, Y., Sukthankar, R., and Huston, L. (2004). Efficient near-duplicate detection and sub-image
retrieval. In ACM Multimedia, volume 4, page 5.
Kemelmacher-Shlizerman, I. (2013). Internet based morphable model. In Proceedings of the IEEE
International Conference on Computer Vision, pages 3256–3263.
Kemelmacher-Shlizerman, I. and Basri, R. (2011). 3D face reconstruction from a single image using
a single reference face shape. Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, IEEE Transactions
on, 33(2):394–405.
Kerdvibulvech, C. and Saito, H. (2007). Vision-based detection of guitar players’ fingertips without
markers. In Computer Graphics, Imaging and Visualisation.
Kim, G., Eum, S., Suhr, J. K., Kim, D. I., Park, K. R., and Kim, J. (2012a). Face liveness
detection based on texture and frequency analyses. In Biometrics (ICB), 5th IAPR International
Conference on, pages 67–72.
Kim, H.-N., El Saddik, A., and Jung, J.-G. (2012b). Leveraging personal photos to inferring
friendships in social network services. Expert Systems with Applications, 39(8):6955–6966.
Kim, S., Yu, S., Kim, K., Ban, Y., and Lee, S. (2013). Face liveness detection using variable
focusing. In Biometrics (ICB), 2013 International Conference on, pages 1–6.
Kluever, K. A. and Zanibbi, R. (2009). Balancing usability and security in a video CAPTCHA. In
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, pages 1–14.
Ko, T. (2008). A survey on behavior analysis in video surveillance for homeland security applica-
tions. In Applied Imagery Pattern Recognition Workshop, 2008. AIPR’08. 37th IEEE, pages
1–8. IEEE.
191
Kolev, K., Tanskanen, P., Speciale, P., and Pollefeys, M. (2014). Turning mobile phones into 3d
scanners. In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), IEEE Conference on, pages
3946–3953.
Kollreider, K., Fronthaler, H., and Bigun, J. (2005). Evaluating liveness by face images and the
structure tensor. In Automatic Identification Advanced Technologies, Fourth IEEE Workshop
on, pages 75–80. IEEE.
Kollreider, K., Fronthaler, H., and Bigun, J. (2008). Verifying liveness by multiple experts in face
biometrics. In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops, IEEE Computer Society
Conference on, pages 1–6.
Kollreider, K., Fronthaler, H., Faraj, M. I., and Bigun, J. (2007). Real-time face detection and
motion analysis with application in liveness assessment. Information Forensics and Security,
IEEE Transactions on, 2(3):548–558.
Ku¨c¸u¨ktunc¸, O., Bas¸tan, M., Gu¨du¨kbay, U., and Ulusoy, O¨. (2010). Video copy detection using
multiple visual cues and mpeg-7 descriptors. Journal of Visual Communication and Image
Representation, 21(8):838–849.
Kuhn, M. and Kuhn, C. (2003). Compromising emanations: eavesdropping risks of computer
displays.
Kuhn, M. G. (2013). Compromising Emanations of LCD TV Sets. IEEE Transactions on Electro-
magnetic Compatibility, 55(3):564–570.
Kumar, M., Garfinkel, T., Boneh, D., and Winograd, T. (2007). Reducing shoulder-surfing by using
gaze-based password entry. In Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security.
Lagorio, A., Tistarelli, M., Cadoni, M., Fookes, C., and Sridharan, S. (2013). Liveness detection
based on 3d face shape analysis. In Biometrics and Forensics (IWBF), International Workshop
on, pages 1–4.
Langmead, B., Trapnell, C., Pop, M., Salzberg, S. L., et al. (2009). Ultrafast and memory-efficient
alignment of short dna sequences to the human genome. Genome Biol, 10(3):R25.
Laptev, I. and Pe´rez, P. (2007). Retrieving actions in movies. In Computer Vision, 2007. ICCV 2007.
IEEE 11th International Conference on, pages 1–8. IEEE.
Lavie, A. (2010). Evaluating the output of machine translation systems. AMTA Tutorial.
Lavie, A. and Denkowski, M. J. (2009). The METEOR metric for automatic evaluation of machine
translation. Machine Translation, 23(2-3):105–115.
Law-To, J., Buisson, O., Gouet-Brunet, V., and Boujemaa, N. (2006). Robust voting algorithm
based on labels of behavior for video copy detection. In Proceedings of the 14th annual ACM
international conference on Multimedia, pages 835–844. ACM.
Law-To, J., Buisson, O., Gouet-Brunet, V., and Boujemaa, N. (2009). Vicopt: a robust system for
content-based video copy detection in large databases. Multimedia systems, 15(6):337–353.
192
Law-To, J., Joly, A., and Boujemaa, N. (2007). Muscle-vcd-2007: a live benchmark for video copy
detection.
Lazar, J., Feng, J. H., and Hochheiser, H. (2010). Research Methods in Human-Computer Interaction.
John Wiley and Sons.
Lee, B. and Chun, J. (2009). Manipulation of virtual objects in marker-less AR system by fingertip
tracking and hand gesture recognition. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on
Interaction Sciences.
Lee, T. and Hollerer, T. (2007). Handy AR: Markerless inspection of augmented reality objects
using fingertip tracking. In IEEE International Symposium on Wearable Computers.
Li, Y., Li, Y., Yan, Q., Kong, H., and Deng, R. H. (2015). Seeing your face is not enough: An
inertial sensor-based liveness detection for face authentication. In Proceedings of the 22nd
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 1558–1569.
Li, Y., Xu, K., Yan, Q., Li, Y., and Deng, R. H. (2014). Understanding osn-based facial disclosure
against face authentication systems. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Information,
Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS), pages 413–424. ACM.
Liao, W.-H. and Chang, C.-C. (2004). Embedding information within dynamic visual patterns. In
IEEE Multimedia and Expo, volume 2, pages 895–898.
Liu, J., Huang, Z., Cai, H., Shen, H. T., Ngo, C. W., and Wang, W. (2013). Near-duplicate video
retrieval: Current research and future trends. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 45(4):44.
Liu, Y., Gummadi, K. P., Krishnamurthy, B., and Mislove, A. (2011). Analyzing facebook privacy
settings: user expectations vs. reality. In Proceedings of the 2011 ACM SIGCOMM conference
on Internet measurement conference, pages 61–70. ACM.
Lowry, R. (1998). Concepts and Applications of Inferential Statistics. Vassar College, http:
//www.vassarstats.net/textbook/.
Lu, C. and Tang, X. (2014). Surpassing human-level face verification performance on lfw with
gaussianface. arXiv preprint arXiv:1404.3840.
Lucas, B. and Kanade, T. (1981). An iterative image registration technique with an application to
stereo vision. In Joint Conf. on Artificial Intelligence, pages 674–679.
Lutton, E., Maitre, H., and Lopez-Krahe, J. (1994). Contribution to the determination of vanishing
points using hough transform. Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, IEEE Transactions
on, 16(4):430–438.
Ma¨a¨tta¨, J., Hadid, A., and Pietikainen, M. (2011). Face spoofing detection from single images using
micro-texture analysis. In Biometrics (IJCB), International Joint Conference on, pages 1–7.
Magee, M. and Aggarwal, J. (1984). Determining vanishing points from perspective images.
Computer Vision, Graphics, and Image Processing, 26(2):256–267.
193
Maggi, F., Volpatto, A., Gasparini, S., Boracchi, G., and Zanero, S. (2011). A fast eavesdropping
attack against touchscreens. In Information Assurance and Security (IAS). IEEE.
Marquardt, P., Verma, A., Carter, H., and Traynor, P. (2011). (sp) iphone: decoding vibrations
from nearby keyboards using mobile phone accelerometers. In Proceedings of the 18th ACM
conference on Computer and communications security, pages 551–562. ACM.
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: a computational investigation into the human representation and processing
of visual information. W. H. Freeman, San Francisco.
Marr, D. and Poggio, T. (1979). A computational theory of human stereo vision. Proceedings of the
Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 204(1156):301–328.
Marszałek, M., Laptev, I., and Schmid, C. (2009). Actions in context. In IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision & Pattern Recognition.
Mitra, N. J., Chu, H.-K., Lee, T.-Y., Wolf, L., Yeshurun, H., and Cohen-Or, D. (2009). Emerging
images. ACM Transactions on Graphics, 28(5).
Mo, F., Lu, Y.-H., Zhang, J.-L., Cui, Q., and Qiu, S. (2013). A support vector machine for
identification of monitors based on their unintended electromagnetic emanation. Progress In
Electromagnetics Research M, 30:211–224.
Moon, Y.-S., Whang, K.-Y., and Han, W.-S. (2002). General match: a subsequence matching
method in time-series databases based on generalized windows. In Proceedings of the 2002
ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data, pages 382–393. ACM.
Mori, G. and Malik, J. (2003). Recognizing objects in adversarial clutter: breaking a visual
CAPTCHA. In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, volume 1, pages 134 –141.
Motoyama, M., Levchenko, K., Kanich, C., McCoy, D., Voelker, G. M., and Savage, S. (2010). Re:
CAPTCHAs-understanding CAPTCHA-solving services in an economic context. In USENIX
Security Symposium, pages 435–462.
Nakamura, J. (2005). Image sensors and signal processing for digital still cameras. CRC.
Naor, M. (1996). Verification of a human in the loop or identification via the Turing test.
Nguyen, D., Pham, T., and Jeon, J. (2009). Fingertip detection with morphology and geometric
calculation. In IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems.
NuCaptcha (2011). Whitepaper: NuCaptcha & Traditional Captcha. http://nucaptcha.com.
Oka, K., Sato, Y., and Koike, H. (2002). Real-time fingertip tracking and gesture recognition.
Computer Graphics and Applications, 22(6):64–71.
Oliva, A. and Torralba, A. (2007). The role of context in object recognition. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 11(12):520 – 527.
194
Owusu, E., Han, J., Das, S., Perrig, A., and Zhang, J. (2012). Accessory: password inference using
accelerometers on smartphones. In Proceedings of the Twelfth Workshop on Mobile Computing
Systems & Applications. ACM.
Pantic, M., Pentland, A., Nijholt, A., and Huang, T. S. (2007). Human computing and machine
understanding of human behavior: a survey. In Artifical Intelligence for Human Computing,
pages 47–71. Springer.
Parkhi, O. M., Vedaldi, A., and Zisserman, A. (2015). Deep face recognition. In Proceedings of the
British Machine Vision Conference (BMVC).
Pavlovic, V. I., Sharma, R., and Huang, T. S. (1997). Visual interpretation of hand gestures for
human-computer interaction: A review. Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, IEEE
Transactions on, 19(7):677–695.
Paysan, P., Knothe, R., Amberg, B., Romdhani, S., and Vetter, T. (2009). A 3d face model for
pose and illumination invariant face recognition. In Proceedings of the 6th IEEE International
Conference on Advanced Video and Signal based Surveillance (AVSS) for Security, Safety and
Monitoring in Smart Environments.
Peixoto, B., Michelassi, C., and Rocha, A. (2011). Face liveness detection under bad illumination
conditions. In Image Processing (ICIP), 18th IEEE International Conference on, pages
3557–3560.
Pe´rez, P., Gangnet, M., and Blake, A. (2003). Poisson image editing. ACM Transactions on
Graphics (TOG), 22(3):313–318.
Polakis, I., Lancini, M., Kontaxis, G., Maggi, F., Ioannidis, S., Keromytis, A. D., and Zanero,
S. (2012). All your face are belong to us: Breaking facebook’s social authentication. In
Proceedings of the 28th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pages 399–408.
Poullot, S., Buisson, O., and Crucianu, M. (2007). Z-grid-based probabilistic retrieval for scaling
up content-based copy detection. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM international conference on
Image and video retrieval, pages 348–355. ACM.
Qu, C., Monari, E., Schuchert, T., and Beyerer, J. (2014). Fast, robust and automatic 3d face model
reconstruction from videos. In Advanced Video and Signal Based Surveillance (AVSS), 11th
IEEE International Conference on, pages 113–118.
Qu, C., Monari, E., Schuchert, T., and Beyerer, J. (2015a). Adaptive contour fitting for pose-invariant
3d face shape reconstruction. In Proceedings of the British Machine Vision Conference (BMVC),
pages 1–12.
Qu, C., Monari, E., Schuchert, T., and Beyerer, J. (2015b). Realistic texture extraction for 3d face
models robust to self-occlusion. In IS&T/SPIE Electronic Imaging. International Society for
Optics and Photonics.
195
Raffel, C. and Ellis, D. P. (2015). Large-scale content-based matching of midi and audio files. In
Proceedings of the 16th International Society for Music Information Retrieval Conference,
pages 234–240.
Raguram, R., White, A., Goswami, D., Monrose, F., and Frahm, J. (2011). ispy: automatic
reconstruction of typed input from compromising reflections. In Proceedings of the 18th ACM
conference on Computer and communications security, pages 527–536. ACM.
Raguram, R., White, A. M., Xu, Y., Frahm, J.-M., Georgel, P., and Monrose, F. (2013). On the
privacy risks of virtual keyboards: automatic reconstruction of typed input from compromising
reflections. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing.
Ray, S. and Turi, R. (1999). Determination of number of clusters in k-means clustering and
application in colour image segmentation. In Proceedings of the International conference on
advances in pattern recognition and digital techniques, pages 137–143.
Rodriguez, M. D., Ahmed, J., and Shah, M. (2008). Action mach a spatio-temporal maximum
average correlation height filter for action recognition. In Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition, 2008. CVPR 2008. IEEE Conference on, pages 1–8. IEEE.
Samal, A. and Iyengar, P. A. (1992). Automatic recognition and analysis of human faces and facial
expressions: A survey. Pattern recognition, 25(1):65–77.
Schops, T., Sattler, T., Hane, C., and Pollefeys, M. (2015). 3d modeling on the go: Interactive 3d
reconstruction of large-scale scenes on mobile devices. In 3D Vision (3DV), International
Conference on, pages 291–299.
Schroff, F., Kalenichenko, D., and Philbin, J. (2015). Facenet: A unified embedding for face
recognition and clustering. arXiv preprint arXiv:1503.03832.
Seo, H. J. and Milanfar, P. (2009). Detection of human actions from a single example. In Computer
Vision, 2009 IEEE 12th International Conference on, pages 1965–1970. IEEE.
Shen, H. T., Ooi, B. C., and Zhou, X. (2005). Towards effective indexing for very large video
sequence database. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGMOD international conference on Manage-
ment of data, pages 730–741. ACM.
Shi, F., Wu, H.-T., Tong, X., and Chai, J. (2014). Automatic acquisition of high-fidelity facial
performances using monocular videos. ACM Transactions on Graphics (TOG), 33(6):222.
Shirali-Shahreza, M. and Shirali-Shahreza, S. (2008). Motion CAPTCHA. In Conference on Human
System Interactions, pages 1042–1044.
Shukla, D., Kumar, R., Serwadda, A., and Phoha, V. V. (2014). Beware, your hands reveal
your secrets! In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, pages 904–917. ACM.
Simard, P., Steinkraus, D., and Platt, J. (2003). Best practices for convolutional neural networks
applied to visual document analysis. In Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference
on Document Analysis and Recognition, volume 2, pages 958–962.
196
Smeaton, A. F., Over, P., and Kraaij, W. (2006). Evaluation campaigns and trecvid. In Proceedings
of the 8th ACM international workshop on Multimedia information retrieval, pages 321–330.
ACM.
Sobrado, L. and Birget, J.-C. (2002). Graphical passwords. The Rutgers Scholar, 4.
Soomro, K. and Zamir, A. R. (2014). Action recognition in realistic sports videos. In Computer
Vision in Sports, pages 181–208. Springer.
Soundararajan, R. and Bovik, A. C. (2013). Video quality assessment by reduced reference spatio-
temporal entropic differencing. Circuits and Systems for Video Technology, IEEE Transactions
on, 23(4):684–694.
Soupionis, Y. and Gritzalis, D. (2010). Audio CAPTCHA: Existing solutions assessment and a new
implementation for VoIP telephony. Computers & Security, 29(5):603–618.
Stelzer, E. (1998). Contrast, resolution, pixelation, dynamic range and signal-to-noise ratio:
fundamental limits to resolution in fluorescence light microscopy. Journal of Microscopy,
189(1):15–24.
Stevenage, S. V., Nixon, M. S., and Vince, K. (1999). Visual analysis of gait as a cue to identity.
Applied cognitive psychology, 13(6):513–526.
Sun, L., Pan, G., Wu, Z., and Lao, S. (2007). Blinking-based live face detection using conditional
random fields. In Advances in Biometrics, pages 252–260. Springer.
Sun, Y., Wang, X., and Tang, X. (2013). Deep convolutional network cascade for facial point
detection. In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), IEEE Conference on, pages
3476–3483.
Suwajanakorn, S., Kemelmacher-Shlizerman, I., and Seitz, S. M. (2014). Total moving face
reconstruction. In Computer Vision–ECCV 2014, pages 796–812. Springer.
Suwajanakorn, S., Seitz, S. M., and Kemelmacher-Shlizerman, I. (2015). What makes tom hanks
look like tom hanks. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision,
pages 3952–3960.
Szeliski, R. (2006). Image alignment and stitching: A tutorial. Foundations and Trends® in
Computer Graphics and Vision, 2(1):1–104.
Taigman, Y., Yang, M., Ranzato, M., and Wolf, L. (2014). Deepface: Closing the gap to human-level
performance in face verification. In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), IEEE
Conference on, pages 1701–1708.
Tan, D. S., Keyani, P., and Czerwinski, M. (2005). Spy-resistant keyboard: More secure password
entry on public touch screen displays. In Proceedings of the 17th Australia Conference on
Computer-Human Interaction.
197
Tan, H.-K., Ngo, C.-W., Hong, R., and Chua, T.-S. (2009). Scalable detection of partial near-
duplicate videos by visual-temporal consistency. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM international
conference on Multimedia, pages 145–154. ACM.
Tan, X., Li, Y., Liu, J., and Jiang, L. (2010). Face liveness detection from a single image with sparse
low rank bilinear discriminative model. In European Conference on Computer Vision (ECCV),
pages 504–517.
Tanskanen, P., Kolev, K., Meier, L., Camposeco, F., Saurer, O., and Pollefeys, M. (2013). Live metric
3d reconstruction on mobile phones. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on
Computer Vision, pages 65–72.
Thorpe, S., Fize, D., and Marlot, C. (1996). Speed of processing in the human visual system. Nature,
381(6582):520–522.
Torralba, A. and Freeman, W. T. (2012). Accidental pinhole and pinspeck cameras: revealing the
scene outside the picture. In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), 2012 IEEE
Conference on, pages 374–381. IEEE.
Tsin, Y., Ramesh, V., and Kanade, T. (2001). Statistical calibration of ccd imaging process. In
Computer Vision, 2001. ICCV 2001. Proceedings. Eighth IEEE International Conference on,
volume 1, pages 480–487. IEEE.
Turk, M. A. and Pentland, A. P. (1991). Face recognition using eigenfaces. In Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition, 1991. Proceedings CVPR’91., IEEE Computer Society Conference on,
pages 586–591. IEEE.
Ukita, N. and Kidode, M. (2004). Wearable virtual tablet: fingertip drawing on a portable plane-
object using an active-infrared camera. In Proceedings of the International Conference on
Intelligent User Interfaces. ACM.
Ullman, S. (1983). Computational studies in the interpretation of structure and motion: Summary
and extension. In Human and Machine Vision. Academic Press.
Ullman, S. (2000). High-Level Vision: Object Recognition and Visual Cognition. The MIT Press.
Valentin, D., Abdi, H., O’Toole, A. J., and Cottrell, G. W. (1994). Connectionist models of face
processing: A survey. Pattern recognition, 27(9):1209–1230.
van Eck, W. (1985). Electromagnetic radiation from video display units: an eavesdropping risk?
Computer Security, 4:269–286.
Vedaldi, A. and Fulkerson, B. (2010). VLFeat: An open and portable library of computer vision
algorithms. In Intl. conference on Multimedia, pages 1469–1472.
Ventura, J., Arth, C., Reitmayr, G., and Schmalstieg, D. (2014). Global localization from monocular
slam on a mobile phone. Visualization and Computer Graphics, IEEE Transactions on,
20(4):531–539.
198
Viola, P. A. and Jones, M. J. (2001). Rapid object detection using a boosted cascade of simple
features. In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition.
Von Ahn, L., Blum, M., Hopper, N. J., and Langford, J. (2003). Captcha: Using hard ai problems
for security. In Advances in CryptologyEUROCRYPT 2003, pages 294–311. Springer.
von Ahn, L., Blum, M., and Langford, J. (2004). Telling humans and computers apart automatically.
Commun. ACM, 47:56–60.
Vuagnoux, M. and Pasini, S. (2009). Compromising electromagnetic emanations of wired and
wireless keyboards. In Proceedings of the 18th USENIX Security Symposium.
Wang, L., Hu, W., and Tan, T. (2003). Recent developments in human motion analysis. Pattern
recognition, 36(3):585–601.
Wang, T., Yang, J., Lei, Z., Liao, S., and Li, S. Z. (2013). Face liveness detection using 3d structure
recovered from a single camera. In Biometrics (ICB), International Conference on, pages 1–6.
Weaver, J., Mock, K. J., and Hoanca, B. (2011). Gaze-based password authentication through
automatic clustering of gaze points. In IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and
Cybernetics.
Wei, S., Zhao, Y., Zhu, C., Xu, C., and Zhu, Z. (2011). Frame fusion for video copy detection.
Circuits and Systems for Video Technology, IEEE Transactions on, 21(1):15–28.
Weickert, J. (1998). Anisotropic diffusion in image processing, volume 1. Teubner Stuttgart.
Widrow, B. and Kolla´r, I. (2008). Quantization noise: roundoff error in digital computation, signal
processing, control, and communications. Cambridge University Press.
Willems, G., Tuytelaars, T., and Van Gool, L. (2008). Spatio-temporal features for robust content-
based video copy detection. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM Int. Conf. on Multimedia informa-
tion retrieval, pages 283–290. ACM.
Wu, H.-Y., Rubinstein, M., Shih, E., Guttag, J., Durand, F., and Freeman, W. T. (2012). Eulerian
video magnification for revealing subtle changes in the world. ACM Transactions on Graphics
(TOG), 31(4).
Wu, X., Hauptmann, A. G., and Ngo, C.-W. (2007). Practical elimination of near-duplicates from
web video search. In Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Multimedia, pages
218–227. ACM.
Xiong, X. and De la Torre, F. (2013). Supervised descent method and its applications to face
alignment. In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), IEEE Conference on, pages
532–539.
Xu, Y., Frahm, J.-M., and Monrose, F. (2014a). Watching the watchers: Automatically inferring tv
content from outdoor light effusions. In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, Scottsdale, AZ, pages 418–428. ACM.
199
Xu, Y., Heinly, J., White, A. M., Monrose, F., and Frahm, J.-M. (2013). Seeing double: reconstruct-
ing obscured typed input from repeated compromising reflections. In Proceedings of the 2013
ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security, Berlin, Germany, pages
1063–1074. ACM.
Xu, Y., Reynaga, G., Chiasson, S., Frahm, J.-M., Monrose, F., and van Oorschot, P. C. (2012).
Security and usability challenges of moving-object captchas: Decoding codewords in motion.
In USENIX Security Symposium, Bellevue, WA, pages 49–64.
Xu, Y., Reynaga, G., Chiasson, S., Frahm, J.-M., Monrose, F., and van Oorschot, P. C. (2014b).
Security analysis and related usability of motion-based captchas: Decoding codewords in
motion. Dependable and Secure Computing, IEEE Transactions on, 11(5):480–493.
Yan, J. and Ahmad, A. S. E. (2007). Breaking visual CAPTCHAs with naive pattern recognition
algorithms. In ACSAC, pages 279–291.
Yan, J. and Ahmad, A. S. E. (2008a). A low-cost attack on a Microsoft CAPTCHA. In ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 543–554.
Yan, J. and Ahmad, A. S. E. (2008b). Usability of CAPTCHAs or usability issues in CAPTCHA
design. In SOUPS, pages 44–52.
Yan, J. and El Ahmad, A. (2011). CAPTCHA robustness: A security engineering perspective.
Computer, 44(2):54 –60.
Yan, J. and Pollefeys, M. (2007). Articulated motion segmentation using RANSAC with priors.
Dynamical Vision, pages 75–85.
Yang, D., Jin, L., and Yin, J. (2005). An effective robust fingertip detection method for finger writing
character recognition system. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine
Learning and Cybernetics.
Yang, H. and Meinel, C. (2014). Content based lecture video retrieval using speech and video text
information. Learning Technologies, IEEE Transactions on, 7(2):142–154.
Yang, J., Lei, Z., Liao, S., and Li, S. Z. (2013). Face liveness detection with component dependent
descriptor. In Biometrics (ICB), International Conference on, pages 1–6.
Yeh, M.-C. and Cheng, K.-T. (2009). A compact, effective descriptor for video copy detection. In
Proceedings of the 17th ACM international conference on Multimedia, pages 633–636. ACM.
Yilmaz, A., Javed, O., and Shah, M. (2006). Object tracking: A survey. ACM Comput. Surv., 38.
Youtube (2015). Statistics from youtube website. https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/
statistics.html. Accessed: 2015-04-28.
Yuan, J., Duan, L.-Y., Tian, Q., and Xu, C. (2004). Fast and robust short video clip search using an
index structure. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGMM international workshop on Multimedia
information retrieval, pages 61–68. ACM.
200
Yue, Q., Ling, Z., Liu, B., Fu, X., and Zhao, W. (2014). Blind recognition of touched keys: Attack
and countermeasures. arXiv preprint arXiv:1403.4829.
Zhang, D.-Q. and Chang, S.-F. (2004). Detecting image near-duplicate by stochastic attributed
relational graph matching with learning. In Proceedings of the 12th annual ACM international
conference on Multimedia, pages 877–884. ACM.
Zhang, L., Curless, B., and Seitz, S. M. (2002). Rapid shape acquisition using color structured light
and multi-pass dynamic programming. In 3D Data Processing Visualization and Transmission,
First International Symposium on, pages 24–36.
Zhang, L. and Rui, Y. (2013). Image search–from thousands to billions in 20 years. ACM
Transactions on Multimedia Computing, Communications, and Applications (TOMCCAP),
9(1s):36.
Zhang, L. and Samaras, D. (2006). Face recognition from a single training image under arbitrary
unknown lighting using spherical harmonics. Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, IEEE
Transactions on, 28(3):351–363.
Zhang, Y., Xia, P., Luo, J., Ling, Z., Liu, B., and Fu, X. (2012). Fingerprint attack against
touch-enabled devices. In Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices, SPSM
’12.
Zhang, Z. (2003). Vision-based interaction with fingers and papers. In Proceedings International
Symposium on the CREST Digital Archiving Project.
Zhu, B. B., Yan, J., Li, Q., Yang, C., Liu, J., Xu, N., Yi, M., and Cai, K. (2010). Attacks and design
of image recognition CAPTCHAs. In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pages 187–200.
Zhu, X., Lei, Z., Yan, J., Yi, D., and Li, S. Z. (2015). High-fidelity pose and expression normalization
for face recognition in the wild. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision
and Pattern Recognition, pages 787–796.
Zhuang, L., Zhou, F., and Tygar, J. (2005). Keyboard acoustic emanations revisited. In Proceedings
of the 12th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security.
201
